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Findings  -  Part  III 6.0  FINDINGS  -  PART  III 
6.0.1  INTRODUCTION 
To  remind  the  reader,  the  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  the  concept  of  phased 
development  in  alliances  and  the  research  questions  being  investigated  are:  - 
1.  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
2.  Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itself  from  another? 
3.  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops,  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
4.  Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in  another 
5.  What  factors  identify  the  transition  from  one  stage  to  another? 
6.  What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
The  author's  involvement  with  the  participant  companies  was  limited  to  attendance  at 
project  related  video  conferences,  project  reviews  and  research  team  discussions  (refer  to 
chapter  3.14,  page  108).  In  the  first  instance,  using  secondary  data,  it  was  intended  to  find 
out  how  the  alliance  had  developed,  if  progressive  stages  could  be  identified,  what 
characteristics  differentiated  one  stage  ftom  another  and  if  it  was  possible  to  identify 
particular  events  that  signalled  the  relationship  had  moved  into  another  stage. 
The  benefit  of  using  secondary  data  was  that  it  enabled  the  researcher  to  test  the  findings 
from  the  previous  two  cases.  Implicit  in  the  developing  framework  was  the  idea  that 
movement  could  be  forward,  backward  and  indeed  iterative. 
Information  for  the  current  analysis  has  been  drawn  from  interviews,  minutes,  researchers' 
notes  and  case  study  compiled  at  the  time  of  the  project.  Subsequent  personal  interviews 
were  conducted  by  the  author  during  1998  and  1999,  with  senior  managers  who  took  part  in 
the  Sun  Microsystems  and  Birkbys  alliance.  (see  appendix  VIH  for  organisational 
background). 
224 Information  drawn  from  this  study  reinforces  the  Stage  0  identified  in  the  SCA  (refer  to 
chapter  5.0.1,  page  172)  and  the  following  describes  the  activities  undertaken  by  Sun 
Microelectronics  and  Birkbys  Plastics  prior  to  the  start  of  the  alliance  in  1991.  Table  6.1 
shows  the  characteristics  drawn  from  the  secondary  data  in  the  first  stage  of  the  Sun 
Microsystems  and  Birkbys  alliance. 
Characteristics  from  Sun/  Birkbys  data  Dominant  characteristics 
Informal  agreement  Alliance  agreement 
0  Competitor  analysis  0  Environmental  analysis 
"  None  0  History  of  working  together 
"  Formal  process  of  selection  0  Partner  selection 
"  Strategic  decision  by  customer 
9  None 
"  Strategic  outsourcing 
"  Widen  customer  base 
"  Opportunity  to  move  into  new  markets 
0  Previous  alliance  experience 
0  Strategic  intent 
Table  6.1  Sun  Microsystems  /  Birkbys,  Characteristics  in  Stage  0 
STAGEO 
6.1.1  Alliance  Agreement 
At  the  outset  of  this  alliance  one  of  the  basic  problems  was  that  there  was  no  attempt  to 
identify  a  vision  or  strategy  expectations  from  each  partner. 
"  There  was  certainly  no  grand  plan  or  strategy  written  down,  saying  this  is  where  we  both 
want  to  go  and  making  sure  the  two  directions  were  complementary.  I  think  the  alliance 
was  well-intentioned,  but  not  at  all  planned,  until  about  two  years  ago  (1993),  when  we  sat 
225 down  and  began  to  look  at  the  relationship;  where  are  we,  and  where  do  we  need  to  be, 
and  how  are  we  going  to  get  there?  "  (CKSK96,14:  3) 
6.1.2  Environmental  Analysis 
"In  1989  Linlithgow  was  the  first  off-site  venture.  At  the  time  we  were  quite  a  young 
organisation,  very  US  oriented  and  comfortable  with  our  suppliers  in  the  States.  As  we 
were  within  the  EC,  the  idea  was  to  source  components  in  Europe  not  onlyfor  this  site  but 
alsofor  the  US.  So  we  set  out  on  a  very  comprehensive  survey  of  all  European  suppliers.  " 
(DTPM,  SM,  96,4.,  4) 
Environmental  analysis  of  Sun's  market  was  not  only  essential  but  it  had  to  be  continuous. 
Product  development  was  rapid  and  customers  highly  knowledgeable  in  terms  of  their 
needs  and  other  sources.  On  average  the  life  cycle  of  a  workstation  design  was  less  that 
one  year,  and  the  rate  of  new  product  innovation  was  increasing.  Sun  had  several 
competitors  and  if  the  company  failed  to  meet  customer  needs  they  quickly  went  elsewhere. 
Sun  was  increasingly  reluctant  to  expand  its  manufacturing  base  and  the  preferred  solution 
was  to  concentrate  on  product  development  and  to  outsource  as  much  of  the  lower  value 
manufacturing  as  possible. 
6.1.3  History  of  Organisations  Working  Together 
The  two  companies  had  been  collaborating  since  1991,  although  Sun  first  showed  interest 
in  Birkbys  as  early  as  1989.  In  1993,  Birkbys  created  a  dedicated  cell  of  sixteen  staff 
assembling  only  Sun  products,  for  the  Linlithgow  plant.  Until  1995,  the  work  Birkbys  did 
for  Sun  was  entirely  for  Linlithgow,  but  a  significant  amount  now  went  to  Sun  in  the  US 
and  by  1996,  it  had  become  one  of  Sun's  primary  suppliers  of  enclosures.  In  1996,  Birkbys 
opened  a  new  facility  in  Glenrothes,  Fife  which  manufactured  not  only  for  Sun,  Linlithgow, 
but  had  also  taken  over  most  of  the  work  previously  done  for  Sun  at  the  Birkbys  plant  in 
Liversedge. 
226 "Yhe  link  with  Birkbys  has  really  beenforged  over  the  eight  years  that  I've  personally  been 
working  with  them  -  and  that  kind  of  investment  doesn't  happen  overnight.  If  we  bring 
anybody  else  on  board,  it  would  be  our  intention  to  build  something  like  that, 
(CKSK96,14:  2) 
6.1.4  Partner  Selection 
Production  at  the  Linlithgow  plant  began  in  1989  using  enclosures  supplied  from  the  US. 
As  production  increased,  management  wanted  to  shorten  its  supply  lines  for  these  bulky 
items  by  sourcing  materials  in  the  UK. 
Sun  was  looking  for  a  quality,  comparable  to  what  it  was  getting  from  three  US  suppliers. 
Material  also  had  to  be  equivalent  in  terms  of  price  and  the  source  was  important  to  reduce 
transportation  costs.  The  Sun  supply  team  surveyed  suppliers  in  continental  Europe,  UK 
and  Ireland  and  this  included  known  as  well  as  new  suppliers. 
Sun  was  looking  for  enclosures  and  Birkbys  had  the  technical  expertise  required  by  Sun  at 
the  time.  Birkbys'  infrastructure  included  R&D,  laboratories,  chemical  analysis,  coordinate 
measurement  machinery  and  presses.  It  was  also  experimenting  with  Bakelite  and  other 
plastics.  These  factors,  as  well  as  very  experienced  staff,  contributed  to  the  ultimate 
selection  of  Birkbys. 
"  "at  we're  going  to  do  is  select  a  supplier  who  we  believe  has  got  the  correct  technical 
and  commercial  skills  and  we'll  sit  down  and  develop  a  price  as  we  go.  Even  when  You  try 
the  competitor  bUling  route  the  design  you've  got  at  the  start  is  usually  as  different  as 
night  and  dayftom  the  eventual  design  anyhow,  so  it  defeats  the  purpose  as  the  price  has 
been  negotiated  anyway.  "  (CMSM,  95,2.2) 
Sun's  selection  of  the  alliance  partner  was  logical  and  systematic.  It  was  based  on  the 
contenders  technical  and  commercial  ability  to  carry  out  the  project  and  continuity  had  to 
be  conditional  on  open  book  accounting  to  control  costs. 
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Sun  Microsystems 
From  the  beginning,  the  company  had  deliberately  limited  its  involvement  in 
manufacturing.  The  two  manufacturing  sites,  at  Milpitas,  California  and  Linlithgow, 
Scotland,  concentrated  on  assembly  and  test  operations,  and  acquired  from  suppliers  disc 
drives,  memory,  keyboards,  printed  circuit  boards,  enclosures  and  monitors.  Less  than  30% 
by  value  of  materials  used  in  Sun's  production  touched  its  factories.  This  outsourcing 
strategy  allowed  management  to  better  utilise  engineering  expertise  and  capital  resources, 
which  could  focus  on  design  and  development  of  Sun's  high  value  products. 
The  company's  heavy  investment  in  SPARC  chip  design,  UNIX  operating  systems  and 
graphical  interface  technology  gave  its  products  their  unique  features,  and  it  felt  that  these 
elements  should  not  be  outsourced.  However,  major  players  in  the  industry  including 
Sony,  Texas  instruments,  Toshiba  and  ICL  offered  electronic  manufacturing  contract 
services  and  many  of  the  components  Sun  required  could  be  bought  from  these  and  other 
suppliers.  In  September  1996,  Sun  decided  that  it  would  outsource  the  complete 
manufacture  of  two  products  at  the  lower  end  of  its  price  range. 
Outsourcing  policies  were  also  applied  to  logistics.  In  1993  Sun  had  reached  an  agreement 
with  three  competing  freight  groups  to  jointly  manage  its  global  distribution  network.  The 
company  had  already  decided  to  outsource  its  distribution  department  and  had  concluded 
that  no  single  company  would  be  able  to  handle  all  the  work.  It  selected  Nippon  Express 
USA  for  distribution  throughout  Asia,  Roadway  Logistics  for  the  US  and  Frans  Maas  for 
Europe  and  the  three  companies  were  to  handle  all  of  Sun's  material  shipments.  In 
addition  to  handling  materials  into  and  out  of  their  areas,  the  haulage  companies  dealt 
directly  with  suppliers,  vendors  and  the  manufacturing  sites.  In  practice,  other  freight 
companies  would  carry  some  materials  for  Sun,  but  on  the  other  hand  Frans  Maas  had  taken 
on  greater  responsibility  for  managing  the  flow  of  supplies  to  the  Sun  assembly  lines.  In 
fact  Frans  Maas  staff  actually  had  their  own  working  areas  within  Sun  facilities. 
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The  company  had  good  long-term  relations  with  customers  especially  in  the  motor  industry. 
These  however  did  not  involve  the  close  alliance-type  of  arrangements  that  Sun  had 
envisaged. 
6.1.6  Strategic  Intent 
Sun  Microelectronics  was  mainly  a  design  and  marketing  company  and  the  partnering  link 
with  a  supplier  of  enclosures  was  in  line  with  the  corporation's  wider  sourcing  strategy. 
I 
For  Birkbys,  the  attraction  of  the  alliance  was  the  opportunity  to  widen  its  customer  base. 
Working  with  a  prestigious  customer  like  Sun  was  very  attractive,  as  up  to  that  time 
Birkbys  had  depended  on  selling  exclusively  to  the  automotive  industry. 
The  competitive  power  of  the  market  underpinned  the  move  to  partnering  in  both 
companies.  Consumers  were  changing  and  in  the  past  a  long  lead-time  was  not  important 
since  customers  had  been  more  willing  to  wait  for  new  features  and  technical  innovations. 
As  commercial  pressures  built  up,  customers  expect  shorter,  predictable  lead  times  and 
were  more  willing  to  go  to  competitors  if  these  needs  were  not  met.  As  a  way  of  meeting 
lead  times  and  by  focusing  on  resources,  the  alliance  between  Sun  and  Birkbys  had  an 
obvious  attraction  for  both  participants. 
6.1.7  Summary 
Sun  management  believed  that  a  constant  flow  of  new  products  was  essential  for  the 
continued  growth  of  the  company.  Offering  products  with  better  performance  helped  to 
maintain  interest  and  keep  ahead  of  competitors.  New  models  usually  brought  higher 
margins  than  those  they  replaced.  This  was  especially  so  when  the  company  adapted  them 
to  the  customer  specific  requirements,  by  adding  optional  extras  such  as  graphical 
interfaces,  or  more  memory. 
229 Sun  products  were  increasingly  aimed  at  the  higher  end  of  the  market,  involving  lower 
volumes  and  higher  margins.  To  reduce  costs  at  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  that  is  in  the 
high  volume-low  cost  market;  the  strategy  chosen  has  been  that  of  outsourcing. 
"Our  value  add  has  increasingly  become  testing  systems  integration  and  preparation  for 
customers.  We  call  this  pre-staging.  For  example,  a  customer  might  place  an  order  for 
several  million  dollars  not  onlyfor  the  products  themselves  but  alsofor  a  complete  system 
to  run  his  business.  We  arefinding  we  have  to  do  more  and  more  pre-stage,  as  we  provide 
more  and  more  customised  solutions.  "  (ESCKSK99,11:  4) 
About  1990,  the  priority  for  Sun  to  establish  a  local  enclosure  supplier  overruled  all  other 
factors.  At  no  stage  did  the  companies  jointly  evaluate  external  trends  and  there  were  few, 
if  any,  discussions  regarding  a  shared  vision.  Neither  did  Sun  anticipate  the  challenges  of 
working  with  a  new  supplier,  whose  expertise  was  in  an  entirely  different  industry.  Sun 
personnel  were  used  to  rapid  -product  life  cycles  and  this  created  a  dynamic  and  flexible 
culture.  As  might  be  expected  in  a  more  stable  industry  where  product  change  was  slower, 
this  influenced  Birkbys  predisposition  to  change. 
Sun's  corporate  commitment  to  partnering  was  later  to  be  further  supported  by  a  process- 
re-engineering  programme  that  closely  involved  Birkbys. 
In  contrast  to  other  customer  organisations,  Sun  had  an  unusual  perspective  regarding 
suppliers  who  were  perceived  as  being  at  risk  of  putting  all  their  eggs  in  one  basket. 
"I  think  it's  equally  important  that  we  protect  some  of  our  suppliers  from  Sun.  I  mean 
there  are  some  companies  who  are  quite  happy  to  get  almost  all  of  their  workftom  a  single 
source.  This  is  great  as  long  as  the  work  keeps  coming,  but,  all  it  takes  is  somebody  to 
build  a  better  mousetrap  and  then  everybody  goes  down  together.  "  (CKSK96,10:  7). 
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Table  6.2  below,  shows  characteristics  drawn  from  secondary  data  sources.  The  dominant 
characteristics  provided  the  structure  to  describe  in  detail  how  the  Sun/Birkbys  relationship 
developed  in  its  early  stage. 
Characteristics  drawn  from  Sun/Birkbys  data 
"  Committing  resources 
"  Closer  working  relations 
"  Growing  confidence  in  partner's  abilities 
Ready  allocation  of  time  and  resources 
Investment  in  relationsWp  -  time  and  resources 
Regular  inforniation  sharing 
Understand  partner  processes 
10  Sun  score  card 
"  Problem  definition 
"  Transfer  of  ideas 
"  Supplier  development 
Leaming  new  adding  value  processes 
10  Sun  Score  Card 
10  Joint  scheduling 
New  product  introduction 
Supplier  development 
Dominant  characteristic 
0  Building  Trust 
0  Commitment  and  Leadership 
0  Communication 
9  Coordination  and  Control  Mechanisms 
0  Leaming 
0  Performance  Metrics 
0  Resource  planning 
0  Setting  objectives 
Table  6.2:  Dominant  Characteristic  in  Stage 
Stage  I  of  the  Sun  and  Birkbys  alliance,  which  lasted  for  about  two  years,  was  a  period  of 
intense  supplier  development,  led  by  Sun.  The  following  section  describes  how  the 
companies  changed  during  this  time. 
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Trust  was  erratic  but,  as  more  difficulties  were  overcome,  Sun's  confidence  in  Birkbys 
grew.  It  was  a  two  way  process  and  Birkbys  now  better  understood  the  demands  of 
customers  like  Sun. 
Birkbys  was  a  traditional  engineering  company,  used  to  working  in  a  stable  and  mature 
sector  and  it  took  some  time  for  the  management  to  realise  that  it  would  need  to  respond 
very  quickly  to  Sun's  demands.  The  old  way  of  revising  and  refining  was  no  longer 
appropriate,  as  it  signalled  apparent  inertia  on  the  part  of  Birkbys,  which  was  unhelpful  in 
building  confidence  during  this  early  stage  of  the  alliance. 
"Yhe  attitude  was,  shall  we  say,  oldfashioned  and  there  was  a  sense  of  cultural  inertia 
about  the  place.  Our  products  change  in  eighteen  month  cycles  and  we  don't  have  time  to 
waitfor  the  next  revision,  things  have  he  done  right  now.  "  (DTPKSM,  96,5:  2) 
6.2.2  Commitment  and  Leadership 
It  was  explicitly  recognised  by  Sun  that  considerable  time  and  effort  would  have  to  be 
devoted  to  developing  Birkbys  capacity.  It  therefore  became  Sun's  aim  to  transform 
Birkbys  into  a  global  company. 
6.2.3  Communication 
Communication  between  the  two  organisations  was  intense.  Sun  personnel  were  spending 
a  lot  of  time  educating  Birkbys  and  promoting  the  idea  of  higher  standards.  Birkbys  began 
to  change,  responding  faster  and  with  a  greater  flexibility. 
I  think  the  more  they  understand  the  planning  issues,  the  volatility  of  demand  and  supply, 
the  more  it  affects  theirflexibility.  "  Do  I  need  extra  capacity,  more  trucks..  .? 
"  Even  the 
very  fact  of  passing  information  regularly  about  changes  in  volumes  and  having  these 
232 conversations,  is  a  sea  change  in  itsel(  It  gets  everyone  into  the  way  of  adapting,  by 
learning  to  cope  with  the  lows  and  the  highs.  "  (BPSK96,4:  4) 
Personal  networks  built  up  which  enabled  people  to  talk  directly  to  the  appropriate  person 
in  Sun.  This  was  a  major  breakthrough,  given  that  it  was  often  very  difficult  to  speak  to 
people  in  the  Sun  organisation  because  of  their  dependence  on  voice  mail  and  e-mail. 
"Schedule  changes  happen  every  &ýý  and  we  have  to  react  to  them  quickly.  Personal 
communication  is  the  main  thing  -  in  my  view,  E-mail  and  Fax  are  all  very  well,  but  unless 
you  talk  to  a  customer,  you've  lost.  You've  got  to  talk  to  them  directly.  Yhe  bane  of  my  life 
is  the  answering  machine  -  because  you  lose  that  personal  touch  which  is  so  important. 
(  SCBP,  96,3:  2) 
"People  are  becoming  more  open  with  each  other.  Ifyou  don't  know  who's  picking  up  the 
phone  on  hehay'of  Sun  Microsystems,  it  becomes  very  clinical  and  I  encourage  people  to 
share  news,  particularly  had  news,  with  each  other.  If  our  forecast  has  collapsed,  tell 
people  right  away,  because  you  know  its  going  to  cause  problems.  Don't  hide  it,  and  make 
sure  they  know  what  the  issues  are,  and  get  them  to  think  through  how  they  can  cooperate 
so  that  we  manage  the  situation.  Likewise  with  us,  if  the  vendor  has  bad  news,  we  want  to 
know  about  it.  "  (BP,  SK96,1:  2) 
6.2.4  Coordination  and  Control  Mechanisms 
Sun  engineers  who  worked  with  the  suppliers  had  to  approve  the  manufacturing  processes 
which  Birkbys  used  on  Sun  work,  and  any  changes  to  them.  Sun  tooling  engineers  also 
approved  the  design,  the  manufacture  and  modification  of  all  moulding  tools  used.  In 
addition,  Sun  took  on  tasks  and  responsibilities  in  areas  of  manufacturing  that  the  supplier 
had  previously  undertaken. 
A  kitting  system  was  introduced  to  help  Birkbys  meet  Sun  standards.  All  parts  needed 
were  assembled  into  bundles,  with  each  kit  containing  the  exact  components  required  to 
assemble  the  product  part.  Staff  took  the  kit,  and  assembled  it  in  the  enclosure  (case).  The 
233 finished  product  part  was  then  tested,  wrapped  and  passed  to  the  distribution  area  ready  for 
dispatch  by  Frans  Maas  to  the  kitting  area  in  Livingston. 
Birkbys  already  had  a  shop  floor  system  of  "Quality  Circlee',  although  it  was  not  known  to 
what  extent  it  specifically  addressed  Sun  quality  issues. 
Although  coordination  and  control  had  to  be  a  two  way  process,  Sun  felt  that  Birkbys  was 
to  blame  for  every  problem.  However,  as  the  alliance  matured,  people  realised  this  was  not 
necessarily  the  case. 
"A  lot  of  coordination  problems  happen  here.  I  think  I've  had  more  problems  getting  our 
people  to  acknowledge  that,  than  getting  the  Birkbys  people  to  realise  it  I  think  we're  the 
main  cause  of  inconsistency,  but  trying  to  prove  that  has  been  extremely  difficult,  especially 
when  we've  got  very  volatile  manufacturing  managers,  who  firmly  believe  that  every 
problem  is  created  by  a  supplier,  and  that  Sun  doesn't  cause  problems!  Only  suppliers 
make  problems!  So  we've  had  some  mindset  changes  to  go  through  internally  and  we're 
stififire  fighting.  Yhis  attitude  never  goes  away,  there  are  just  quiet  periods.  It  can  blow 
up  at  any  time.  "  (CKSK96,12:  5) 
6.2.5  Learning 
It  soon  became  apparent  that  Birkbys  was  not  only  to  supply  the  moulded  enclosure  but 
would  also  be  involved  in  new  processes  for  painting  and  plating  the  unit.  Birkbys  found 
this  difficult  as  no  one  had  anticipated  that  it  would  have  to  complete  the  job.  It  was  news 
to  Sun  that  Birkbys  were  unable  to  carry  out  the  task  properly. 
In  the  past  Sun  had  been  quite  adversarial  with  suppliers  and  would  certainly  have  pounced 
on  this.  Because  this  reaction  was  changing,  some  people  suggested  that  Sun  was  in  a 
"transitional  mode.  " 
234 I  think  we're  probably  still  at  a  transitional  stage.  Maybe  the  men  who  handle 
commodities  would  be  able  to  give  you  a  better  idea  From  the  outside  looking  in,  my 
feeling  is  that  we  used  to  be  almost  wholly,  "we'll  get  a  better  deal  down  the  street.  " 
"ereas  now,  we  still  want  to  know  what's  happening  down  the  street  and  we  may  take  a 
little  of  it  to  test  but  not  as  much  as  we  used  to.  "  (CKSK96,19:  3) 
6.2.6  Performance  Metrics 
The  main  method  of  measuring  supplier  performance  was  by  use  of  the  "Sun  score  card", 
designed  and  administered  by  staff  in  Linlithgow. 
Supplier  performance  was  graded,  as  prescribed  in  the  score  card  model.  The  model 
covered  a  comprehensive  set  of  standards  appertaining  to  quality,  lead-time,  delivery, 
flexibility,  process  technology,  price,  support  and  service.  Checks  were  quarterly  and  the 
results  were  faxed  to  the  supplier.  Sun  staff  then  met  the  supplier's  staff  to  discuss  and 
analyse  the  data  and  agree  how  to  overcome  the  areas  of  weakness.  It  was  imperative  that 
Birkbys  achieved  a  good  score,  which  was  a  crucial  factor  to  future  prospects  of  Sun 
business  on  a  global  basis. 
"My  role  in  the  scorecard  is  to  ensure  that  we  do  it  on  time,  pull  all  the  results  together 
and  lay  them  out  in  aformat  that  we  and  the  supplier  can  understand  I  then  communicate 
it  to  the  supplier,  take  anyfeedback  and  document  any  corrective  actions.  I  do  afollow-up 
to  make  sure  that  all  actions  are  done  and  try  to  help  out  if  there's  a  problem.  "' 
(CKSK96,10:  5) 
The  score  card  review  was  the  trigger  for  joint  corrective  action. 
It  would  begin  with  a  team  going  to  look  at  problem  areas.  For  instance,  with  Birkhys 
we've  consistently  had  difficulties  with  quality,  the  bumps,  scratches,  and  scrapes  that  are 
in  one  sense  cosmetic  and  highly  suhjective.  This  has  been  an  ongoing  issue  and  in  my 
experience,  difficult  to  solve,  because  it  means  something  different  to  everyone  who  looks  at 
it.  Unfortunately,  everybody's  got  an  opinion  and  the  entire  world  is  becoming  an  expert, 
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interaction,  for  example  with  the  manager  of  Birkbys'final  assembly.  He's  in  here  this 
morning,  looking  at  our  process  along  with  some  of  our  engineers.  So  he  can  say,  'ýves  I 
understand  that's  afault  ".  or  at  least,  I  thought  that  was  acceptable  and  now  I  realise  you 
see  that  as  a  problem".  So  we're  actually  getting  them  to  look  into  it.  We're  not  just 
sending  back  a  truckload  saying  all  this  is  rejected  and  the  manager's  saying,  I  don't 
understand  Whatfor?  "  (CKSKII:  2) 
To  assist  Birkbys  meet  the  score  card  requirements,  there  was  a  computerised  "Quality 
Operating  Systerif  'to  measure  performance  relative  to  lost  time,  tooling  faults,  scrap,  re- 
work,  environmental  measures  etc.  Statistical  Process  Control  had  been  implemented  on 
the  moulding  machines  and  an  ISO  quality  system  was  in  force.  Sun  recognised  however 
that,  in  common  with  other  organisations,  there  was  too  much  red  tape. 
During  this  time,  a  lot  of  discussions  and  meetings  took  place  to  resolve  the  problems. 
"We  couldn't  see  where  all  of  this  would  lead  to  because,  to  be  quite  honest,  in  the  initial 
two  years  we  had  with  them,  there  was  more  problem  solving  and  ironing  out  of  issues  than 
discussing  real  strategic  direction.  To  be  quite  honest,  they  nearlyfell  off  the  ladder  at  one 
point  and  it  was  a  question  of,  do  we  stick  with  them  or  do  they  go.  "  (DTPKSK96,5:  4) 
"Yhe  quality  issue  was  the  main  problem.  It  was  our  standard  versus  what  they  were  used 
to  producing.  We  wouldn't  put  up  with  it  and  it  took  a  while  to  get  on  common  ground  " 
(DTPM,  SK96,6:  2) 
From  the  outset,  one  clear  operational  change  was  that  Birkbys  had  to  work  to  the  higher 
standards  demanded  by  Sun,  rather  than  to  those  which  their  existing  customers  expected. 
Technical  help  from  Sun  was  available  to  achieve  this  quality  and  changes  in  behaviour 
were  necessary  on  the  part  of  both  organisations.  From  the  earliest  days,  Sun  staff  worked 
at  Birkbys  to  help  meet  the  standards.  Supply  management  staff,  as  well  as  manufacturing 
engineers,  spent  a  lot  of  time  at  Birkbys  explaining  how  they  wanted  things  done. 
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there.  We  took  overfor  a  couple  of  weeks  until  we  had  the  process  the  way  we  wanted  it. 
We  learned  a  lotftom  what  they  were  doing  and  they  taught  us  a  lot.  It  was  a  good  way  to 
hannonise  expectations.  "  (DTPKSK96,6:  4) 
6.2.7  Resource  Planning 
Although  difficult  to  achieve,  volatile  demand  called  for  minimising  inventory,  while 
keeping  assembly  lines  working.  Sun's  close  dependence  on  Birkbys  shaped  the  systems 
for  scheduling  production  and  linked  Birkbys  output  to  Sun's  requirements. 
The  traditional  way  it  was  done  was  that  the  buyer/planner  sent  Birkbys'  sales  coordinator 
Sun's  requirements  for  the  next  three  months.  This  order  could  not  be  broken  down  into 
shorter  periods,  because  of  the  volatility  of  demand. 
Sun  drew  off  weekly  requirements  against  that  order.  The  sales  coordinator  at  Birkbys 
received  these  and  entered  them  into  the  Birkbys  system.  All  production  departments  could 
then  see  the  schedule  on  their  screens.  Materials  management  reviewed  the  implications  of 
incoming  components  and  communicated  these  to  the  suppliers.  This  was  a  complex  job 
considering  the  volume  of  added-  value  work  now  being  done. 
6.2.8  Setting  Objectives 
In  the  early  stages  of  this  alliance,  Sun  gave  little  consideration  to  the  overall  strategic 
direction  of  its  relations  with  Birkbys.  The  priority  was  to  establish  a  reliable  local  supplier 
and  secure  Sun's  supply  base  by  building  up  and  developing  Birkbys  as  a  key  supplier  of 
enclosures. 
"Back  in  19911  don't  think  that  worldwide  supply  was  on  the  agenda.  We  were  looking 
local,  to  be  dealing  with  somebody  who  was  within  reasonable  distance.  "  (DT?  M,  SM,  96,5:  3) 
237 Birkbys  too,  in  the  first  instance,  was  not  all  concerned  about  setting  objectives,  although  it 
did  have  the  foresight  to  realise  that  business  with  Sun  would  enable  the  company  to 
diversify  and  grow. 
"We  should  be  picking  someone  who  can  manage  this  piece  of  the  figsawfor  us  -  who's  got 
the  inftastructure,  and  is  willing  to  move  his  business  in  that  direction.  That's  what  we 
went  lookingfor  -  Birkbys  said  that  was  the  way  it  wanted  to  go  -  to  grow  the  revenue, 
grow  the  breadth.  At  that  time  it  was  already  a  nom  moulding  company,  and  probably 
wouldn't  get  much  bigger.  It  had  to  branch  out,  so  the  timing  wasjust  right.  It  had  to  bring 
in  new  skills  and  re-train.  "  (DT?  KSK96,5:  1) 
6.2.9  Summary  and  Transition  to  Stage  H 
Sun  did  not  articulate  its  vision  of  the  alliance  to  Birkbys  and  how  Sun  intended  the 
companies  to  work  together.  Very  little  consideration  had  been  given  to  the  overall  strategic 
direction.  Birkbys  had  no  idea  of  the  extent  that  it  would  have  to  change  to  meet  Sun's 
requirements.  This  lack  of  appreciation  strained  relations  from  the  outset,  particularly  as 
Sun  soon  set  about  demanding  changes  to  the  supplier  procedures,  which  was  something  it 
was  used  to  doing. 
Problems  arose  very  quickly  when  Sun  found  quality  poor,  which  meant  large  numbers  of 
rejects.  More  time  was  being  spent  fire  fighting,  rather  than  discussing  tactics. 
Seeds  of  doubt  were  sown  early  on.  The  first  crisis,  which  concerned  quality  issues  and 
standards,  culminated  with  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  to  continue  the  alliance. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Birkbys  was  ISO  9002  registered  and  had  achieved  the  Ford  QI  award, 
Sun  demanded  higher  standards  than  any  of  Birkbys'  other  customers.  It  took  some  time 
for  this  to  sink  in.  The  crisis  of  confidence  resulted  in  a  discussion  at  the  highest  level  in 
both  companies  regarding  the  future  of  the  alliance. 
Sun  provided  more  resources.  to  help  Birkbys  overcome  these  early  difficulties.  The 
transition  to  Stage  II  was  characterised  by  Sun's  growing  confidence  as  Birkbys  began  to 
238 manage  the  scorecard  criteria  with  greater  efficiency  and  improved  quality.  Table  6.3 









Building  trust 
Comn-titinent  and  leadership 
Communication 
Coordination  and  control 
mechanisms 
Leaming 
Performance  metrics 
Resource  planning 
Setting  objectives 
Crisis  followed  by 
Managerial  Action 
"  change  of  attitude 
"  improved  supplier 
performance 
"  communication  and  open 
dialogue 
"  friendly  behaviour 
"  building  trust 
"  Supplier  given  more  value- 
added  work 
"  future  oriented 
Table  6.3:  Transition  from  Stage  I  to  Stage  11. 
6.3  STAGE  11:  Duration  1993-1996 
Birkbys  was  now  meeting  Sun  standards  and  had  created  a  dedicated  assembly  cell  in  the 
Liversedge  plant.  There  was  a  greater  understanding  of  the  cost  of  the  enclosure  and 
more  open  communication  between  the  companies,  the  spin  off  from  which  was  growing 
interdependence.  Inter-organisational  teams  had  been  made  responsible  for  the  Perform- 
to-Pay  project  (see  6.3.4,  page  239)  and  related  sub  projects.  By  the  end  of  1996,  Birkbys 
had  a  Sun  dedicated  plant  in  Scotland  and  was  beginning  to  supply  Sun  in  the  US. 
Table  6.4  below,  shows,  dominant  characteristics  drawn  from  secondary  data  used  to 
describe  the  events  in  Stage  11. 
239 data  I  Dominant 
New  product  introduction 
Early  supplier  involvement 
0  Compelling  Purpose 
0  Dialogue  to  resolve  issues 
"  Information  exchange 
"  Joint  planning 
"  Investment  by  supplier  in  new  factory 
0  Co-location  of  personnel 
Understanding  joint  processes 
Understanding  partner  business 
0  Early  design  stage  input 
0  Joint  team  projects 
Improved  communication  behaviour 
Individual's  responsibility  increasing 
0  Conflict  Management 
0  Interdependence 
0  Learning  and  Alliance  Skills 
0  Joint  decision  making 
0  Personal  Satisfaction  and  Motivation 
Table  6.4:  Dominant  Characteristic  in  Stage  11 
6.3.1  Compelling  Purpose 
In  1993  Sun  was  to  begin  manufacturing  a  new  product  in  Linlithgow,  code  named  Aurora. 
The  new  product  included  sheet  metal  components  that  Sun  had  to  first,  source  and  second, 
assemble  into  the  containment  enclosures. 
The  commodity  manager  questioned  this  approach,  citing  Sun's  outsourcing  and  reduced 
manufacturing  strategy.  He  proposed  that  the  company  should  make  one  supplier 
responsible  for  delivering  ready  assembled  enclosures  to  Linlithgow.  At  least  one  other 
moulding  specialist  was  given  the  opportunity  of  the  work,  but  declined  the  business. 
240 "As  ourphilosophy  and  strategy  movedforward  we're  really  no  longer  lookingfor  a  guy  to 
make  plastic  or  metal,  we're  lookingfor  someone  to  supply  the  whole  thing.  If  that  also 
meant  procuring  andputting  in  some  cables,  some  boards  and  whatever  on  our  behalf,  then 
that's  the  kind  of  supplier  we  needed  to  find.  Well,  Birkbys  rose  to  that  challenge. 
(CKSK96,2:  1) 
Birkbys  on  the  other  hand  decided  to  follow  Sun  in  its  strategic  direction.  It  means  that 
Birkbys  now  added  components  inside  the  plastic  enclosure,  including  some  fabricated 
metal,  a  small  computer  interface  and  some  cables. 
6.3.2  Interdependence 
The  two  companies  became  more  interdependent  as  Birkbys  grew  in  strength  and  became 
accustomed  to  meeting  Sun's  demands.  Birkbys  was  extending  its  processes  and  providing 
Sun  with  a  high  quality  product.  This  allowed  Sun  to  optimise  its  own  manufacturing 
potential,  increase  the  volume  of  units  and  to  cut  the  assembly  line  time  to  seven  minutes 
per  unit.  Sun  was  able  to  concentrate  on  value  adding  activities  such  as  fabricating  units  in 
unique  configurations. 
Interdependence  increased  on  account  of  Birkbys'  decision  to  site  a  new  factory  at 
Glenrothes,  a  location  relatively  near  to  Sun.  This  significantly  reduced  the  lead-time  for 
delivery  of  enclosures  and  enabled  quicker  response. 
Growing  mutual  reliance  of  Birkbys  and  Sun  was  evident  from  the  joint  resource  planning 
and  scheduling.  As  Birkbys  value  added  work  for  Sun  continued  to  increase  and  delivery 
times  shortened,  it  became  imperative  that  Sun  gave  Birkbys  more  notice  of  requirement 
changes.  This  meant  that  both  parties  not  only  had  to  be  aware  of  market  demand,  but  also 
conscious  of  the  lead  times  of  sub  tier  suppliers.  Staff  had  to  learn  to  respond  rapidly  to  the 
customer.  The  consequence  of  collaboration  with  Sun's  resident  planner  was  that  daily  and 
even  hourly  requirements  were  made  known  to  Birkbys. 
241 Sun's  confidence  in  Birkbys'  abilities  grew.  Assured  price  was  a  major  benefit  to  emanate 
from  the  alliance.  Sun  now  knew  Birkbys'  cost  structures  and  profit  margins  and  used  this 
knowledge  to  pin  down  the  cost  of  enclosures  for  the  next  eighteen  months. 
"This  way  we  set  the  level  of  one  or  two  key  prices  at  meetings.  Because  we've  got  a 
declaration  of  all  the  elements  at  the  beginning  we  can  then  sit  down  and  run  through  the 
costs  either,  when  the  product  is  ready  to  start  shipping,  orjust  before  the  date  when  we  do 
our  quarterlyforecasts.  "  (CKSK96,3:  7) 
Myfeeling  has  ahvays  been  that  "these  men  are  only  as  good  as  we  allow  them  to  be.  " 
And  if  we  give  them  poor  information  we're  going  to  get  a  poor  part.  If  we  don't  give  them 
honest  and  constnictiveftedback  it  won't  get  better.  "  (CKSK96,13:  5) 
6.3.3  Learning  and  Alliance  Skills 
Birkbys  gained  enormously  from  the  alliance  and  freely  acknowledged  that  back  in  1991  it 
had  not  imagined  the  volume  and  diversity  of  business  it  would'eventually  undertake  for 
Sun.  No  one  foresaw  just  how  much  the  alliance  would  change  the  Birkbys  organisation 
and  certainly  dealing  with  the  United  States  market  was  beyond  its  widest  dreams. 
Practices  evolved  by  trial  and  error  and  Birkbys  transferred  benefits  of  learning  to  its 
customers. 
Plastics  moulding  is  a  mature  industry  with  little  scope  for  eliminating  costs  and  Sun 
realised  that  competitive  bidding  for  each  new  product  was  an  unprofitable  exercise. 
Trying  to  save  money  by  continually  seeking  tenders  wasted  valuable  time  and  Sun  decided 
not  to  pursue  that  route. 
As  projects  increased  in  complexity,  tracking  responsibility  and  maintaining  accountability 
became  an  important  issue.  The  allies  learned  that  to  avoid  disorder  it  was  necessary  to 
establish  explicit  structures,  such  as  a  responsibility  matrix.  Sun  wanted  Birkbys  to  take 
242 greater  responsibility  for  products  and  suppliers  and  decided  that  the  matrix  should  cover 
the  following  areas:  - 
"  Supplier  selection 
"  Part  approval 
"  Procurement 
"  Assembly 
"  Warranties 
*  Failure  analysis  and  corrective  action 
o  Metrics 
Part  of  the  agreement  was  that  Birkbys  should  own  the  matrix  and  take  responsibility  for 
using  it  to  schedule  and  plan  sub-tier  supplier's  work. 
As  Sun's  confidence  in  Birkbys  grew,  it  asked  the  latter  to  take  on  work  with  greater  added 
value.  This  meant  that  Birkbys  had  to  learn  a  new  skill,  that  is,  managing  sub-tier  suppliers 
working  to  Sun  standards.  The  quality  of  the  enclosure  delivered  to  Sun  did  not  just 
depend  on  the  quality  of  Birkbys  work,  it  also  depended  on  miscellaneous  metalwork  and 
cables  purchased  from  other  suppliers. 
In  reality,  this  was  not  left  entirely  to  Birkbys.  Sun  and  Birkbys  were  working  hand  in 
hand,  helping  each  other,  by  drawing  on  in-house  Sun  experts,  such  as  cable  engineers.  The 
intention  was  that  eventually  Birkbys  would  develop  that  resource  itself 
"Yhey  have  taken  on  a  lot  more  value-add  work  and  have  gone  through  a  learning  curve  as 
well.  "  (DT?  KSK96,5:  1) 
"Moving  to  Glenrothes  added  a  lot  more  customerfocus  to  Birkbys.  A  major  advantage  to 
us  was  that  they  were  local  and  visited  us  more.  "  (DTPKSM,  96,8:  3) 
243 "The  staff  are  more  likely  to  highlightpotentialfaults  before  the  customer  sees  them.  We've 
learned  that  in  the  course  of  working  with  them  and  b  being  shown  what  is  right  and  what  y 
is  wrong.  Attention  to  detail  is  what  it  is  all  about.  "  (DKBP,  96,3:  4) 
Concerns  were  raised  once  again  about  responsibility  and  the  ally  companies  had  to  pin 
down  the  fundamental  reasons  for  this  problem.  In  the  past,  Sun  had  selected  sub-tier 
suppliers  for  Birkbys  to  work  with.  This  meant  Birkbys  working  with  suppliers  it  would 
not  necessarily  have  chosen  although  Sun  expected  Birkbys  to  accept  responsibility  for  the 
supplier's  long-term  performance  and  development.  As  it  turned  out,  Birkbys  inherited 
only  one  supplier  whose  performance  contributed  to  quality  problems. 
Over  the  years  Sun  had  accrued  both  explicit  and  tacit  knowledge  about  managing  suppliers 
that  was  articulated  and  transmitted  to  Birkbys. 
6.3.4  Joint  Decision  Making 
By  1996,  Birkbys  understood  Sun's  business  better  than  ever  before.  Sun  proposed  that 
both  companies  inventories  should  be  reduced  in  a  planned  manner.  Birkbys  was  directly 
involved  with  scheduling  and  order  information  coming  from  Sun.  This  was  subsequently 
termed  demand-pull  and  meant  that  Birkbys  had  to  supply  kits  in  numbers  and  just-in-time 
to  match  the  demand  in  Sun.  Not  only  were  inventories  reduced,  but  it  also  cut  double 
handling  and  scratch  damage.  Responsibility  for  inventory  management  was  finally  passed 
in  total  over  to  Birkbys. 
As  the  association  matured,  the  work  and  responsibilities  involved  in  new  product 
development  were  more  widely  shared.  By  1996  Sun  staff  and  Birkbys  moulding  and 
tooling  engineers  worked  together  from  the  very  earliest  stage  of  product  design.  This 
enabled  Birkbys  to  offer  its  expertise  and  to  influence  the  original  design  formulation. 
In  the  past,  Sun  would  have  presented  a  design  and  asked  Birkbys  to  make  the  moulding 
tools.  If  tools  were  outsourced  elsewhere,  it  was  still  necessary  for  Sun  to  tell  Birkbys 
244 when  the  product  needed  to  be  ready  for  trials.  Birkbys  had  to  forward  allocate  time  on 
machines  and  to  secure  supplies  of  resin,  which  sometimes  took  several  weeks  and  notify 
its  design,  materials  and  production  staff  of  requirements,  well  in  advance.  Delays  had 
severe  market  implications  for  Sun. 
The  introduction  of  a  Resident  Planner  was  a  new  concept  to  both  Sun  and  Birkbys.  This 
person  was  employed  by  Birkbys,  but  worked  in  Sun  offices.  Once  again  the  initial  stages 
of  implementation  raised  difficulties  in  terms  of  role  clarification  and  job  description. 
Defining  the  boundaries  of  the  position  appeared  to  be  a  problem  as  the  planner  was  seen  as 
the  contact  point  for  all  matters  concerning  Birkbys,  although  in  fact  the  role  was  meant  to 
focus  on  immediate  materials  requirements. 
With  the  passage  of  time,  these  details  were  resolved  and  advantages  of  having  a  person 
based  within  the  customer  organisation  became  evident.  Essentially  these  derived  from 
having  a  presence  on  the  location.  When  problems  arose  the  Resident  Planner  took  part  in 
discussions  to  resolve  t4e  issues  and  was  generally  able  to  monitor  events  and  assess  the 
gravity  of  the  delay.  The  resident  planner  therefore  positively  impacted  on  Sun's  planning 
and  scheduling. 
"I  think  Birkbys  together  with  global  supply  planning  is  helping  a  lot.  Giving  the  supply 
plan  directly  to  Birkbys  allows  them  to  do  their  business  as  opposed  to  us  changing  the 
supply  plan  around  Yhjs  has  helped  everyone  and  we  are  going  from  strength  to 
strength.  "  (BPRFSK96,10:  4) 
The  demand-pull  arrangement  was  helped  by  the  appointment  of  Birkbys  employee  as  a 
Resident  Planner  within  Sun. 
In  1995  a  major  global  re-engineering  project  in  Sun,  termed  Perfonn-to-Pay'(PTP)  was 
introduced  which  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  alliance  with  Birkbys.  Its  purpose  was  to 
radically  simplify  business  processes  within  the  entire  Sun  Microelectronics  supply  chain 
245 and  create  cost  saving  opportunities  by  reducing  time,  improving  quality  and  as  a 
consequence,  realising  increased  customer  satisfaction. 
All  of  this  was  to  be  achieved  by  providing  high  performance  support  systems  and  by 
minimising  duplication  as  a  result  of  cross  functional integration. 
Projects  initiated  to  pursue  PTP  were  concerned  with  the  following:  - 
1.  Introduction  of  new  products  which  included  early  supplier  involvement. 
2.  Demand  and  planning  fulfillment,  aimed  at  getting  suppliers  involved  in  planning  so  as 
to  "triggee,  stock  replenishment  e.  g.  the  Demand-Pull  model  and  Electronic  Commerce 
(EC). 
3.  Accounts  invoicing  and  looking  at  payment  in  terms  of  EC 
4.  Financial  control 
5.  Managing  the  supply  base  by  use  of  teams  and  introduction  of  a  Supplier  Information 
Management  System  (SIMS)  with  EC. 
6.  Quality  Management 
7.  New  IT  applications 
Globalising  maintenance,  repair  and  operations  (MRO) 
The  first  project  to  impact  on  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  relationship  was  Planning  and  Demand 
fulfillment/replenishment.  Its  manifestation  was  the  introduction  of  a  demand  trigger  to 
ensure  that  Birkbys  met  Sun's  daily  materials  requirements  within  four  hours  of  call-off. 
As  a  result  of  these  changes  Birkbys  realised  that  it  had  to  align  its  operations. 
"A  lot  of  people  remarked  that  ývour  approach  in  this  PTP  is  incredible'  whereas  other 
customers,  who  will  remain  nameless,  had  the  big  stick  approach.  "Ifyou  don't  do  this  you 
will  not  be  on  our  vendor  base...  "  type  of  remark.  nereas  we're  trying  to  share  the 
benefits  -with  them.  I  know  from  feedback,  that  Birkbys  admit  the  scorecard  we  employed 
246 has  helped  them  with  other  customers,  which  is  fine.  If  it  makes  them  more  competitive 
and  healthy,  it's  goodfor  us.  "  (BPRFSK96,10:  3) 
Birkbys  subsequently  ý  introduced  its  own  internal  Process  Simplification  (PS)  project  to 
address  this  matter. 
From  a  Sun  perspective,  PS  was  intended  to  give  the  company  increased  manufacturing 
flexibility;  to  give  Birkbys  wider  vision;  to  reduce  Birkbys  inventory  and  to  increase  speed 
of  components  supply.  This  was  to  be  achieved  by  operating  an  Inventory  Pull  System, 
from  Sun  down  through  the  supply  base,  using  visual  or  electronic  signalling  techniques. 
PS  recognised  that  a  level  of  inventory  would  be  required  at  each  stage  of  the  process  so  as 
to  service  the  immediate  requirements  of  the  next  stage. 
A  Sun  steering  group  was  formed  in  July  1996  with  the  objective  of  meeting  regularly  and 
determining  the  strategic  objectives  for  the  two  companies.  At  the  same  time,  three 
improvement  teams  were  formed  and  each  was  tasked  with  monitoring  progress  of  one  of 
the  main  initiatives,  namely  Resident  Planner,  Demand-Pull  and  Responsibility  Matrix. 
Teamwork  was  assiduously  promoted  in  both  companies. 
"It's  very  much  team  orientated  now.  In  the  past  you  could  say  the  rewards  went  to  the 
individual,  but  there's  been  a  big  change.  You  know,  there's  no  letter  Tin  team.  It's  very 
much  a  teamwork  thing  and  we  Ire  trying  to  promote  that  with  new  initiatives  under  way.  " 
(BPRF,  SK96,10:  3) 
These  were  inter-organisational  teams  and  comprised  members  from  both  Sun  and  the 
Birkbys  organisation.  The  objectives  of  the  Resident  Planner  team  were  to  clarify  the 
planner's  own  overall  remit,  operational  responsibilities,  -  communications  links  and  his 
targets.  These  would  enable  all  relevant  parties  to  have  a  clearer  picture  of  the  demand,  aid 
the  PTP  programme  and  at  the  same  time  increase  confidence  between  customer  and 
supplier. 
247 The  objective  of  the  Demand-Pull  team  was  to  arrange  for  a  system  to  provide  a  kanban 
signal  that  prompted  a  delivery  from  Birkbys  to  Sun's  Livingston  warehouse.  Associated 
sub-objectives  included  devising  a  planning  and  inspection  routine  that  involved  zero 
inspection  in  the  Sun  facility,  reduced  inventory,  and  provided  on  time  delivery  from 
minimal  stock  levels. 
The  Resident  Planner  team's  objectives  were  to  develop  a  generic  matrix  that  would  clarify 
responsibilities  and  activities  associated  with  supplier  responsibility  and  the  management  of 
sub-tier  suppliers.  It  was  Sun's  view  that  sub-tier  supplier  control  should  be  "invisible'  to 
Sun. 
6.3.5  Personal  Satisfaction  and  Motivation 
People  were  extremely  motivated  by  the  alliance  in  both  organisations.  Day-to-day  jobs 
were  getting  easier  to  manage.  There  was  a  better  understanding  of  how  both 
organisational  processes  interfaced  and  the  impact  of  one's  actions  on  the  other.  Birkbys 
was  now  prepared  to  go  the  extra  mile  to  satisfy  the  customer.  - 
"It  becomes  quite  'ýpeqple-dependent'-'..  as  you'llfind  out.  You  can  write  and  document  as 
much  as  you  want,  but  suppliers  have  to  do  a  lot  based  on  trust.  Birkbys  does  a  lotfor  us  on 
the  basis  ofa  verbal  agreement-  "we'll  work  out  later  what  it  costs  ".  And  we've  never  had 
a  problem.  You  don't  get  that  ifyou  don't  get  to  know  people.  "  (CKSK96,5:  3) 
Birkbys  was  now  part  of  Sun's  future  and  recognition  of  this  fact  was  getting  through  to 
people. 
"There  are  clear  messages  about  the  long-term  link  with  Birkbys.  There's  a  group  called 
the  enclosure  strategy  team  consisting  of  senior  people  ftom  the  US  and  UK  which  has 
mapped  out  the  long-term  future  for  suppliers  who  stay  with  us.  Birkbys  are  part  of  that 
future  and  the  message  is  there.  In  the  five  year  plan  Birkbys  is  identified  as  one  offour 
enclosure  suppliers  world-wide.  "  (SE,  SK95,5:  2) 
249 "We're  totally  committed,  unless  they  askedfor  something  that's  impossible  to  do.  We'd 
change  everything  round  to  suit  them,  even  if  it  was  at  the  expense  of  another  customer.  But 
I  wouldn't  do  that  until  Id  checked  with  the  other  customer,  and  tested  the  water  -  for 
example,  how  seriously  it  would  impact  on  his  business.  But  I  look  at  it  this  way  -  if  Sun 
came  to  me  and  said,  "we  need  that...  ",  I  wouldn't  question  them.  I  expect  them  to  be  as 
fair  with  me  as  I  am  with  them.  But  by  and  large,  we  are  both  veryflexible.  "  (SKBP,  96,5:  2) 
6.3.6  Summary:  Transition  to  Stage  M 
The  alliance  gave  Birkbys  the  opportunity  to  significantly  broaden  its  customer  base  and  to 
offer  higher  value  products,  which  positively  impacted  on  its  profitability.  Birkbys  became 
the  sole  UK  supplier  of  enclosures  to  Sun  Linlithgow  and  it  was  soon  doing  business  with 
Sun  in  the  United  States. 
Sun  no  longer  had  to  find  suppliers  with  technical  and  commercial  expertise,  or  to  get 
involved  in  seeking  competitive  tenders.  This  was  a  major  target  of  the  alliance  strategy  in 
1991.  Some  years  down  the  line,  Sun  was  now  able  to  access  Birkbys  accounts  although  it 
has  taken  Sun  a  long  time  to  build  up  enough  trust  credits  in  Birkbys  to  get  this 
information. 
Reaching  this  point  in  the  alliance  had  not  been  easy  for  either  company  and  Sun  had  even 
considered  withdrawing  at  an  earlier  stage.  In  late  1996,  quality  was  once  again  a 
contentious  issue  due  to  Birkbys" low  grade  on  the  Scorecard.  For  a  period  of  time, 
Birkbys  was  no  longer  the  preferred  enclosure  supplier  for  new  products,  although  it 
continued  to  do  work  for  Sun  within  the  existing  alliance  model. 
Sharing  forecasting  and  scheduling  information  was  critical  to  the  entire  process.  Sun  was 
sharing  more  and  more  market  information  with  Birkbys  and  this  gave  the  latter  a  better 
insight  into  future  trends. 
249 Nevertheless,  misinterpretations  and  misunderstood  communications  had  been  a  problem, 
especially  when  dealing  with  technical  matters.  Messages  and  intentions  easily  became 
distorted  as  information  was  passed,  especially  to  persons  not  involved  in  the  technical 
details.  This  kind  of  difficulty  was  resolved  when  the  people  directly  affected  by  the 
activity  got  together  to  agree  the  way  forward.  A  champion,  or  leader  of  the  project,  was 
needed,  who  would  be  kept  in  the  picture  at  all  times  and  who  would  in  turn,  pass  on 
information  to  colleagues  about  things  that  might  impact  on  their  responsibilities. 
Factors  that  contributed  to  the  slow  down  in  activity  and  the  transition  to  Stage  III  as  listed 




Compelling  purpose 
Conflict  management 
Interdependence 
Leaming  and  alliance  skills 
Joint  decision  making 
Personal  satisfaction  and 
motivation 
Crisis 
Management  action 
Conflicting  priorities 
Unfinished  actions 
Questioning  supplier  accuracy 
Lack  of  written  procedures 
and  vague  targets 
Table  6.5:  Transition  from  Stage  II  to  Stage  M 
6.4  STAGE  IH:  Duration  1996-1997 
Up  to  1996,  the  extent  to  which  the  companies  had  changed  was  considerable.  The 
metamorphosis  had  involved  a  great  number  of  people's  time  and  energy.  Sun  was  now 
confident  in  Birkbys  ability  and  Birkbys  was  accepting  greater  responsibility,  allowing  Sun 
to  concentrate  on  more  valuable  work.  However,  the  intensity  of  the  relations  began  to 
wane  between  1996  and  1997.  Table  6.6  shows  the  main  characteristics  of  Stage  111. 
250 ics  drawn  from  Sun/Birkbys  data  Dominant 
Adapting  cultures 
Supplier  changes  and  becomes  more  adaptable 
Customer  does  not  change 
Some  common  values  at  operational  level 
HR  practices  not  influenced  by  the  alliance 
Companies  maintain  own  policies  and 
procedures 
Customer  commitment  questioned 
Questioning  appropriateness  of  alliance 
strategy 
0  HR  Assessment 
0  Perforniance  plateau 
"  Partners  knowledgeable  about  each  other's  Process  understanding 
business. 
"  Scheduling  and  planning  infonnation  available 
"  Open  book  costing 
Customer  focused  0  Reflection  and  learning 
Increased  technical  and  commercial  know-how 
Learning  from  each  other  and  experience 
Table  6.6:  Distilled  Characteristics  in  Stage  IH 
6.4.1  Adapting  Cultures 
The  two  organisations  had,  in  large  measure,  grown  separately  and  inevitably  each  had 
developed  business  cultures  independently.  Working  between  these  cultures  has  often  been 
a  source  of  tension.  Sun  was  very  multi-cultural  and  employed  people  who  had  come  from 
different  electronic  companies,  for  example  Apollo  and  Wang.  Sun  was  dynamic, 
proactive,  promoted  employee  flexibility  and  expected  suppliers  to  be  like  its  own  people. 
Sun  wanted  to  use  the  capability  of  its  supplier  over  a  long  period  of  time.  It  looked  for  key 
partners  to  grow  and  understand  Sun's  business  and  it  expected  suppliers  to  behave 
appropriately. 
I 
251 "Compared  to  other  employers,  Sun  looks  after  its  employees  very  well.  I  also  think  we're 
veryfair  with  our  suppliers  although  I  sometimes  think  we're  too  even  handed  with  them. 
Also,  you  have  to  remember  not  to  jump  in  with  both  feet.  You're  going  to  be  dealing  with 
that  supplier  for  a  long  time,  so  you  try  and  maintain  a  reasonable  relationship  -  never 
screaming  and  shouting.  "  (BP,  SM,  96,4:  2) 
I'm  objective  with  my  supply  base,  and  I  expect  that  back.  Nobody  ever  said  it  was  going  to 
be  easy.  I  think  suppliers  respect  us  because  we're  more  equitable.  We  have  a  better 
information  flow  in  some  of  the  new  initiatives  we're  working  now.  Some  people  in  the 
electronic  industry  are  very  aggressive,  but  I  don't  think  Sun  is  hostile.  I  think  most  of  the 
buyers  in  Sun  have  the  same  attitude,  and  try  to  keep  some  control  and  sanity. 
(BP,  SK96,4:  2) 
Birkbys'  way  of  working  used  to  be  at  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum  to  Sun  (refer  to 
6.2.1,  page  232).  Its  culture  was  that  of  a  traditional  company  in  a  mature  industry.  The 
alliance  with  Sun  started  on  the  basis  of  compatible  technologies  and  the  cultural  impact 
was  not  considered  at  all.  It  was  only  later  that  Sun  realised  some  of  the  negative  aspects  of 
dealing  with  a  long  established  company  and  this  could  be  seen  from  the  first  score  card 
results.  Birkbys  was  regarded  as  slow  to  respond  and  not  proactive  enough. 
Birkbys  made  great  efforts  to  make  cultural  changes  so  as  to  fall  into  line  with  the  working 
methods  expected  by  Sun.  Contrasts  in  culture  continued  to  be  alluded  to  but,  over  time, 
these  became  less  frequent. 
"Changes  that  happened  before  didn  It  seem  to  last  -  there  were  nofoundations,  nothing  to 
make  them  endure.  Birkbys  now  seem  to  mean  business  and  aren't  playing  at  it.  There 
have  been  big  changes,  mainly  in  attitude.  "(DTPMSm.,  96,10:  2) 
Me  impression  you  get  is  that  it's  comefrom  a  change  of  attitude  at  the  top.  Although  it  is 
being  driven  downwards,  there  are  a  lot  of  the  old  guard  about  yet  who  resist  change, 
especially  on  the  shopfloor.  "  (DKBP,  96,4:  2) 
252 Birkbys  had  changed  and  was  now  very  customer  focused.  Common  values  had  developed 
and  continued  to  be  absorbed  at  production  level  due  to  frequent  interaction  with  Sun.  Both 
parties  recognised  the  mutual  benefits  of  schedule  changes  and  information  exchange  as 
early  as  possible  regarding  supply  problems. 
6.4.2  HR  Assessment 
Jobs  had  been  affected  by  the  alliance  and  it  had  also  impacted  on  production  and  design 
work.  The  common  theme  however  was  responsibility  devolved  to  everyone.  Due  to 
simplified  procedures  jobs  had  become  less  reactive  and  there  was  now  more  ownership 
and  empowerment  at  the  lower  levels.  Better  planning  had  freed  up  resources  and 
professional  staff  had  had  to  deploy  a  different  set  of  managerial  skills  in  a  bigger  market. 
Recognising  the  need  for  continuous  training,  Birkbys  put  a  learning  programme  into  action 
and,  as  a  result,  achieved  an  "Investors  in  People"  award. 
The  alliance  reward  structure  had  not  been  integrated  in  line  with  the  company-wide 
philosophy.  For  example,  Sun  people's  performance  was  measured  in  different  ways.  In 
Sun,  if  targets  were  achieved  people  received  bonuses.  If  targets  were  repeatedly  missed, 
then  people  were  fired.  It  was  very  straightforward  and  Sun  was  justifiably  described  as  a 
"hire  and  fire"  organisation.  This  was  recognised  and  accepted  by  Sun  personnel. 
"Yhere's  a  strong  sense  ofpersonal  pride  in  people's  work  and  in  how  they  achieve  career 
progression  as  well.  It's  generally  the  norm  not  to  accept  bad  quality  or  bad  workmanship 
or  whatever  else  may  not  be  up  to  scratch.  Wejust  don't  tolerate  it. 
It  's  not  about  -  "do  I  get  rewarded  at  the  end  of  it?  "  Aere  are  good  team  inducements  and 
a  lot  of  good  personal  incentives,  but  they're  icing  on  the  cake.  If  you  took  them  away 
results  might  drop  by  20%  but  that's  about  all.  You're  left  with  80%  effectiveness  because 
of  the  culture.  "  (DTPKSK96,11:  3) 
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6.4.3  Performance  Plateau 
Although  performance  had  reached  a  sustainable  high,  by  mid  1996,  Sun's  commitment 
started  to  come  into  question.  Senior  Sun  personnel  began  to  persistently  fail  to  attend 
review  meetings,  despite  the  fact  that  the  commercial  review  had  been  publicised  as  so 
important.  It  seemed  that  problems  relating  to  the  meetings  were  symptomatic  of 
something  stale  in  the  alliance. 
The  actual  basis  of  the  alliance  was  being  questioned,  that  is,  "just  how  realistic  are 
customer/supplier  alliances?  "  It  seemed  that  as  long  as  objectives  were  being  met  then 
everything  was  all  right.  If  not,  then  the  relationship  could  easily  go  sour. 
By  this  stage  Birkbys  was  an  entirely  different  type  of  company  than  in  1991  when  all  the 
changes  started.  Sun  had  driven  Birkbys  very  hard  and  this  was  the  case  even  more  so  now 
that  it  supplied  both  the  UK  and  US.  Management  styles  in  the  UK  and  US  differed  and 
Birkbys  relations  with  Sun  in  the  United  States  were  more  confrontational  than  with  Sun 
UK.  However,  Birkbys  was  able  to  deal  with  this  because  on  the  most  part  that  was  how 
customers  in  the  automotive  sector  behaved.  What  was  happening  at  this  time  was  that 
people  who  managed  the  alliance  in  Scotland  were  being  put  under  pressure  by  their  US 
counterparts.  In  considering  the  way  it  treated  suppliers  Sun  UK  had  concluded  that  it  is 
too  "soft"  and  even  too  "generous". 
Another  worrying  aspect  was  that  "time  windows"  for  the  supply  of  information  were 
becoming  shorter  and  shorter.  Sun  was  demanding  information  from  Birkbys  at  ever 
increasing  rates  and  if  "the  ball  was  dropped"  then  Birkbys  would  get  no  more  business. 
When  the  alliance  began,  Sun  had  only  one  major  programme.  Now  it  had  three  desktop 
PC's  on  offer.  Whether  it  was  secure  in  its  preeminent  position  or  not,  Birkbys  considered 
itself  the  only  supplier  in  the  enclosures  market  with  the  breadth  and  scope  necessary  to 
satisfy  Sun  Microsystems. 
254 6.4.4  Process  and  Cost  Understanding 
The  ally  companies  had  to  learn  how  to  divide  work  between  them  to  best  effect.  Within 
Sun,  commodity  managers  were  given  the  responsibility  for  the  strategic  aspects  of  the 
supply  chain.  Most  of  the  commodity  managers  were  based  in  the  US  and  were  in  close 
touch  with  the  engineering  and  design  communities  that  initiate  new  product  programmes. 
Commodity  managers  monitored  and projected  new  product  development  within  the 
company  for  the  next  2-5  years,  as  well  as  anticipating  implications  of  these  plans  on  the 
supply  base. 
At  the  operational  level,  Sun  had  a  team  of  supply  engineers  responsible  for  ensuring  that 
current  and  potential  suppliers  were  technically  able  to  manufacture  materials  it  required. 
Two  Sun  supply  engineers  were  exclusively  dedicated  to  Birkbys  to  develop  its  managerial 
capabilities.  This  helped  Birkbys  a  great  deal  with  sub-tier  suppliers,  for  whom  it  had  been 
made  to  take  responsibility. 
Inventory  management  was  important  to  Sun,  given  that  product  life  cycles  were  short  and 
obsolete  stock,  wasteful.  Sun  employed  buyer/planners  to  manage  stock  holding  who  were 
responsible  for  particular  groups  of  components.  They  used  the  sales  forecasts  to  plan 
material  requirements  which  were  then  communicated  to  the  supply  base.  The  planners' 
role  was  to  ensure  that  materials  were  available  to  support  the  production  programme  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  keep  inventories  low. 
Sun  had  also  created  several  internal  institutions  to  support  those  in  charge  of  different 
aspects  of  supply  management.  For  example,  a  commodity  team  had  been  created  for  each 
major  group  of  products  comprising  the  commodity  manager,  the  buyer/planner  and  one  or 
I  more  supply  engineers.  These  teams  held  weekly  internal  reviews  in  order  to  report  current 
activities  to  management. 
255 Within  Birkbys,  the  sales  coordinator's  job  was  to  look  after  the  customer  and  ensure  that 
Sun  got  what  it  had  ordered,  at  the  right  time.  In  order  to  do  this  successfully,  materials 
supply  had  to  be  coordinated  by  Production,  Purchasing  and  Transport. 
Birkbys'  tooling  engineer's  job  was  to  anticipate  potential  difficulties  and  to  ensure  that 
moulding  tools  designed  by  Sun  fitted  Birkbys  machines.  The  tooling  engineer  worked 
closely  with  Sun's  engineers  on  tool  design. 
Birkbys  made  changes  to  its  systems  by  forming  a  Business  Electronics  team  which 
included  a  design  engineer,  a  tooling  engineer,  a  sales  coordinator  and  a  customer  account 
manager.  It  also  created  a  dedicated  assembly  cell  with  its  own  manager  to  deal  solely  with 
Sun  products.  The  plant  in  Glenrothes  initially  only  supplied  Sun. 
Familiarity  with,  and  knowledge  of,  the  complete  process  enabled  people  to  look  for 
potential  areas  of  improvement  up  or  down  the  supply  chain 
"Ifind  thatfurther  back  in  the  chain  as  well,  suppliers  need  to  let  their  guard  down  and  to 
be  open  about  the  root  cause  of  this  or  that  Problem.  Yhe  way  this  will  work  properly  is  to 
knock  down  the  barriers  ftom  around  departments  so  that  people  can  openly  comment. 
"y  are  we  making  defects?  Is  it  happening  in  our  process  or  in  yours?  Openness  is  really 
what's  going  to  make  the  relationship  work.  "  (DTPKSK96,12:  5) 
In  the  early  days  of  the  alliance,  Birkbys  was  not  good  at  producing  or  collecting  data  and 
found  it  almost  impossible  to  measure  anything.  This  had  all  changed. 
"I  hy  to  collect  data  on  everything  -  quality  issues,  faults  and  recurrences,  so  that  I  can  tell 
purchasing  the  history  of  that  particular  problem.  We  also  went  on  to  a  kitting  system  quite 
early,  because  previously  people  went  to  a  bin  to  collect  what  they  needed,  andforgot  to 
pick  up  hay'  of  what  was  required  Now  exactly  all  the  parts  needed  for  a  particular 
machine  are  gathered  into  one  kit  -  and  if  there's  anything  left,  somebody's  made  a 
mistake!  "'  (DKBP,  96,3:  4) 
256 One  of  the  biggest  problems  for  Sun  was  to  pin-down  how  Birkbys  actually  costed  its 
business.  It  was  therefore  impossible  to  make  a  comparison  in  order  to  ascertain  if  it  was 
running  the  business  competitively. 
"Yhey  would  put  all  the  overheads  into  the  piece, whereas  we  would  just  have  the 
manufacturing  cost  of  the  part.  So  the  problem  was  over  costing,  it  was  attitudes  and  the 
way  they  wanted  to  do  business.  In  JuYlIlling  an  order,  they  wouldjust  deliver  when  it  was 
ready.  On  time  andflexibility  didn't  seem  important.  To  us  it  was  critical.  "  (BP,  SK95,4:  2) 
Now  it  was  a  question  of  open  book  costing  and  Sun  was  only  prepared  to  work  with 
suppliers  who  provided  all  the  information  required.  This  enabled  Sun  to  judge  not  only 
product  cost,  but  also  value  for  money. 
6.4.5  Reflection  and  Learning 
A  great  deal  of  learning  by  both  organisations  derived  from  the  alliance.  Sun  spent  a  lot  of 
time  endeavouring  to  monitor  the  suppliers'  capa6ty  to  satisfy  demand.  Regular 
discussions  with  Birkbys  reassured  Sun  about  forward  planning  and  at  the  same  time 
emphasised  to  Birkbys  the  importance  of  accurate  forecasting. 
Birkbys  was  aware  of  Sun's  long-term  aims  and  because  of  its  own  and  Sun's  commitment, 
it  was  prepared  to  put  resources  at  Sun"s  disposal.  Daily  discussion  about  matters  in  detail 
and  open  communication  channels  built  up  a  rapport,  which  reduced  uncertainty  and 
provided  stability. 
A  new  range  of  skills  such  as  networking,  creating  solutions  to  problems  of  supply  and 
anticipating  trouble,  had  been  learned  by  those  closely  involved  in  the  alliance. 
Sun  had  a  greater  appreciation  of  the  supplier  production  problems,  which  added  a  realistic 
perspective  to  its  outlook.  Preconceptions  of  poor  quality  or  perceived  inflexibly  had  been 
reduced  by  educating  Sun  to  appreciate  the  ally's  manufacturing  difficulties. 
257 Work  at  the  interface  between  the  companies  had  changed.  People  had  a  wider  set  of  skills, 
especially  as  regards  communication  and  there  was  more  contact  in  general  between  Sun 
and  Birkbys.  Individual  jobs  had  taken  on  a  creative  edge,  not  present  before,  which  was 
conducive  to  enhancement  of  supplier  capabilities  and  to  the  overcoming  of  supply 
blockages. 
Sceptical  voices  could  still  be  heard  within  Sun,  mainly  as  regards  the  choice  of  partner  and 
whether  or  not  this  was  particular  to  the  Sun/  Birkbys  alliance  was  difficult  to  say.  This 
led  Sun  to  look  at  alliance  strategies  in  general,  in  order  to  identify  the  best  reasons  for 
choosing  a  supplier. 
"It  makes  me  think  about  the  less  successful  partnerships  we've  ended  up  with.  I  wonder  if 
we  stay  with  people  because  of  sheer  inertia,  as  opposed  to  actively  seeking  an  alternative. 
Obviously  any  such  change  would  mean  a  loss  of  time  andproduction,  which  is  difficult. 
(BP,  SK95,4:  2) 
Sun  began  to  use  the  alliance  strategy  developed  with  Birkbys,  when  working  with  other 
global  suppliers. 
I  think  we've  taken  the  model  developed  with  Birkby's,  of  having  a  one-stop  shop,  with 
these  guys  responsible  for  the  product,  working  much  m  ore  on  the  basis  of  trust,  sharing 
things  with  them,  and  getting  them  to  share  with  us.  A  lot  of  what  we've  now  written  into 
the  strateSy  document  also  goes  for  the  global  suppliers.  It  is  a  new  way  of  working  and 
we  and  Birkbys  ploughed  thefirstfurrow.  "  (CK  SK96,14:  7) 
6.4.6  Summary:  Transition  to  Stage  IV 
The  main  problems  concerning  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  in  Stage  III  are  listed  as  follows:  - 
*A  growing  agenda  of  unfinished  actions. 
9  Vague  targets  and  success  criteria. 
258 "  Basic  information  unavailable  and  paucity  of  written  procedures. 
"  New  project  and  product  names,  inconsistent  or  unavailable,  resulting  in  confusion. 
"  Policies  not  understood  in  some  parts  of  the  chain. 
"  Relations  mostly  dependent  on  individual  effort.  While  some  aspects  of  the  alliance 
were  managed  at  a  series  of  monthly  review  meetings,  most  depended  on  individuals 
and  ad  hoc  meetings.  One  meeting,  to  review  the  alliance,  was  cancelled  after  unrelated 
organisational  changes  altered  the  duties  of  a  key  member. 
e  Influence  of  corporate  policies.  Several  projects  were  stalled  or  obstructed  by  wider 
corporate  policies  or  became  tangled  up  in  other  issues,  for  example  the  alliance 
agreement. 
9  Conflicting  priorities.  Actions  needed  to  coordinate  the  chain  depended  on  other 
departments  aligning  with  the  alliance  objectives.  For  example,  the  progress  in 
addressing  EDI  and  delays  resulting  from  the  colour  sampling,  affected  quality. 
9  Birkbys  was  not  sufficiently  empowered  to  make  decisions  and  required  more  authority. 
Despite  the  foregoing,  the  alliance  had  required  people  in  the  two  companies  to  coordinate 
their  work.  Tasks  and  responsibilities  for  developing  new  products  were  shared  and  this 
reliance  on  the  other  intensified  as  the  relationship  developed.  Birkbys  offered  its  expertise 
during  the  preliminary  design  work,  whereas  previously  Sun  would  have  presented  Birkbys 
with  a  design  and  simply  asked  it  to  model  the  tools  with  which  to  mould  the  enclosure. 
As  well  as  developing  close  personal  contacts,  the  companies  created  a  series  of  joint 
institutions  to  manage  the  relationship,  such  as  regular  meetings  at  which  issues  arising 
would  be  dealt  with.  Some  of  the  objectives,  responsibilities  and  features  that  constituted 
the  transition  to  Stage  IV  can  be  summarised  as:  - 
"  Sun  and  Birkbys  plan  management  of  sub-tier  suppliers 
"  Regular  meetings  with  minutes  recorded  and  actions  timeously  distributed 
"  Common  matrix  of  current  and  future  products 
"  Responsibility  for  material  forecasts  passed  to  Birkbys  and  sub-tier  suppliers 
"  Demand-pull  ground  rules  set  out  what  Sun  expected  from  Birkbys  in  terms  of  delivery 
"  Clear  statement  of  Sun's  corporate  policy  e.  g.  colour  sampling  procedures 
259 Along  with  formal  procedures,  personal  networks  had  been  built  up  and  this  had  led  to 
quicker  responses,  as  people  used  their  own  contacts  to  help  deal  with  issues. 
Birkbys  had  gained  greatly  from  association  with  Sun.  Over  the  years  it  has  become  more 
efficient  with  increased  capability  and  in  turn  Birkbys  had  been  able  to  influence  sub  tier 
suppliers  to  improve  performance.  Table  6.7  illustrates  behaviour  prevalent  during  Stage 
III  and  IV  transition. 
Adapting  cultures 
FIR  assessment 
Performance  plateau 
Process  understanding 
Reflection  and  learning 
Crisis  Increased  responsibility 
devolved  to  supplier 
Regular  meetings 
Review  of  current  and  future 
products 
New  team  projects 
Management  Action 
Table  6.7:  Transition  from  Stage  III  to  Stage  IV 
6.5  STAGE  IV:  Duration  1997-1999 
Table  6.8  shows  the  main  characteristics  in  Stage  IV. 
Characteristics 
10  Supplier  changed  dramatically 
"  RR  practices  not  influenced  by  the  alliance 
"  Companies  maintain  own  policies  and 
procedures 
"  Problem  solving,  influencing  and  analysis  skills 
10  Joint  projects  produce  innovative  solutions 
Dominant  charactedstics 
0  Cooperating  cultures 
0  Developing  alliance  skiHs 
0  Joint  innovation  and  continuous  improvement 
Partners  knowledgeable  about  each  other's  Joint  learning  tacit  and  explicit 
business. 
Scheduling  and  planning  information  available 
260 Charactedstics 
0  Improved  planning  and  information  sharing 
Dominant  characteristics 
0  Process  alignment  at  interface 
Customer  focused  0  Strategic  review 
Increased  technical  and  commercial  know-how  0  Step  change  (the  dominant  characteristic  has 
Operational  objectives  achieved  been  embodied  in  strategic  change) 
Table  6.8:  Characteristics  in  Sun  /  Birkbys  Alliance  in  Stage  W 
6.5.1  Cooperating  Cultures 
As  previously  mentioned  there  has  been  considerable  cultural  incompatibility  at  the 
interface  between  the  two  organisations.  However,  Birkbys  rose  to  the  challenge  and  had 
changed  from  being  rather  slow  and  old-fashioned  to  a  business  that  responded  quickly  to 
its  customer's  requirements. 
"Ifyou  are  used  to  afast  changing  culture,  you  deal  with  the  negative  aspects  because  it's 
in  your  nature.  Some  organisations  findfast  track  completely  alien  and  think  it  creates 
more  problems  than  its  worth.  I  would  say  that  most  companiesfail  to  change  because  they 
try  to  do  too  much  too  soon.  "  (BPRF,  SM,  97,8:  2) 
6.5.2  Joint  Tacit  and  Explicit  Learning 
There  had  always  been  changes  in  Birkbys  but  not  as  frequent  or  radical  as  over  the  three 
years.  "The  company  has  been  very  good  at  training  -  they've  made  us  able  to  cope  with 
c  an  . 
(SC,  BP,  97,4:  2) 
"In  the  beginning  Birkbys  had  no  notion  how  the  relationship  would  end  up.  I  think  we 
found  out  as  we  went  along.  It  is  amazing  when  you  consider  what  we  did  in  the  early 
days,  compared  to  what  we  do  now  -  we  couldn't  imagine  it  at  the  time.  Building  the  bits 
into  the  units  before  they  actually  leave  here  is  something  we've  learned  by  being  with  Sun. 
261 We've  been  able  to  pass  this  learning  on  to  our  other  customers.  Also  we  couldn't  have 
imagined  we'd  be  dealing  with  America  the  way  we  do  now  -  it  was  way  beyond  our 
dreams.  "  (SC,  BP,  97,2:  4) 
6.5.3  Process  Alignment  at  Interface 
In  mid  1996,  the  alliance  was  enlarged  with  the  introduction  of  GE  Plastics,  who  supplied 
Birkbys  with  resin  for  moulding.  In  the  past,  Sun  dealt  directly  with  GE  Plastics  and  once 
the  Birkbys  and  GE  link  had  been  established,  this  part  of  the  supply  chain  interface 
worked  well  and  proved  beneficial. 
"Another  difference  is  getting  advance  warning  about  plant  and  manufacturing  problems. 
Ae  more  notice  we  can  get  the  better.  With  some  suppliers,  when  we  don't  get  deliveries 
and  run  out,  it  leads  to  panic  stations.  We  ring  them  up  and  they  say,  "Oh,  has  nobody  told 
you?  I  thought  somebody  in  production  was  going  to  give  you  a  phone!  "  But  i(people  warn 
you  something  is  going  to  affect  your  delivery  in  a  month's  time,  you  can  look  around  the 
market  to  see  if  there's  something  else  you  could  use.  It's  always  going  to  be  beneficial  if  a 
supplier  is  beingproactive  in  those  terms.  "  WBP,  97,3:  3) 
The  alliance  transformed  the  attitude  of  sales  people  working  in  Birkbys. 
"Put  it  this  way.  If  you  asked  any  of  our  sales  people  what  the  lead  time  is  on  any  of  our 
products,  they  wouldn't  be  able  to  tell  you,  because  they  don't  know.  7hey  don't  know  how 
long  it  takes  to  make  our  products,  or  what  is  critical  to  production.  Yhat  doesn't  stop 
them  making  delivery  promises  and  it  means  I  have  to  hold  a  large  inventory  in  case  I  have 
to  deal  with  these  situations.  Yhat  impacts  directly  on  my  supplier.  "  (WBP,  97,5:  4) 
The  improved  planning  and  forecasting  system  dramatically  affected  both  Sun  and  Birkbys. 
Sun,  Birkbys  and  GE  plastics  have  improved  although  it  still  is  Birkbys  practice  to  hold 
stocks  of  GE  products,  as  a  back  up. 
262 "Although  I  have  suppliers  that  deliver  within  4  or  5  hours  I  still  tend  to  hold  a  safety 
stock.  I  do  ST  deliveries  on  certain  key  accounts  but  don't  with  GE  Plastics.  Yhere  isn't 
any  reason  why  we  couldn't  do  that  with  GE,  if  we  had  a  decent  planning  system.  It'svery 
easy  to  do  on  some  of  the  polymers,  which  are  regular  runners.  You  can't  plan  your  supply 
where  things  are  very  up  and  down  and  people  can't  decide  when  they  are  going  to  load 
something  into  the  schedule.  We  hold  too  much  inventory  infinished  stock  because  we  lack 
a  good  production  planning  system.  We  tend  to  make  for  stock,  rather  than  making  to 
order,  which  is  wrong.  "  (MM,  BP,  97,5:  4) 
6.5.4  Strategic  Review 
By  December  1997  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  was  well  on  the  way  to  achieving  a  number 
of  major  goals.  These  included:  - 
*  Lead  time  reduced  from  eighty  six  days  to  twenty  five  days 
9  20%  improvement  in  productivity 
9  100%  customer  order  fulfillment,  i.  e.  the  ability  to  supply  a  customer  immediately  on 
request. 
9  Continuation  and  development  of  the  suppliers'  collaborative  model 
Birkbys  now  received  supply  information  on  a  regular  basis.  The  new  Glenrothes  facility 
optimised  operations  as  expected  and  it  held  a  minimum  level  of  stock  to  satisfy  the 
company's  service  level  agreement.  This  gave  Birkbys  four  hours  to  respond,  from  receipt 
of  the  warehouse  agent's  demand,  to  Frans  Maas  delivery  to  Sun.  Frans  Maas  commitment, 
to  deliver  enclosures  on  demand,  enabled  Sun  to  be  less  involved  in  day  to  day  business 
and  allowed  it  to  turn  its  attention  to  supply  management  as  a  whole. 
"Our  people  are  more  productively  employed  -  there's  a  lot  more  work  we  can  do,  now  that 
we've  streamlined  the  process.  That  makes  us  more  competitive  and  it  will  also  improve 
the  quality  ofworkforpeople  to  do.  "  (BPRF,  SK97,10:  1) 
263 6.5.5  Summary 
In  the  first  instance,  there  was  a  real  leap  of  faith  by  the  companies.  Since  they  first  decided 
to  work  closely  together,  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  relationship  progressed  significantly  and  this 
had  brought  tangible  benefits  to  the  partners.  These  benefits  were  supported  by  structural 
changes  in  both  companies,  especially  as  they  affected  people,  business  processes  and 
technology. 
Sun  provided  valuable  expertise  and  support  to  help  Birkbys  develop  its  capability  in  the 
electronics  industry. 
It  took  time  to  change  attitudes  and  ways  of  working  and  there  had  been  problems  and 
disappointments  all  during  the  alliance.  Sun  was  not  prepared  for  the  slow  speed  of 
r  learning.  Also  it  took  Birkbys  timeto  adjust  and  to  understand  where  they  would  fit  in. 
The  Sun/  Birkbys  alliance  was  at  its  peak  between  1996  and  1997  when  Birkbys  won  the 
"Best  Sun  Supplier  Award7.  Joint  teamwork  in  the  Resident  Planner  and  Demand-Pull 
projects  contributed  greatly  to  this  achievement. 
'Commercial  and  organisational  changes  within  the  entire  Sun  organisation  were 
contributory  factors  to  the  alliance  slow  down. 
Supply  managers  with  an  international  responsibility  replaced  Sun  commodity  managers 
and  as  a  result  geographical  proximity  was  lost  and  supply  management  methodology 
changed.  Birkbys'  only  contacts  in  Sun  had  been  local  UK  quality  managers  and  the 
scorecard  was  not  as  rigorously  applied  in  respect  of  the  American  work  because  Sun's  US 
counterparts,  did  not  put  such  importance  on  the  score  card  as  the  UK  company. 
The  result  of  these  changes  was  that  there  was  no  longer  the  continuous  pressure  to 
improve  together.  The  scorecard  had  been  a  very  important  control  mechanism  and 
performance  metric  used  extensively  by  §un,  Linlithgow.  At  the  time,  Birkbys  had 
264 welcomed  the  introduction  of  the  scorecard  because  it  improved  supplier  capabilities  and 
helped  the  drive  for  innovation.  More  importantly,  the  scorecard  gave  Birkbys  a  view  of 
Sun's  strategic  direction  and  regrettably  this  window  was  now  closed.  The  disadvantage 
was  that  Birkbys  and  Sun  could  not  calculate  in  advance  future  resource  requirements  or 
harmonise  customer  and  supplier  strategies. 
Initially,  cultural  differences  were  very  obvious.  Sun  was  seen  as  the  modem,  dynamic 
company  and  Birkbys,  a  slow  moving  anachronism,  reluctant  to  change.  Birkbys  personnel 
were  neither  used,  nor  empowered,  to  respond  to  problems  quickly. 
In  this  alliance,  customer  domination  was  very  evident,  nevertheless  many  in  Sun 
considered  the  supplier  had been  allowed  too  much  freedom.  Despite  such  internal 
arguments,  the  Sun  organisation  was  determined  to  succeed  in  developing  supplier  relations 
over  the  long-term. 
Birkbys  had  changed  more  than  it  would  ever  have  dreamed,  which  is  a  testament  to  the 
people  in  the  company  and  the  faith  of  Birkbys  management  in  Sun's  future  vision.  The 
first  two  years  of  the  alliance  were  taken  up  with  Sun  nurturing  Birkbys  and  slowly  getting 
to  understand  the  supplier's  cost  structure.  Trust  between  the  two  allies  gave  Birkbys  the 
confidence  to  divulge  cost  information.  Perhaps  this  is  the  point  when  the  alliance  actually 
began;  at  the  point  of  open  book  accounting. 
The  operation  had  allowed  Birkbys  to  take  on  morevalue-adding  work  and  it  was  a 
completely  different  organisation  now  than  in  1991.  Birkbys  had  transformed  its  attitude 
with  regard  to  quality,  flexibility  and  continuous  improvement. 
4re  Although  we  are  constantly  getting  better,  we  are  continually  reviewing  the  process  to 
improve  even  further.  Day-to-day  demand  replenishment  is  being  systematically 
managed  "  (BPRF,  SK97,4:  4) 
265 Continuous  improvement  is  now  a  way  of  life  for  Birkbys.  "It  helps  us  tremendously  if 
somebody  can  propose  solutions  to  problems,  when  you  meet.  777ey  can  also  give  us 
indications  on  price  movements,  to  help  us  plan.  If  we're  told  there's  going  to  be  an 
increase  in  prices  in  x  month's  time,  we  can  then  tell  the  customer  so  that  he  can  budget 
accordingly.  It  doesn't  look  good  if  wefail  to  give  the  customer  notice.  It's  always  better  if 
people  can  anticipate  that  sort  of  thing.  "'  OvIKBP,  97,3:  2) 
Te  resi  ent  model  had  been  developed  since  the  early  days  and  now  there  were  several 
resident  engineers  on  site.  People  whose  responsibilities  were  intertwined  were  closely 
situated,  for  example  the  physical  distance  between  a  planner  and  a  scheduler  might  only 
have  been  six  feet.  Face  to  face  communication  was  now  seen  as  vital,  in  sharp  contrast  to 
the  past  when  people  communicated  via  spreadsheets.  A  planner  used  spreadsheets  as  his 
primary  source  of  information  and,  although  absolutely  necessary  tools  in  themselves,  a 
spreadsheet  was  a  very  clumsy  way  to  convey  complex  ideas.  Human  interaction  was 
irreplaceable  and  most  supply  chains  broke  down  through  inadequate  or  lack  of  human 
interaction. 
The  biggest  problem  with  the  resident  model  seemed  to  be  that  of  confidentiality.  There 
were  times  when  Sun  staff  discussed,  in  private,  sensitive  matters  and  the  Resident  Planner 
knew  what  the  talk  was  about.  This  led  to  role  insecurity,  for  example  when  the  individual 
did  not  know  the  context  of  the  conversation  and  was  obviously  not  welcome  to  participate. 
Are  they  talking  about  me?  Are  they  criticising  my  work?  Consequently,  the  perception 
was  that  a  lot  of  closed-door  discussions  were  taking  place  and  this  might  have  affected 
self-esteem. 
The  resident  planner  had  to  be  someone  with  authority,  who  had  external  contacts,  who  was 
able  to  network  and  who  understood  how  the  two  organisatiOns  worked.  In  1998,  Sun 
upgraded  the  resident  to  managerial  level. 
266 Birkbys  and  Sun  both  underestimated  the  skills  required  to  do  the  intermediary's  job 
successfully.  These  included  a  whole  range  of  aptitudes  from  interpersonal,  dealing  with 
outsiders,  to  the  ability  to  influence  management  in  his  own  company. 
"A  resident  planner  needs  to  be  able  to  initiate  a  concept  and  take  it  ftom  there.  If  he 
doesn't  have  the  management  skills  you  have  to  step  in  to  sort  out  the  detail.  This  causes 
morale  and  performance  issues  and  suppliers  took  some  time  to  understand  that. 
(EMSCKSK99,4:  9) 
On  some  occasions  Sun  reached  conclusions  that  the  supplier  did  not  share.  7  don't 
believe  the  partnership  between  supplier  and  customer  can  be  an  equal  one.  When  I  talk  to 
a  supplier,  I  am  the  customer  and  expect  to  be  treated  like  one.  I  am  not  saying  that  gives 
me  license  to  get  what  I  want  every  time,  but  a  lot  of  suppliers  believe  that  success  is 
winning  the  argument,  rather  than  satisfying  the  customer.  "  (EMSCKSM,  99,3:  6) 
In  the  past,  Sun  elevated  the  status  of  the  supplier  and  even  though  it  was  obvious  they 
were  not  on  a  par,  nevertheless  they  were  at  least  treated  as  if  they  were.  When  Sun  dealt 
with  its  customers,  it  was  usually  very  clear  who  the  customer  was. 
Sun  intended  to  continue  collaboration  but  at  that  moment  the  US  company  largely  decided 
this  strategy.  Nevertheless  opportunities  may  have  existed  in  the  UK  to  bring  suppliers  in 
at  an  earlier  stage  of  the  planning  cycle. 
A  strategy  team  and  a  commodity  team  were  set  up  in  1998,  bringing.  in  people  from 
various  product  groups.  If  there  was  a  difficult  job  to  be  done,  they  would  do  it.  Sun's 
management  had  a  genuine  interest  in  business  alliances  and  in  learning.  In  the  company 
Sun  recognised  that  it  had  to  include  a  wider  constituency  in  the  future  to  sort  out  problems. 
Sun's  entire  worldwide  organisation  had  undergone  two  internal  changes  since  1997.  The 
Sun  operation  has  become  less  functionally  orientated  and  works  using  cross-functional 
product  groups.  By  the  year  2001,  Sun  intended  to  re-organise  its  entire  supply  chain, 
267 rather  than  just  the  supply  base  and  this  would  mean  fewer  points  of  contact  between  Sun 
and  suppliers. 
There  continued  to  be  two  different  schools  of  thought  in  the  company,  on  the  subject  of 
supplier  collaboration.  On  balance  the  predominant  view  was  that  competition  was  healthy 
and  it  questioned  why  Sun  should  be  putting  all  its  eggs  in  the  one  basket. 
"7here  is  definitely  a  difference  of  opinion  within  the  organisation  about  suppliers.  I 
believe  that  we  have  spent  too  much  time  with  the  wrong  suppliers.  Yhe  cost  to  us  has  been 
too  high,  not  in  all  cases,  but  mostly.  "  (EMSCKSK99,6:  4) 
6.6  CONTINUING  CONCEPTUAL  DEVELOPMENT 
Having  analysed  all  the  secondary  data  for  this  project,  it  was  the  author's  objective  to  re- 
establish  contact  with  key  participants  in  both  companies  who  had  either  moved  to  other 
organisations  or  were  dispersed  across  the  globe. 
Information  was  further  garnered  by  resorting  to  e-mail  exchanges  and  telephone  calls. 
From  these  it  was  ascertained  that  Sun  and  Birkby's  were  no  longer  involved  in  a  close 
alliance  relationship  and  as  a  consequence  of  this  new  information,  a  further  stage  was 
added  to  the  conceptual  framework.  This  stage,  named  Stage  V,  is  discussed  in  the 
following  section. 
Stage  V  describes  the  time  when  the  particular  alliance  is  no  longer  deemed  appropriate  for 
the  customer,  his  supplier  or  both.  Questions  considered  were:  -  What  caused  the  alliance 
to  end?  Do  the  players  continue  to  trade? 
The  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  went  through  four  pivotal  periods,  that  might  fairly  be  termed 
critical,  although  the  first  crisis  of  confidence  was  the  most  serious.  The  latter  follow  a 
period  of  uncertainty  and  the  resulting  change  triggered  upsets  of  differing  degrees  of 
severity. 
268 The  first  crisis  of  confidence  occurred  in  the  very  early  stage  of  the  Sun  and  Birkbys 
alliance.  Neither  organisation  had  experienced  working  with  the  other  and  even  although 
Birkbys  had  a  highly  developed  standard  of  quality  control,  obviously  it  was  not  rigorous 
enough  for  Sun. 
Significantly,  it  transpired  that  many  of  the  quality  issues  were  not  merely  the  result  of 
Birkbys  ineptitude  but  were  of  Sun's  own  making.  Improved  forecasting  and  scheduling 
information,  as  well  as  direct  assistance  from  Sun  supply  engineers  helped  Birkbys  comply 
with  Sun's  service  level  requirements. 
Sun  personnel  did  not  readily  admit  that  they  could  in  some  way  be  held  responsible  for  the 
suppliers'  performance.  The  second  crisis  was  a  result  of  Birkbys'  misunderstanding  due  to 
lack  of  communication  as  well  as  Sun's  non-attendance  at  alliance  meetings.  The  direct 
effect  was  that  Birkbys  was  judged  to  be  performing  poorly  against  the  score  card  criteria 
and  resulted  in  it  being  taken  off  the  preferred  supplier  list  for  a  time.  Advice  and  support 
from  Sun  rectified  the  situation,  however  the  matter  could  have  been  managed  in  a  more 
efficient  manner. 
Birkbys  resumed  its  position  of  preferred  supplier  to  Sun  and  consequently  was  given  more 
and  more  new  product  work.  Already  operating  on  stretched  resources  and  unwilling  to  turn 
business  away,  Birkbys  became  overloaded.  This  situation  also  overwhelmed  suppliers  as 
they  could  not  increase  their  resources  quickly  enough  to  keep  up  with  Sun's  demands  and 
the  outcome  was  translated  into  poor  scorecard  results. 
The  alliance  was  never  based  on  any  formal  agreement  or  ground  rules  and  the  strategy  that 
developed  was  based  on  emergent  issues  rather  than  planning.  Subsequently,  this  strained 
the  alliance  as  the  supplier  was  taking  on  more  work  and  becoming  increasingly  dependent 
on  Sun. 
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supplier  management  and  consequently  Sun  personnel  were  physically  and  intellectually 
withdrawing  from  the  alliance.  What  would  be  the  future  of  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance? 
As  a  direct  result  of  the  alliance,  Birkbys  had  developed  from  a  traditional,  UK  engineering 
business  to  a  major  company  operating  in  an  international  market.  For  its  part,  the  Sun 
Linlithgow  plant  had  followed  its  intended  strategic  direction,  developing  high  value 
products  at  a  planned  rate  of  progression. 
Sun  used  the  Birkbys/Sun  strategy  to  develop  other  customer  supplier  relations.  Initiatives 
first  introduced,  such  as  the  resident  planner  role,  had  been  improved  and  served  as  the 
model  with  other  Sun  suppliers.  Birkbys  has  also  used  the  learning  gained  from  the  Sun 
alliance  to  manage  its  other  customers  and  sub-tier  suppliers. 
The  close  association  between  Sun  and  Birkbys  had  ceased.  For  Sun,  the  alliance  had 
achieved  an  objective  of  outsourcing  low  end  value  work.  For  Birkbys,  the  company  had 
doubled  its  turnover  during  the  alliance  period  and  was  now  in  a  position  to  work  directly 
with  the  US  company.  Although  Sun  Linlithgow  and  Birkbys  had  terminated  their  Scottish 
association,  Birkbys  was  now  working  with  Sun  in  th  e  United  States  as  a  direct  result  of  the 
alliance. 
Given  the  difficulty  in  capturing  complex  social  and  interpersonal  relations  using  tightly 
structured  research  methods)  both  deductive  and  inductive  methods  have  been  employed. 
These  methods  were  used  to  achieve  the  research  objective  of  understanding  alliance 
relationships  as  they  mature  with  the  passage  of  time.  Gaining  access  to  three  alliances, 
allowed  the  investigator  to  explore  and  capture  diverse  events  and  their  effect  on  players  in 
dynamic,  changing  business  environments.  Stages  or  characteristics  may  not  be  plainly 
evident  as  each  alliance  was  at  a  different  level  of  maturity  and  more  importance  may  have 
been  given  to  certain  aspects  rather  than  others.  Nevertheless  the  work  described  in  detail 
how  characteristics  were  manifested  within  and  between  the  alliance  stages  and  how  they 
270 influenced  implementation  and  progress.  Table  6.9  summaries  the  development  of  the 
framework  in  the  cases. 
Stage  0  Stage  I  Stage  H  Stage  Ell  Stage  IV  Stage  V 
IDV/Kifleen  x  x  x  x 
SCA  x  x  x  x  x 
SunlBirkbys  x  x  Ix  Ix  tx  x 
Table  6.9  Stages  Present  in  each  Case 
Table  6.9  indicates  that  both  the  Supply  Chain  Alliance  and  the  Sun/  Birkbys  agreement 
had  a  period  of  pre-alliance  analysis.  In  the  light  of  these  findings,  the  data  from  the  IDW 
Killeen  alliance  was  revisited  to  search  for  evidence  of  a  preliminary  stage  prior  to  the 
alliance  being  formally  recognised.  The  following  describes  activities  of  ]IDV  and  Killeen 
apropos  and  prior  to  signing  the  partnering  agreement  in  August  1994. 
6.7  STAGE  I  IN  THE  IIDV/KIILLEEN  CASE 
f- 
6.7.1  Alliance  Agreement 
IDV  and  Killeen  both  signed  a  partnering  agreement  at  the  outset  of  the  alliance.  Although 
informal,  the  agreement  provided  the  guidelines  within  which  the  alliance  would  operate 
for  the  first  three  years.  This  stated  the  objectives  to  be  achieved  by  each  party  as  well  as 
the  team  structure  and  membership. 
6.7.2  Cultural  Compatibility 
There  was  no  attempt  to  consider  cultural  compatibility,  although  both  the  companies  had  a 
similar  heritage  and  open  style  of  management.  Both  companies  had  flat  organisational 
structures  and  were  autonomous  with  respect  to  their  corporate  owners. 
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"At  the  beginning  of  the  partnership  we  identified  this  20%  gap.  Killeen  realised  they'd  a 
great  deal  to  lose  and  had  to  do  something  about  it.  A  very  strong  competitive  element 
motivated  and  focused  everyone  and  at  the  end  of  the  day  the  hoped  for  results  were 
delivered  "  (B,  IDV,  96,7:  1) 
Market  analysis  brought  up  a  number  of  challenges.  Of  particular  significance  was  the  fact 
that  IDV's  box  supplier  was  20%  uncompetitive  compared  with  UK  suppliers,  and  that  in 
the  corrugated  market,  price  variations  had  usually  been  passed  onto  the  customer  without 
adverse  reaction.  There  were  also  concerns  about  quality,  for  example,  case  failures, 
production  stoppages  and  print  quality.  The  small  runs  that  IDV  demanded  from  Killeen 
contributed  to  the  malaise.  Also,  there  was  a  large  amount  of  finished  and  redundant  stock. 
All  these  factors,  as  well  as  internal  IDV  year  end  pressures  and  poor  communication, 
resulted  in  unwelcome  high  costs  and  waste.  Both  IDV  and  Killeen  objectives  are 
summarised  in  table  6.10  below-.  - 
*  Greater  competitiveness 
*  Change  of  behaviour 
*  20%  cost  reduction 
*  Board  quality  and  print  quality  improvements 
"  Logistics  improvement 
"  Smooth  planning 
"  Eliminate  year  end  pressures 
Improve  competitiveness 
Secure  customers  in  volatile  market 
Gain  competitive  edge  in  terms  of  print  quality 
Promote  print  innovation 
IDV  used  as  the  vehicle  to  express  and 
achieve  the  above  aims 
Table  6.10:  Alliance  Objectives 
272 6.7.4  History  of  Working  Together 
IDV  and  Killeen  had  been  doing  business  together  for  over  twenty  years,  albeit  in  a 
traditional  way.  Surprisingly,  prior  to  the  alliance,  both  companies  had  little  personal 
contact  with  the  other  despite  the  fact  that  the  two  factories  were  only  half  a  mile  apart. 
6.7.5  Partner  Selection 
IDV  managers  took  a  pragmatic  view  of  partnering  and  held  that  alliancing,  based  on 
willingness  and  trust,  had  to  be  used  as  a  management  tool  to  improve  business  and 
develop  supplier  capabilities  in  tenns  of  cost  reduction  and  R&D  opportunities. 
"Choosing  an  alliance  partner  was  a  learning  exercise  for  me.  Having  identified  which 
suppliers  are  strategic,  you  ask  yourself  which  ones  have  the  resources  to  make  it 
worthwhile  cultivating  the  relationship.  It's  no  use  embarking  on  a  strategic  relationship 
with  a  supplier;  ifyou  simply  buy  a  commodity.  You've  got  to  look  at  where  there's  room 
for  development,  room  to  jointly  invest  in  either  processes  or  procedures  or  products,  so 
that  both  parties  benefit  and  resources  can  be  devoted  to  it.  "  (BD,  IDV,  96,7:  2) 
6.7.6  Previous  Experience  of  Partnering 
Although  business  relations  between  IDV  Operations  and  Killeen  were  of  long  standing, 
there  was  a  strong  recognition  by  Killeen  that  it  had  to  consolidate  its  support  of  IDV, 
which  it  valued  as  a  very  significant  customer. 
Other  parts  of  IDDV  had  claimed  some  success  in  implementing  collaborative  ways  of 
working.  Notable  in  this  regard  was  J&B  Whisky,  which  was  operating  in  a  somewhat 
similar  environment.  IDV  Europe  was  also  keen  to  build  up  a  team  of  supply  chain  experts 
to  develop  and  spread  best  practice  throughout  the  IDV  group  of  companies. 
273 At  the  same  time,  people  in  other  parts  of  the  Smurfit  Group,  Killeen's  parent  company, 
were  investigating  similar  issues  with  customers  and  overall  the  circumstances  at  the  time 
were  favourable  for  partnering.  The  situation  was  undoubtedly  helped  by  the  fact  that 
IDV's  Procurement  Director  and  the  relatively  new  MD  of  Killeen  had  personally 
established  a  very  good  working  relationship. 
Other  factors  in  the  background  included  the  German  National  Marketing  Company's 
(NMC's)  experience  as  regards  a  more  open  approach  to  inventory  management.  This 
involved  IDV  examining  computer  records  appertaining  to  the  distribution  channel  with  the 
aim  of  smoothing  out  production  fluctuations  and  allocating  stocks  in  a  more  coherent  way 
(see  appendix  VIR).  Although  at  an  early  stage,  allied  to  this  was  the  introduction  of 
Distribution  Requirements  Planning  Software  at  Gilbey's  of  Ireland  Sales  for  direct 
interaction  with  IDV)  as  well  as  the  development  of  computerised  planning  and  control 
systems  within  IDV  itself. 
Persistent  efforts  to  encourage  more  open  communication  and  greater  interaction  in  and 
between  the  NMC's  and  operating  companies  also  helped  to  change  adversarial  behaviour 
of  the  past. 
In  1996,  "Operation  Phoenix7  was  set  up  at  corporate  level  to  determine  a  strategy  for 
integration  of  systems  and  reduction  of  the  number  of  warehouses.  The  objective  was  a 
more  rapid  response  to  customer  demand  and  to  streamline  the  whole  European  logistics 
operation.  This  involved  examining  the  physical  location  of  distribution  centres,  analysing 
how  information  was  gathered,  in  particular  forecasting,  and  the  way  data  was 
communicated  back  through  the  supply  chain  to  the  operating  companies.  Operation 
Phoenix  was  a  comprehensive  logistical  review  of  the  process  from  receipt  of  an  order  to 
delivery  to  the  customer. 
11  0  It  sa  huge  logistical  project  and  will  significantly  reduce  warehouses  in  Europe.  I  think 
ultimately  it'll  extend  down  the  supply  chain  to  the  vendors,  instead  of  having  a 
manufacturing  plant  that  attempts  to  do  all  things,  that  is,  tries  to  deliver  volume,  mix 
SKU's  as  well  as  gives  rapid  service.  It's  impossible  to  do  all  of  these  together.  It  may 
274 mean  that  there  is  a  plant  within  a  plant,  specifically  designed  to  produce  a  variety  of 
SKU's  and  deliver  a  very  rapid  service  with  short  lead  time,  and  in  another  part,  afacifity 
designed  to  generate  one  SKU  at  volume.  "  (PD,  IDV,  98,2:  4) 
Killeen's  previous  attempts  at  partnering  had  been  unsuccessful,  so  this  new  Killeen  /  IDV 
example  created  little  interest  within  the  Smurfit  group.  Smurfit  managers  had  been  given 
a  high  degree  of  autonomy  and  could  run  their  plant  any  way  they  thought  fit,  as  long  as 
margins  continued  to  meet  the  Group's  expectations.  The  manager  at  Killeen  went  ahead 
with  the  alliance  and  it  was  only  after  it  had  been  going  for  some  years  that  Smurfit 
corporate  began  to  take  notice. 
6.7.7  Strategic  Intent 
The  significant  event  behind  the  proposal  to  take  a  partnering  route  was  an  IDV 
benchmarking  survey  of  other  IDV  operating  companies.  The  purpose  of  the  exercise  was 
to  evaluate  who  was  buying  what  in  terms  of  corrugated  packaging  and  at  what  price.  This 
survey,  subsequently  termed  "the  blue  book!  ',  indicated  that  Killeen  was  20%  less 
competitive,  compared  with  other  UK  suppliers  of  corrugated  packaging. 
Switching  immediately  to  a  new  supplier  was  a  real  option  and  there  was  considerable 
pressure  within  IDV  to  do  so.  However  a  number  of  people  in  IDV  Operations  Ireland  felt 
that  if  this  happened  they  would  lose  all  the  experience  and  reliable  service  they  were  used 
to  getting  from  the  local  supplier. 
Initially  IDV's  overriding  motivation  for  the  alliance  was  to  reduce  cost. 
"The  whole  point  of  the  exercise  is  to  get  closer  and  closer  to  someone  like  Killeen, 
and  to  take  out  costs.  jop  (PDJDV,  97,2:  1) 
The  original  partnering  agreement  in  August  1994,  not  only  referred  to  the  need  to  reduce 
base  costs  by  the  20%  target  but  it  also  said  that  savings  above  this  figure  were  to  be  shared 
275 at  a  proportion  of  70:  30  between  IDV  and  Killeen.  Raw  material  costs,  recognised  as  highly 
volatile,  were  to  be  subject  of  separate  negotiation. 
IDV  Operations  vision  is  to  establish  "World  Class"  performance,  especially  as  compared 
with  other  parts  of  the  IDV  group. 
Killeen!  s  goal  was  to  retain  its  reputation  for  quality  print  and  packaging  and  to  increase  its 
share  of  the  Irish  market.  Killeen  took  a  pragmatic  view  of  the  benefits  of  the  partnering 
relationship  and  decided  that  the  best  tactic  was  to  become  "tied-in"  to  IDV, 
"We're  in  the  partnership  hecause  of  the  trade  with  IDVjbr  more  than  twenty  years.  Ae 
more  dependent  they  are  on  us  the  more  secure  we  are,  which  is  as  good  as  having 
competitive  advantage.  777e  fact  that  ftiendships  have  huilt  up,  and  loya4  is  stronger,  in 
itseyýis  very  helpful"  (FMX97,3:  4) 
After  discussion  with  Killeen,  III)Vs  preferred  solution  was  to  work  together  to  beat  the 
competition  via  an  alliance  route.  At  the  time  neither  company  knew  what  it  was  getting 
into. 
Other  areas  that  needed  attention  were  identified,  including  quality.  EDV  had  been 
experiencing  difficulties  on  the  production  line  that  had  caused  stoppages  and  also  some 
box  failures,  indicating  that  the  case  quality  was  below  standard.  Apart  from  this  issue,  the 
companies  wanted  to  move  forward  in  terms  of  product  development. 
"  We  took  stock  of  business  between  ourselves  and  noted  a  couple  of  areas  needing 
attention.  One  was  quality,  as  we  were  experiencing  difficulties  on  the  production  line  and 
the  other  was  field  failures  where  cases  were  proving  unfit  for  the  intended  purpose.  " 
(PD,  IDV,  97,2:  1) 
Killeen  utilised  flexographic  printing  and,  because  of  the  importance  of  the  packaging  for 
retail  display,  it  was  decided  that  ways  to  improve  print  quality  should  be  investigated. 
Killeen's  particularly  talented  print  team  had  won  company  awards  for  innovative  use  of 
276 the  flexographic  techniques.  Killeen's  aim  was  to  attain  lithographic  print  quality  using  the 
flexographic  process. 
"  There  was  also  an  R&D  part  to  it.  Killeen  had  just  put  in  a  flexographic  postprint 
machine  that  had  great  potential  in  terms  of  improving  print  quality,  so  we  decided  we  had 
a  good  change  to  take  afurther  innovative  step.  "  (PD,  IDV,  97,2:  2) 
6.8  CONCEPTUAL  DEVELOPMENT 
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Figure  6.1.  Six  Stage  Framework  of  Alliance  Development 
Each  case  study  has  led  to  the  refinement  of  a  framework  which  describes  the  progressive 
development  in  the  alliances  investigated  as  illustrated  in  figure  6.1 
The  feedback  loop  demonstrates  the  non-linearity  and  emergent  quality  of  the  alliance 
process.  Regardless  of  the  stage,  there  was  a  continuous  requirement  for  the  partners  to 
assess  and  review  performance  against  the  planned  objectives.  In  this  way,  each  alliance 
was  managed  proactively  with  adjustments  made  as  and  when  required.  That  is,  the 
strategies  were  dynamic  and  with  each  iteration,  partners  learned  how  to  deal  with  complex 
situations  more  effectively. 
277 The  diagram  also  illustrates,  by  the  lower  curved  arrows,  that  when  companies  withdraw 
from  a  particular  alliance,  the  knowledge  gained  may  be  used  to  generate  other  alliances. 
In  this  event,  the  cycle  ending  in  Stage  V  would  begin  again  at  Stag(  ,0  with  a  new  partner. 
The  framework  was  advanced  using  a  number  of  methodologies.  In  the  first  instance  the 
early  conceptualisation  was  built  upon  a  review  of  supply  chain  alliance  literature  and 
secondary  data  and  provided  a  foundation  to  refocus  the  research  aims  and  objectives. 
Data  gathering,  observation  and  interviews  continued  in  parallel  with  the  introduction  of  a 
second  field  site  and  in  this  instance,  there  was  little  historical  data  to  inform  the  model. 
This  presented  the  opportunity  to  apply  an  inductive  approach  and  allow  the  framework  to 
emerge  empirically  from  field  research.  Finally,  secondary  data  from  the  third  alliance 
helped  to  further  develop  the  framework. 
The  foregoing  chapters,  four,  five  and  six  explain  in  detail  construction  of  the  framework 
which  progressively  evolved  using  data  from  three  research  sites,  each  case  study  explores, 
describes  and  analyses  the  interactions  and  processes  in  the  alliances  under  investigation. 
Chapter  seven,  reflects  on  the  research  questions:  -ý 
7.  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
8.  Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itself  from  another? 
9.  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops,  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
10.  Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in  anotter 
11.  What  factors  identify  the  transition  from  one  stage  to  another? 
12.  What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
And  discusses  and  compares  the  cases  described  in  chapters  four,  five  and  six. 
278 Chapter  Seven 
Discussion  -  Part  I 7.0  DISCUSSION  -  PART  I 
7.0.1  CONCEPTUAL  DEVELOPMENT 
To  remind  the  reader,  the  research  objective  for  this  thesis  was  to  investigate  the  notion  of 
phased  evolutionary  development  in  strategic  alliances.  As  an  additional  aide-memoire 
figure  7.1  illustrates  the  initial  framework  established  from  the  exploratory  phase  of  this 
research  (refer  to  chapter  4.0,  page  12  1). 
This  chapter  aims  to  address  specifically  the  following  questions  -- 
1.  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
2.  Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itself  from  another? 
3.  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
4.  Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in  another 
5.  What  factors  identify  the  transition  from  one  stage  to  another? 
6.  What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
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Figure  7.1.  Early  Conceptual  Framework 
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Figure  7.2:  Progressive  Relationship  Development  in  Alliances 
Figure  7.2  illustrates  the  framework  developed  from  data  in  three  case  studies.  On  the  basis 
of  findings,  answers  to  research  questions  posed  at  the  outset  of  the  study  substantiate  the 
characteristic  features  within  each  stage  and  whether  it  is  possible  to  recognise  the  signs 
when  an  alliance  is  in  transition. 
The  answers  to  questions  1,2,3  and  4  are  discussed  in  the  following  sections  7.1  -  7.5  and 
questions  5  and  6  in  7.6  -  7.8. 
7.1  STAGE  0 
The  main  attributes  in  this  stage  are  listed  alphabetically  below,  rather  than  in  order  of 
importance.  Each  will  be  discussed  in  turn,  with  reference  to  the  three  cases.  The  findings 
are  summarise  as  propositions  to  capture  the  essence  of  each  characteristic,  for  example 
PO.  I  means  first  finding  as  described  in  Stage  0,  similarly  P  1.1,  means  first  finding  in  Stage 
I. 
"  Alliance  agreement 
"  Environmental  analysis 
"  History  of  working  together 
"  Organisational  readiness 
"  Partner  selection 
Previous  alliance  experience 
Strategic  intent 
280 7.1.1  Alliance  Agreement 
Of  the  three  alliances  in  which  the  author  has  had  involvement,  two  had  a  measure  of 
agreement  in  place  before  start-up.  IDV  and  Killeen  both  signed  a  partnering  agreement  at 
the  outset.  The  agreement  provided  the  guidelines  within  which  the  association  would 
operate  for  the  first  three  years.  This  stated  the  objectives  to  be  achieved  by  each  party  as 
well  as  the  team  structure  and  membership.  The  concordat  reflected  the  culture  of  the 
alliance  partners  and  the  degree  of  autonomy  that  each  organisation  had  vis-i-vis  the  parent 
group  (refer  to  chapter  6.7.1,  page  27  1). 
UESL  had  to  demonstrate  to  the  tender  board  a  clear  business  case  for  taking  the  alliance 
route  and  the  UESL  alliance  contract  was  designed  to  facilitate  outsourcing  in  a  controlled 
and  measured  way  (refer  to  chapter  5.1.1,  page  174). 
In  contrast,  in  the  case  of  the  Sun  Microsystems  and  Birkbys,  there  was  no  long  term 
alliance  agreement  in  place  and  although  Sun's  unequivocal  strategy  was  to  form  closer 
relations  with  selected  suppliers,  it  did  not  communicate  this  to  Birkbys  (refer  to  chapter 
6.1.1,  page  225). 
From  the  outset,  master/servant  relations  predominated  in  all  three  alliances  and  the 
suppliers  were  not  confident  enough  to  reveal  to  the  customer  what  the  terms  demanded 
meant  to  their  business.  The  outcome  was  that  before  the  alliances  were  able  to  gain 
momentum,  the  shortcomings  of  the  agreements,  whether  tacit  or  explicit,  surfaced  and  the 
contracts  had  to  be  adjusted  to  make  the  goals  mutually  beneficial. 
PO.  1  Agreements  provide  the  structure  and  ground  rules  fundamental  to  the  alliance 
future,  therefore  compiling  the  alliance  agreement  is  a  joint  activity  otherwise 
differing  expectations  may  inhibitprogress. 
281 7.1.2  Environmental  Analysis 
This  looks  at  changing  market  demands,  customer  needs,  new  technology  and  monitors 
competition.  The  results  of  such  a  search  are  extensive  and  complex.  Changing  markets, 
globalisation,  speed  of  change  and  fierce  competition  have  had  very  significant  effects  on 
the  future  of  the  businesses  featured  in  the  three  studies. 
IDV's  (later  UDV)  consolidation  of  its  logistics  and  distribution  network  and  later  Diageo's 
drive  towards  globalisation  meant  that  competition  and  innovation  were  the  most  influential 
factors  justifying  the  alliance  route.  Although  IDV's  operations  in  Ireland  enjoyed 
considerable  autonomy  prior  to  the  merger,  Diageol's  objective  of  doubling  shareholder 
value  in  three  years  meant  that  sourcing  had  to  be,  based  on  worldwide  competitiveness. 
Retaining  the  packaging  supply  contract  in  Ireland  was  no  longer  an  option  for  Killeen, 
unless  it  could  be  proved  to  be  the  cheapest. 
Also,  the  world  wide  drinks  market  was  changing.  In  the  past,  companies  were  prohibited 
from  advertising  on  radio  and  television  and  these  laws  had  been  relaxed.  Consequently, 
UDV  marketing  no  longer  had  to  depend  solely  on  the  brand  image  generated  by  the  outer 
case  and  it  could  consider  simpler  packaging  designs  and  alternative  suppliers  (refer  to 
chapter  4.4.8,  page  163;  6.7.3,  page  272). 
Similarly,  the  fast,  highly  competitive  industry  that  Sun  Microelectronics  was  in,  meant  that 
constant  market  surveillance  was  imperative  to  stay  ahead  of  the  competition  (refer 
6.1.2,  page  226). 
Over  supply  and  the  consequent  oil  price  slump  in  April  1998  had  a  huge  impact  on  the 
UESL,  SNIL  and  ARRC  alliance.  The  strategy  adopted  embraced  an  outsourcing  policy  and 
to  gain  momentum  the  alliance  had  to  be  seen  to  be  the  lowest  cost  service  provider. 
282 Similarly,  supplier  companies  had  to  be  aware  of  environmental  and  market  intelligence 
and  it  was  noteworthy  that  the  small  though  entrepreneurial  haulage  company,  ARRC,  was 
pre-eminent  in  obtaining  this  kind  of  local  knowledge  (refer  to  chapter  5.1.2,  page  174). 
PO.  2  Market  analysis  is  required  to  be  rigorous  and  ongoing  in  order  to  ensure  that  the 
cooperative  strategy  is  the  most  appropriate  and  will  encourage  continuous 
improvement. 
7.1.3  History  of  Organisations  Working  Together 
IDV  and  Killeen  have  at  least  two  decades  of  experience  working  together  and  Baileys 
(IDV)  is  a  very  profitable  brand  with  a  worldwide  reputation.  Similarly,  Killeen  was  well 
known  for  innovative  print  skills  and  up  until  1994  there  was  no  real  attempt  by  IDV  to 
source  an  alternative  supplier  for  its  high  profile  box.  During  this  time  contact  between  the 
two  companies  was  kept  at  arms  length  with  no  transfer  of  technological  or  process 
knowledge  apd  consequently  there  was  no  question  of  joint  innovation  (refer  to  chapter 
6.7.4,  page  273). 
In  the  Sun  and  Birkbys  case,  collaboration  began  in  1991  although  neither  had  any 
experience  of  the  other  company  prior  to  that  time.  Birkbys  was  chosen  by  Sun  because  of 
its  apparent  technological  expertise  and  its  location  (refer  to  chapter  6.1.3,  page  226).  Sun 
was  unaware  of  Birkbys  limitations  and  the  latter  had  to  come  up  to  the  Sun  quality 
standards  very  quickly.  As  a  consequence  of  Sun  nurturing  its  supplier  from  the  start,  there 
was  an  immediate  transfer  of  knowledge  and  innovation  from  Sun  into  Birkbys. 
Shell  (UESL)  had  worked  with  both  Seaforth  Maritime  (SML)  and  ARRC  prior  to  the 
alliance,  but  the  two  contractors  had  not  worked  together  and  in  fact  were  competitors. 
The  contract  between  UESL  and  ARRC  was  traditional,  but  ARRC  was  small  and 
entrepreneurial  in  spirit  and  provided  a  trouble  ftee  service.  Contractors  like  ARRC,  whose 
safety  performance  was  exemplary,  protected  UESL's  high  profile  reputation  and  there  was 
a  sense  of  trust  between  it  and  ARRC  management.  It  was  quite  a  different  relationship  in 
293 UESL's  other  contracts  and  ARRC  worked  well  with  UESL  to  improve  transport  efficiency 
using  initiative  and  innovation.  This  never  altered  throughout  the  duration  of  the  alliance. 
A  comparison  suggests  that  the  organisations  examined  started  roughly  from  the  same 
point,  despite  a  history  of  previous  working  relations.  Indeed,  past  experience  may  have 
required  unlearning  in  the  first  instance,  to  break  down  old  attitudes  and  perceptions.  With 
regard  to  Sun  and  Birkbys,  Sun  immediately  began  by  helping  Birkbys  to  stretch  its 
capabilities. 
PO.  3  The  degree  of  communication  and  interaction  that  characterise  an  alliance  are 
not  usually  encountered  in  a  traditional  contractual  relationship  Therefore 
prior  working  experience,  in  the  traditional  sense,  may  not  necessarily  be 
cnacal  to  a  successful  alliance 
7.1.4  Partner  Selection 
Partner  choice  was  measured  against  criteria  imposed  by  the  customers  in  all  three  cases. 
IDV  used  a  conventional  portfolio  matrix  based  on  high  risk  and  availability  of  alternative 
resources. 
Sun  Microelectronics  selected  Birkbys  on  the  presumption  that  a  UK  company  could 
perform  to  the  same  standard  as  a  counterpart  in  the  USA.  Birkbys  location  in  Britain  was 
favourable  as  it  reduced  transportation  and  lead  times.  Other  major  considerations  were 
Birkbys  technical  expertise,  its  innovative  culture  and  sophisticated  R&D  facilities  (refer  to 
chapter  6.1.4,  page  227). 
UESL's  selection  was  based  on  commercial  awareness,  and  depended  on  its  estimation  of 
the  technical  risk  and  the  potential  added  value  of  the  UESL/  SMU  ARRC  alliance. 
ARRC"s  reputation  for  quality  and  efficiency  was  a  large  selling  point  in  favour  of  the  joint 
tender  to  the  Shell  tender  board  (refer  to  chapter  5.1.4,  page  175). 
284 In  all  cases,  partner  selection  was  carried  out  with  an  eye  on  supplier  reputation  and 
performance.  1DV,  Sun  and  UESL  all  helped  to  support  their  suppliers.  They  did  not  do 
this  prior  to  the  start  of  the  agreement  but  were  notably  considerate  throughout  the  alliance 
in  trying  to  understand  incidents  and  appropriate  actions  from  the  ally's  point  of  view. 
PO.  4  Over  time,  the  position  of  the  partner  shifts  as  the  market  and  competitors 
change.  Maintaining  strategic  differentiation  forces  both  customer  and  supplier 
tojointly  produce  solutions  that  demonstrate  both  lowest  cost  and  added  value. 
Shared  values  fostered  a  positive  attitude  regarding  the  alliance  and  greater  commitment  by 
the  partners.  The  process  can  be  made  smoother  if  the  companies  involved  subscribe  to  a 
similar  set  of  values,  hold  similar  views  on  professional  excellence  and  are  motivated  to 
achieve  the  same  goals.  This  was  clearly  evidenced  in  the  match  between  IDV  and  Killeen 
and  in  the  UESL  and  ARRC  link,  although  there  seemed  to  be  little  attempt  to  consider 
cultural  compatibility  when  selecting  the  partner.  Obvious  cultural  diversity  between  SMIL 
/  ARRC  affected  the  alliance  so  much  that  one  or  two  individuals  could  not  resist  malicious 
threatening  and  petty  squabbling.  Trust  between  some  senior  figures  in  SMEL  and  ARRC 
was  missing  and  UESL  seemed  powerless  to  resolve  this  issue.  It's  attention  was  on 
reorganisation  and  dealing  with  immediately  pressing  issues. 
PO.  S  Cultural  compatibility  is  not  seen  as  an  important  criterion  when  selecting 
partners,  although  in  the  early  stage  of  an  alliance,  cultural  compatibility  can 
help  the  companies  develop  a  sense  of  purpose  through  shared  values  and 
beliefs 
7.1.5  Previous  Alliance  Experience 
In  all  cases,  the  companies  had  little  or  no  experience  of  alliances  and  were  breaking  new 
ground.  1ODV  had  some  knowledge  of  a  mainland  European  alliance  but  this  did  not  impact 
on  the  Irish  partnership  (refer  to  chapter  6.7.6,  page  273). 
285 Sun  regularly  sent  teams  into  supply  companies  to  help  define  processes  and  investigate 
problems,  however,  this  activity  did  not  constitute  an  alliance  commitment  (refer  to  chapter 
6.1.5,  page  228). 
Shell  had  numerous  alliances  going  on  at  the  same  time  throughout  the  organisation  but 
there  was  no  attempt  to  institutionalise  a  process  to  share  or  transfer  learning.  The  UESL, 
SNIL,  ARRC  alliance  was  stimulated  by  a  Shell  senior  manager's  experience  of  an  offshore 
alliance  (refer  to  chapter  5.1.5,  page  177). 
In  all  cases  senior  executives,  convinced  that  cooperative  working  was  a  better  way  to  do 
business,  led  the  alliance.  In  the  first  instance,  it  was  the  blend  of  authority  and 
organisational  hierarchy  that  provided  the  appropriate  conditions  for  positive  action. 
However,  in  the  long  term,  conversion  had  more  to  do  with  personal  characteristics, 
leadership,  integrity,  and  ability  to  influence  and  negotiate. 
Although  all  three  cases  were  relatively  successful  alliances,  in  that  they  achieved  the 
objectives,  many  senior  managers  remained  suspicious.  There  were  perceptions  that 
suppliers  were  using  this  way  of  working  to  exploit  the  customer  and  vice  versa,  although 
the  only  true  measure  of  success  was  financial.  Competitive  tendering  and  traditional 
contracts  were  considered  by  some  as  more  acceptable  as  they  apparently  safeguard 
organisations  from  possibilities  of  exploitation. 
PO.  6  Managers  who  have  experienced  successful  alliances  will  continue  to 
champion  change.  Individuals  not  institutions  transfer  learning  between 
alliances. 
7.1.6  Strategic  Intent 
Competitive  market  pressure  was  the  initial  motivation  in  all  cases  and  the  original  aim  was 
to  reduce  costs  and  add  value.  Strategic  intent  stimulated  a  series  of  activities  targeted 
towards  objectives  and  tactics  within  the  partner  organisations,  namely  cost  benefit 
286 analysis,  internal  persuasion,  environmental  analysis  and  ultimately  discussion  and 
negotiation  with  the  potential  partners.  Strategic  intent  was  important  and  because  of  the 
considerable  effort  and  commitment  prior  to  the  alliance,  participants  were  likely  to  be 
more  sympathetic  to  difficulties  at  the  earlier  stages  and  find  ways  to  move  the  process 
forward. 
In  every  case  costs  were  significantly  reduced  and  the  suppliers  improved  their  productive 
capacity  and  efficiency.  However,  a  notable  feature  was  that,  on  the  most  part,  the  alliances 
were  left  alone  by  their  respective  parent  corporations  to  manage  the  strategy. 
In  IDV  this  all  changed  with  the  Diageo  merger  when  a  new  level  of  complexity  was 
introduced.  The  pressure  to  reduce  costs  and  to  source  from  the  most  competitive  supplier 
was  overriding.  The  business  case  was  no  longer  an  issue  between  IDV  and  Killeen,  in 
Ireland,  but  a  much  bigger  opportunity  for  IDV  and  the  Jefferson  Smurfit  organisation 
(refer  also  to  chapter  6.7.7,  page  275). 
Interestingly,  Sun  Microsystems  changed  from  global  to  local  sourcing  in  order  to  improve 
customer  service  and  reduce  lead  times,  and  then  returned  to  global.  To  reduce  logistics 
costs  further  and  to  supply  Sun's  needs,  Birkbys  built  a  plant  in  Scotland  located  near  to 
Sun  (refer  to  6.1.6,  page  229). 
UESL's  original  aim  to  optimise  assets  and  cut  costs  to  internal  customers  had  been  put 
under  greater  pressure  by  over  supply  in  the  period  to  1998  and  the  consequent  low  price  of 
oil.  The  intention  was  also  to  change  the  way  the  organisations  had  been  working,  that  is, 
away  from  the  customary  "control  and  tell"  contract,  to  a  style  of  working  where  all  parties 
could  mutually  benefit  (refer  to  chapter  5.1.6,  page  178).  As  with  Diageo,  the  main 
concern  was  cutting  costs  and  UESL  was  involving  contractors  to  help  meet  its  corporate 
budget  targets. 
In  summary,  the  power  of  the  market  underpinned  the  trend  towards  collaboration  and 
customers  realised  that  they  must  use  suppliers'  knoWledge  to  achieve  targets. 
297 PO.  7  In  response  to  hoth  external  and  internal  changes  strategic  intent  evolves  to 
identify  new  priorities.  A  flexible  alliance  strategy  can  adapt  quickly,  yet 
maintain  a  cooperative  philosophy  as  changing  internal  re-organisation  and 
market  conditions  dictate. 
Figure  7.3  illustrates  the  thematic  grouping  of  distinctive  features  and  sub  criteria  of 
findings  in  Stage  0. 
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Figure  7.3  Thematic  Grouping  in  Stage  0 
7.2  STAGE  I 
The  main  characteristics  in  Stage  I  as  described  in  the  individual  case  studies  are  arranged 
below  in  alphabetical  order.  The  comparison  that  follows  discusses  how  influential  each 
aspect  was  in  the  individual  cases  and  how  they  relate  to  the  conceptual  framework. 
9  Building  trust 
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7.2.1  Building  Trust 
The  underlying  motivation  of  all  parties  to  trust  was  rational  behaviour,  based  on 
anticipated  reciprocity.  This  was  reflected  in  the  early  alliances  stages  by  fluctuations  in 
the  degree  of  inter-personal  and  inter-organisational  trust. 
Given  that  trust  remains  at  the  heart  of  all  good  business  and  social  relations,  an  atmosphere 
of  trust  provided  the  ground  for  achieving  mutual  goals.  Trust  was  a  basic  ingredient  in 
negotiation  and  there  was  no  hope  of  accommodation  in  the  absence  of  trust.  Trusting 
relations  also  created  favourable  conditions  for  further  developments  that  had  not  been 
anticipated  at  the  outset.  However,  it  was  not  until  there  was  evidence  that  the  alliances 
were  benefiting  all  the  participant  companies  that trust  began  to  grow  and  interaction 
increased. 
In  all  cases  reciprocity  was  demonstrated  by  considerate  behaviour,  which  helped 
realisation  of  tangible  benefits  such  as  increased  profit  or  reduced  costs.  Consequently  it 
was  as  much  an  ingredient  of  cooperation  as  a  product  of  it  and  trust  gradually  increased  as 
people  got  to  know  each  other  better.  All  three  alliances  were  able  to  resolve  issues  by 
promoting  more  communication  and  information  sharing,  thereby  reducing  opportunistic 
behaviour,  which  is  the  antithesis  of  trusting  conduct. 
The  alliances  were  tricky  to  manage,  particularly  at  the  outset  when  inevitably  frustration 
was  experienced  from  lack  of  immediate  results.  Especially  in  the  SCA,  it  was  difficult  for 
289 UESL  managers  to  understand  that  they  had  to  relinquish  some  control,  so  as  to  foster 
freethinking.  Inter-organisational  teams  required  a  measure  of  autonomy  and  this  caused 
problems  as  individual  managers  resented  losing  control  over  logistical  activities. 
From  a  strategic  perspective,  teamwork  was  part  of  the  alliances'  response  to 
environmental challenges  and  it  involved  building  competencies  and  capabilities,  for 
example  sharing  information  among  teams  and  negotiating  for  resources.  Individual  trust 
was  improved  because  of  the  boundary  spanning  activities  of  the  teams,  growing  familiarity 
with  others,  interaction  and  freer  communication. 
Trust  helped  to  stabilise  relations  and  promote  exchanges  of  information  and  imparting  of 
knowledge.  This  confidence  between  the  companies  in  the  alliances  was  an  essential 
element  in  periods  of  crisis.  In  each  alliance,  communication  was  the  foundation  of 
confidence  and  sharing  technical  assistance  was  instrumental  in  increasing  this  trust 
between  the  partners  as  well  as  in  reducing  opportunism.  Often  projects  involved  sharing  of 
confidential  information  and  this  could  be  difficult.  In  the  case  of  IDV  and  Killeen,  the 
degree  of  information  disclosure  between  senior  management  helped  the  teams  break  down 
communication  barriers  and  resulted  in  cooperation  at  a  senior  level,  which  cascaded  into 
the  teams  (refer  to  chapter  4.1.1,  page  129). 
Trust  was  erratic  in  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  and  expectations  of  performance  were 
greater  than  actually  realised.  Both  companies  took  time  to  learn  what  each  anticipated  of 
the  other  and  this  was  further  complicated  because  Sun  had  not  revealed  its  long  term  plan 
and  Birkbys  position  within  it  (refer  to  chapter  6.2.1,  page  232) 
As  far  as  the  SCA  in  Aberdeen  was  concerned,  erratic  trust  was  due  to  the  perceived 
ambivalent  attitude  of  one  of  the  contractors  towards  UESL  as  well  as  unfulfilled 
expectations  of  performance.  On  the  most  part  concerns  about  trust  affected  relations  and 
interaction  between  high  level  managers,  while  on  a  day-to-day  basis  supervisors  working 
together  at  the  operational  level  were  often  confused  by  management  behaviour  (refer  to 
chapter  5.2.1,  pages  183). 
290 By  the  end  of  the  first  stage,  people  were  achieving  their  expectations  overall,  reciprocity 
was  encouraging  trust  building  and  personal  working  relations  were  improving.  Most 
significantly,  research  skills  within  the  alliance  teams  were  growing  and  there  was  a 
heightened  commercial  awareness  and  customer  focus  as  a  result  of  the  alliances.  Table  7.1 
illustrates  factors  which  influenced  trust  in  the  alliances  studied. 
Communication  between  individuals 
Disclosure  of  confidential  inforniation 
Inter-organisational  team  activity 
Experience  of  working  with  each  other 
Partnering  agreement  with  explicit  objectives 
and  ground  rules 
Visible  senior  management  commitment 
Shared  technical  assistance 
"  Ambivalent  attitude  towards  one's  partner 
"  Performance  expectations  not  reciprocated 
"  Under-rcsourced  partner 
Closed  culture,  suspicion 
Not  understariding  partner's  vision 
No  alliance  agreement  or  ground  rules 
Table  7:  1:  Summaqv  of  Factors  Affecting  Trust 
Pl.  I  Trust  is  at  the  heart  (if  alliancing  and  it  evolves  over  time  during  successive  stages 
of  cooperation.  In  times  when  trust  was  at  a  high  point  the  alliances  achieved 
mutual  benefits,  exploited  opportunities  and  encouraged  innovation  and 
creativity.  However,  when  trust  was  low,  conflict  situations  occurrel 
7.2.2  Commitment  and  Leadership 
In  all  the  studies  cited,  the  leaders  were  visionaries  who  fostered  a  sense  of  commitment  in 
all  the  players.  Their  stoical  support  was  a  feature  of  these  alliances  and  they  possessed  the 
authority  and  charisma  to  influence  critical  stakeholders  (refer  to  chapters  4.1.2,  page  127, 
5.2.2,  page  184;  6.2.2,  page  232). 
Commitment  and  leadership  was  individually  driven,  as  opposed  to  being  explicit  it  the 
corporate  strategy.  The  roles  that  leaders  took  were  common  in  each  case,  as  shown  in 
figure  7.2.  They  set  the  initial  objectives,  steered  the  change  process,  communicated  the 
291 individuals  together  vision,  influenced  stakeholders,  negotiated  Im  resources,  brought  key  I 
and  encouraged  ownership  and  commitment. 
"  Allocating  resources 
"  Setting  preliminary  obi  i 
. 
1ectivcs 
"  Nurturing  commitment 
"  Steering  the  change  process 
"  In-fluencing  and  negotiating 
"  Managing  stakeholders 
"  Coaching  and  mentoring 
Table  7:  2:  Summary  of  Common  Leadership  Roles 
The  importance  of  staff  not  directly  involved  cannot  be  understated,  as  their  lack  of 
cooperation  affected  communications  and  in  turn  the  degree  of  information  exchanged. 
Commitment  and  leadership  from  top  management  must  be  evident,  continuous  and  clearly 
articulated  to  every  level. 
PI.  2  A  committed  and  motivated  manager  at  the  higher  echelons  of  the  organisational 
hierarchy  is  critically  important  to  implementation  of  a  successful  alliance. 
7.2.3  Communication 
In  all  three  cases  the  single  biggest  strength  of  the  alliance  was  that  freedom  of' 
communication  and  information  sharing  started  almost  immediately 
The  1DV/  Killeen  steering  committee  encouraged  an  open  environment  In  which 
communication  and  information  sharing  was  promoted.  Communication  channels  were 
opened  up  for  the  first  time.  This,  together  with  the  support  of  senior  managers  and 
adequate  and  well  selected  resources,  motivated  the  teams  (refer  to  chapter  4.1.3,  page 
128). 
292 On  the  whole  the  story  was  similar  in  the  Sun  and  Birkbys  alliance  and  in  the  SCA  between 
UESL,  SMIL  and  ARRC.  Sun  personnel  spent  much  time  in  Birkbys  aligning  the  two 
processes  and  consequently  this  meant  a  rapid  transfer  of  technical  know-how  from  Sun 
into  Birkbys.  Daily  interaction  and  communication  improved  between  ARRC  and  SML 
when  personnel  co-located  at  Torry  dock  and  Altens  base  (refer  to  chapter  6.2.3,  page  232; 
chapter  5.2.3,  page  185). 
A  potential  source  of  conflict  was  when  the  partners  were  unsure  how  much  and  what 
information  could  be  disclosed  to  an  ally.  This  was  not  given  any  weight  in  any  of  the 
alliances  during  the  early  stages  and  only  became  an  important  factor  later  on.  For 
example,  it  arose  when  the  Birkbys  resident  planner  was  introduced  into  Sun,  when  the 
contractors  were  allowed  access  to  the  Shell  management  information  systems  and  when 
IDV  gave  Killeen's  box  transparencies  to  a  competitor  supplier  for  trials.  In  these  instances 
the  intellectual  property  of  the  companies  within  the  alliances  was  made  vulnerable  and  led 
to  questions  of  ethics  and  opportunism. 
The  reason  for  this  oversight  may  be  that  at  the  outset  of  the  alliance,  the  parties  did  not 
appreciate  the  extent  to  which  allies  would  change  and  grow  in  terms  of  knowledge  and 
capability  development.  It  was  not  a  consideration  in  the  early  stages  when  it  was  more 
important  to  get  the  project  off  the  ground  and  running. 
In  all  cases,  informal  networks  were  being  built  up,  and  people  were  talking  to  each  other 
who  would  never  have  done  so  in  the  past.  Individuals  were  now  able  to  go  directly  to  the 
proper  person  and  this  was  significant  because  personnel  in  supplier  organisations  usually 
did  not  talk  to  the  customer  directly.  Suppliers  were  slowly  becoming  more  focused  on 
understanding  customer  needs.  Open  communication  encouraged  learning  and  transfer  of 
know-how  and  information  sharing  promoted  accuracy  and  long  term  planning.  The  start 
of  value  creation  between  the  allies  was  when  inter-organisational  teams  worked  on 
projects  to  bring  down  costs,  eliminated  waste  and  improved  quality. 
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principles  through  the  organisations.  The  importance  of  the  workforce  in  general,  and  in 
particular  those  not  directly  involved  in  the  alliances  was  often  overlooked.  On  the  whole, 
regular  and  support  staff  cooperation  was  only  possible  when  people  understood  what  the 
alliance  was  trying  to  achieve  and  where  they  fitted  in.  Table7.3  illustrates  factors  that 
helped  and  hindered  inter-organisational  communication. 
Scheduling  and  forecasting  information 
Open  and  free  dialogue 
Joint  planning 
Interpersonal  relations  to  develop  informal 
networks  and  enhance  process  understanding 
Transfer  of  explicit  and  tacit  technical 
knowledge 
Increase  of  trust 
Increase  in  commitment 
Unclear  roles  and  responsibilities 
Discomfort  sharing  confidential  information 
Opportunistic  behaviour 
Misunderstanding 
Table  7.3:  Summary  of  Alliance  Communication 
PI.  3  Inter-organisational  communication  and  learning  is  critical  as  the  exchange  of 
technical  know-how  rapidly  increases  process  understanding. 
7.2.4  Co-ordination  and  Control  Mechanisms 
By  the  end  of  Stage  II,  a  number  of  procedures  were  already  in  place  such  as  a  log  book  to 
track  IDV  call-offs,  a  daily  IDV  forecasting  meeting  was  attended  by  Killeen  personnel  and 
inventory  management  procedures  were  being  structured.  On  the  most  part,  there  was  little 
documentation  of  team  activities  and  few  records  kept  (refer  to  chapter  4.14,  page  129). 
In  contrast,  Sun  Microsystems  kept  a  very  tight  control  on  Birkbys  by  requiring  Sun's 
approval  for  any  changes  to  processes  or  tooling,  mainly  to  help  Birkbys  learn  the  Sun 
standards.  It  was  at  this  time  that  it  became  apparent  Birkbys  was  not  solely  to  blame  for 
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problems  that  it  complained  of  (refer  chapter  6.2.4,  page  233). 
Interestingly,  there  was  a  similar  realisation  by  IDV  and  Killeen  and  also  the  players  in  the 
SCA  alliance,  although  some  time  later  in  that  case.  The  point  was  that  when  suppliers 
were  acting  on  insufficient  information,  they  could  not  provide  the  level  of  service  required 
by  the  customer,  due  to  poor  communication  and  quality  problems  within  the  supply  chain. 
On  the  most  part  customers  felt  absolved  of  any  responsibility  for  problems  they  were 
experiencing  with  their  suppliers. 
With  regards  to  information  technology  and  its  exchange,  IDV  and  Killeen's  systems  were 
incompatible,  although  Killeen  was  already  successfully  operating  an  EDI  link  with  another 
of  its  customers.  If  this  weakness  in  the  area  of  electronic  communication  had  been 
addressed  sooner,  improvements  could  have  been  made  and  the  consequent  benefit  could 
only  be  guessed.  As  it  was,  electronic  synergy  was  not  considered  a  priority  and  the  EDI 
link  was  not  established  for  many  months. 
Information  technology  was  also  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  Aberdeen  SCA.  UESL 
launched  a  new  SAP  information  management  programme  at  the  same  time  as  the  start  of 
the  alliance.  This  was  a  source  of  problems  in  the  early  days  because  people  had  not  been 
properly  trained  and  this  led  to  some  corrupt  data.  Although  the  contractors  shared  the 
same  technical  interface  as  UESL  this  seemed  to  be  a  big  problem  from  the  outset. 
Nevertheless  at  the  end  of  the  day,  the  system  was  improved  so  that  it  was  capable  of 
producing  concise  and  accurate  reports  (refer  to  chapter  5.2.4,  page  187). 
As  might  be  expected,  use  of  up  to  date  technology  and  information  systems  was  not  an 
issue  between  Sun  and  Birkbys.  Table  7.4  summarises  the  co-ordination  and  control 
mechanisms  used  by  each  alliance. 
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PI.  4  Control  mechanisms  evolve  as  the  alliance  matures.  These  range  from  control  hy 
the  customer,  or  alliance  initiator,  tojoint  control  qf  cooperative  activities. 
7.2.5  Learning 
As  has  been  previously  described,  prior  to  these  alliances  there  was  no  specific  and  direct 
interaction  between  any  of  the  companies.  Meetings  were  infrequent  and  there  was  little,  if 
any,  knowledge  of  the  other's  processes.  When  the  alliances  began,  project  teams  played  a 
critical  role  in  analysis  and  evaluation  of  the  companies'  strength  and  weaknesses  and  as  a 
result  process  learning  was  virtually  immediate  at  the  start  of  each  of  the  alliances. 
At  the  start,  innovation  did  not  predominate  in  people's  minds  and  they  concentrated  on 
getting  to  know  each  other.  However,  the  environment  established  provided  the  freedom  to 
think  creatively  and  the  teams  came  up  with  new  ideas  and  commercially  sound 
opportunities. 
From  a  strategic  perspective,  teams  responded  to  environmental  challenges  by  building  new 
competencies  and  capabilities.  Creation  of  knowledge,  technological  accumulation  and 
social  learning  built  favourable  conditions  for  innovation  and  exploration  between  the 
allies. 
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conditions  provided  a  healthy  basis  for  learning  and  on  the  whole  people  were  very 
receptive  to  change  and  new  ideas.  The  emphasis  was  on  developing  a  long-term 
relationship  and  all  participants  were  motivated  and  enthusiastic  to  this  end.  Autonomy  in 
both  plants  gave  the  directors  scope  to  divert  time  and  resources  to  the  relationship  (refer  to 
chapter  4.1.5,  page  130). 
Similar  scenarios  were  evident  in  the  case  of  Sun/Birkbys  and  also  the  SCA  (refer  to  5.2.5, 
page  188,6.2.5,  page  234).  As  Birkbys  came  up  to  the  Sun  standard,  they  were  quickly 
given  more  responsibility,  by  increasing  the  scope  of  the  process  and  by  adding  new  tasks. 
Birkbys  very  quickly  adapted  and  expanded  its  capabilities.  Although  the  SCA  could  be 
said  to  be  facilitating  process  learning,  this  was  in  circumstances  of  considerable 
background  turbulence  and  there  was  little  time  to  really  promote  learning.  Table  7.5 
shows  the  impact  of  learning  in  the  alliances  in  this  early  stage. 
Impact  of  Learning  Withýi  Purpose 
"  Process  understanding 
"  Flaws  in  process  become  clear 
"  Team  skills  develop 
"  Recognise  need  to  address  cost  drivers 
"  Sharing  of  planning  pd  scheduling 
information 
"  Leaming  how  to  manage  the  alliance 
Table  7.5:  Summary  of  Impact  of  Learning  within  Stage  I 
P1.5  Learning  is  immediate,  although  the  partners  are  so  consumed  by  learning  to 
work  together  that  the  impact  of  knowledge  transfer  is  notfully  recognised 
7.2.6  Performance  Metrics 
IDV  and  Killeen's  early  paybacks  held  out  the  promise  of  even  greater  prizes.  The  alliance 
objectives  remained  unchanged  and  the  inter-organisational  teams  regularly  assessed  their 
progress  against  targets.  This  stimulated  new  ideas  and  constant  adaptation,  as  the  process 
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impact  of  the  box  price  reduction  (refer  to  chapter  4.1.6,  page  13  1). 
All  of  Sun  suppliers'  performance  was  measured  against  the  scorecard;  a  set  of 
comprehensive  parameters  created  by  Sun.  This  was  completed  every  quarter  and  provided 
the  means  for  continually  checking  improvements  by  Sun  and  Birkbys,  although  at  no 
point  was  joint  performance  considered.  When  Birkbys  failed  to  come  up  to  an  acceptable 
level  this  triggered  corrective  action  whereby  Sun  worked  with  Birkbys  to  resolve  the 
issues.  In  this  sense,  Birkbys  was  involved  with  Sun  harmonising  expectations  and 
developing  processes  common  to  them  (refer  to  chapter  6.2.6,  page  235). 
With  regards  to  the  Aberdeen  SCA,  the  measures  included  in  the  initial  alliance  contract 
were  also  based  on  the  customer's  performance  criteria.  However,  it  was  not  long  before 
these  had  to  be  re-defined  because  they  were  liable  to  misunderstanding  and  different 
interpretation  (refer  to  chapter  5.2.6,  page  189). 
In  all  three  cases,  suppliers  or  contractors  did  not  measure  their  internal  performance  at  all 
or  did  so  unconvincingly  and  for  this  reason  there  was  considerable  confusion  about  cost 
and  overhead  allocations  to  customers.  This  triggered  a  reaction  and  both  the  customer  and 
supplier  began  to  investigate  cost  drivers.  The  supplier  was  entering  into  new  realms  of 
learning. 
P1.6  Jointly  agreed  performance  measures  harmonise  expectations  between  the 
partners  and  on-going  monitoring  and  evaluation  provides  the  basis  for  auditing 
progress- 
7.2.7  Resource  Planning 
In  all  cases  the  managers  were  prepared  to  invest  resources  and  assets  in  the  alliance 
although  the  full  associated  costs  may  not  have  been  apparent  at  this  time. 
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the  alliances  built  up  momentum,  an  inordinate  amount  of  time  was  spent  by  team  members 
in  project  activities  and  this  stretched  scarce  resources.  Board  level  commitment  was 
imperative  to  encourage  people  to  work  energetically  between  day  jobs  and  alliance 
projects.  With  the  passage  of  time  improved  communication  enabled  all  alliances  to 
manage  resource  requirements  to  good  effect. 
Both  IDV  and  Killeen  had  made  considerable  investment  in  the  collaborative  effort  and 
although  the  teams  sometimes  struggled  to  cope  with  daily  duties  as  well  as  alliance  work, 
everyone  was  very  motivated  to  make  the  venture  succeed.  This  was  especially  so  because 
benefits  of  shared  planning  and  scheduling  information  were  almost  immediately  realised. 
Hence,  Killeen  began  to  plan  its  capacity  and  foresee  overtime  requirements  with  the  latter 
representing  a  significant  factor  in  Killeen's  overheads(refer  to  chapter  4.1.7,  page  131). 
Birkbys,  SML  and  ARRC  were  positively  affected  by  similar  information  sharing  (refer  to 
chapter  6.2.7,  page  23  7). 
Sun  and  UESL  purposely  intended  the  alliance  to  free  up  resources  from  daily  operations  to 
work  that  would  add  greater  value  to  the  organisation,  This  effective  use  of  resources 
enabled  suppliers  to  increase  capacity,  while  customers  re-allocated  scarce  resources  from 
operations  to  more  strategic  planning  and  developmental  roles  (refer  to  5.2.7,  page  190). 
In  this  way  alliances  helped  accessed  new  resources  and  capabilities  in  order  to  develop 
innovative  methods,  products  and  organisational  systems. 
P1.7  More  effective  use  of  resources  enables  suppliers  to  improve  efficiency  and 
increase  capacity,  while  customers  can  re-allocate  scarce  resources  from 
operations  to  strategic  p  anning  and  development 
299 7.2.8  Setting  Objectives 
At  the  outset  of  the  alliances  there  was  little  understanding  of  the  other  players'  industries 
or  generally  how  markets  influenced  these  companies'  behaviour  in  terms  of  governance 
and  pricing  structures. 
Having  ascertained  the  market  conditions,  IDV  chose  the  alliance  route,  retaining  the 
business  within  the  Irish  domain.  Project  teams  were  the  vehicles  to  bring  about  the 
fundamental  changes  that  IDV  had  in  mind.  Senior  management  knew  what  it  wanted  to 
achieve,  and  the  participants  understood  the  motivation  behind  the  alliance  (refer  to  chapter 
4.1.8,  page  133). 
Sun  Nficrosystems  on  the  other  hand,  failed  to  articulate  its  vision  for  the  alliance  to 
Birkbys  and  how  it  intended  the  companies  to  work  together.  In  the  first  instance,  very  little 
consideration  had  been  given  to  the  overall  strategic  direction.  Birkbys  had  no  idea  of  the 
extent  that  it  would  have  to  change  to  meet  Sun's  requirements.  This  lack  of  appreciation 
strained  relations  from  the  outset,  particularly  as  Sun  soon  set  about  demanding  changes  to 
the  supplier's  procedures,  which  surprised  Birkby's  but  which  was  something  Sun  was  used 
to  doing  (refer  to  chapter  6.2.8,  page  237). 
Both  Sun  and  UESL  specifically  made  it  clear  that  they  wanted  to  withdraw  from 
operational  and  execution  issues  and  to  concentrate  on  planning  and  strategic 
implementation.  At  the  outset  senior  managers  therefore  felt  frustrated  as  they  got 
increasingly  bogged  down  in  operations.  Sun  resolved  this  by  promoting  supplier 
development  once  they  were  confident  in  Birkbys  and  vice  versa.  Similarly,  UESL  gave 
SNIL  greater  autonomy  when  SML  demonstrated  improved  performance,  supported  by 
favourable  monthly  reports  (refer  to  chapter  5.2.8,  page  190). 
PI.  8  Allies  need  to  continually  assess  the  strategic  position  of  the  alliance,  the 
capabilities  of  the  partners  and  to  modify  short-term  tactics  in  order  to  meet 
changing  circumstances  and  maintain  long-term  objectives. 
300 Figure  7.4  summarises  the  main  characteristics  in  the  Stage  I. 
BUILDINGTRUST 
Social  interaction 
Anticipated  reciprocity 
Basic  ingredient  in  negotiation 
Expectations  developing 
Team  working 
Committing  resources 
Growing  confidence  in  partner's  ability 
Closer  working  relations 
Boundary  spanning 
Promotes  stability 
COMMUNICATION 
Formal  and  informal  networks 
Influences  uncertaintv  and 
bounded  rationality 
Stakeholder  mterests 
Levels  of  communication 
Information  sharing 
Cross  functional  activities 
Break  down  barriers 
Cascade  principles 
CO-ORDINATION  AND  CONTROL 
Alliance  governance 
Rules,  procedures,  reporting 
Steering  group 
Feedback 
Expectations 
Joint  planning  and  control 
Project  management 
Regular  team  meetings 
Role  of  information  technology 
COMMITMENTAND  LEADERSHIP 
Mandate  at  executive  level 
Negotiate  for  resources 
Steer  change  process 
Encourage  ownership 
Assignment  of  task  and  responsibilities 
Communicate  vision 
Influence  stakeholders 
Time  and  effort  dedicated  to  alliance 
RESOURCE  PLANNING 
Investment  in  relationship 
Allocation  of  resources  and  time 
Technological  contribution 
Team  composition 
Joint  scheduling 
SETTING  OBJECTIVES 
N 
Explicit  mutual  goals 
realign  as  external  and  internal 
conditions  dictate 
Gtoundrules 
Contract  refined 
Identify  long  and  short  term  strategic  direction 
VNI,  LEARNING 
Technological  know  -how  transferred 
Norms,  expectations  developing 
Competencies  and  skills  in  teamwork 
Transfer  of  ideas 
Developing  relationship  specific  assets 
PERFORMANCE  METRICS  Negotiation  skills 
Inter-organisational  team  performance  Problems  defined 
Joint  performance  mechanism  required  Understand  alliance  concept 
Metric  identified  Understand  roles  and  responsibilities 
Tracking  performance  Supplier  development 
Metrics  explicit  in  contract 
Score  card  measurement 
Figure  7.4:  Thematic  Grouping  in  Stage  1. 
7.3  STAGE  H 
This  was  a  period  of  intense  activity  by  alliance  participants,  concurrent  with  strong  support 
from  management  champions.  During  this  stage  problems  were  shared  and  mutual 
ownership  nurtured.  Direct  benefits  of  better  communication  included  improved  quality, 
quicker  delivery  and  shorter  lead-time.  Important  characteristics  from  Stage  I  were 
continued  throughout  the  alliance  period.  Stage  H  was  a  time  of  intense  interaction 
between  the  partners  mainly  as  a  result  of  inter-organisational  teamwork.  Distinctive 
features  of  this  stage  are  listed  alphabetically  as  follows. 
301 "  Compelling  purpose 
"  Conflict  management 
"  Interdependence 
"  Learning  and  alliance  skills 
"  Joint  decision  making 
"  Personal  satisfaction  and  motivation 
7.3.1  Compelling  Purpose 
In  all  three  cases  confidence  grew  as  the  parties  were  able  to  draw  on  hard  information  on 
which  to  base  long  term  planning  decisions.  Customers'  gained  appreciation  of  their 
suppliers'  ability  and  business  was  daily  becoming  more  organised.  Increased  dialogue 
between  the  partners  promoted  a  change  of  attitude  and  working  behaviour. 
It  was  apparent  in  each  of  the  studies  that  teams  began  to  acquire  valuable  communication 
skills  and  operational  knowledge  as  a  result  of  the  collaboration.  Significantly,  teams 
highlighted  where  strengths  and  weaknesses  lay,  how  things  could  get  done  and,  most 
important  of  all,  how  procedures  could  be  improved.  Taken  together,  the  teams  began  to  be 
the  eyes  and  ears  of  the  ally  organisations,  embodying  a  new  form  of  corporate  intelligence 
that  cut  across  departmental  boundaries.  Interestingly,  much  of  this  learning  was  tacit. 
One  area  of  learning  during  the  third  stage  was  that  customers  began  to  recognise  that  their 
behaviour  could,  and  did,  have  an  effect  on  suppliers'  service.  The  importance  of  process 
understanding  was  constantly  being  reinforced  and  horizons  were  extended  beyond 
immediate  dyad  relations  by  throwing  light  on  which  chain  activities  were  responsible  for 
either  good  or  bad  performance. 
The  biggest  disappointment  at  this  stage  in  the  IDV/  Killeen  alliance,  was  lack  of  feedback 
from  the  steering  group  and  this  had  a  de-motivating  effect  on  team  performance. 
Individuals,  working  within  the  alliance  as  well  as  attending  to  their  regular  jobs,  felt  that 
this  considerable  effort  seemed  not  to  be  being  recognised.  It  proved  to  be  very  difficult  to 
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progress.  Motivation  lapsed,  people  failed  to  turn  up  for  meetings  and  information  seemed 
to  be  flowing  one  way.  All  the  wrong  signals  were  being  sent  out  (refer  to  chapter  4.2.1, 
page  137). 
With  regards  to  the  SCA  inter-organisational  improvement  teams  were  set  up  with  the  remit 
to  identify  cost  saving  and  process  improvement  opportunities  in  the  alliance  operations 
and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  enthusiasm  to  purse  these  goals  (refer  to  chapter  5.3.1,  page 
195). 
In  much  the  same  way  the  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  was  similarly  successful  in  the  initial 
stages  when  objectives  motivating  the  alliance  began  to  be  realised.  Sun  no  longer  had  to 
search  for  suppliers  with  technical  and  commercial  expertise,  or  to  get  involved  in  seeking 
competitive  tenders.  This  had  been  the  strategic  intent  of  the  alliance  in  1991  and  it  gave 
Birkbys  the  time  and  opportunity  to  significantly  broaden  its  customer  base  by  offering 
higher  value  products  The  alliance  positively  impacted  on  Birkbys  profitability. 
Eventually,  Birkbys  became  the  sole  UK  supplier  of  enclosures  to  Sun,  Linlithgow  and  was 
soon  also  doing  business  with  Sun  in  the  United  States  (refer  to  chapter  6.3.1,  page  240). 
In  all  of  the  alliances  disclosing  sensitive  information  proved  to  be  painful  and  in  all  cases 
costs  were  difficult  to  ascertain.  Once  business  accounts  were  on  the  table  the  unknown 
factor  was  removed.  No  one  argued  with  the  principle  that  parties  have  to  make  a 
reasonable  profit  and  the  ideal  situation  was  when  companies  felt  in  balance  and  that  all 
were  winning. 
Table  7.6  surnmarises  common  themes  in  this  stage 
303 "  Champions  maintain  commitment 
"  Strategic  and  operational  knowledge 
transfer  across  boundaries 
"  Partners  objectives  being  achieved 
"  Results  manifest  in  cost  savings 
"  Inter-organisational  teams  promote 
communication 
Suppliers  following  strategic 
direction  of  the  customer 
Cost  openness  by  degrees 
"  Objectives  not  clearly  articulated 
"  Objectives  achieved  and  not  renewed,  teams 
lose  focus 
"  Lack  of  feedback  from  senior  management 
"  Margins  being  eroded,  cost  drivers  not  being 
addressed 
"  "Old  style"  customer  behaviour 
Start  off  too  quickly 
Innovation  overload 
Table  7.6:  Compelling  Purpose:  Common  Factors 
P2.  I  Participants  are  motivated  only  when  the  plan  has  been  collaboratively  designed 
and  business  objectives  are  aligned 
7.3.2  Conflict  management 
The  alliances  in  general  suffered  from  varying  levels  of  dissent.  However  conflict 
management  was  rational  in  the  sense  that  when  controversial  issues  did  surface  these  were 
resolved,  most  often  immediately,  through  discussion  and  corrective  action. 
Due  to  lack  of  time  and  as  a  result  of  limited  resources,  the  teams  had  to  get  things  done  as 
quickly  as  possible  and  anxiety  to  get  results  tended  to  overcome  intransigence.  Also,  the 
very  fact  of  their  intellectual  ability  and  ranking  in  the  respective  organisations,  meant  that 
team  members  were  also  effective  problem  solvers  and  decision-makers. 
Although  the  alliances  did  not  have  explicit  conflict  management  structures,  difficult  issues 
were  resolved  by  discussion  in  practically  every  case.  Because  of  trust  and  commitment, 
resolution  often  took  the  form  of  innovative  solutions,  rather  than  deadlock  resulting  in 
winners  and  losers  (refer  to  chapter  5.3.2,  page  196). 
304 P2.2  Conflict  is  mostly  due  to  misunderstanding  and  misperceptions  and  may  be 
resolved  through  dialogue  and  corrective  action. 
7.3.3  Interdependence 
In  all  three  cases,  interdependence  was  the  essential  condition,  when  opportunities  were 
revealed  that  would  not  have  been  apparent  if  the  companies  had  remained  completely  free. 
In  an  environment  of  greater  certainty,  the  organisations,  were  able  to  more  accurately 
assimilate  and  process  information  and  make  informed  decisions. 
]1DV  and  Killeen  had  always  seemed  to  acknowledge  their  interdependence,  even  prior  to 
the  alliance.  They  had  been  working  together  for  over  two  decades,  so  much  so  that  I1DV 
described  Killeen  as  being  "attached  with  an  umbilical  cord".  IDV  had  had  difficulty 
sourcing  a  supplier  of  Killeen's  calibre,  however  over  the  years  this  situation  changed. 
Continual  benchmarking  together  with  increasing  knowledge  of  Killeen's  costs  and  the 
anomalies  of  the  paper  market,  enabled  IDV  to  identify  alternative  suppliers.  In  the  long- 
term,  this  may  yet  spell  the  end  of  the  alliance  between  the  companies.  In  this  case,  greater 
knowledge  may  ultimately  make  the  partners  less  interdependent  (refer  to  4.2.2,  page  138). 
Sun's  supplier  development  strategy  was  also  intended  to  increase  the  mutual  reliance 
between  the  organisations  and  the  die  was  cast  when  Birkbys  began  to  follow  Sun's 
strategic  direction  by  re-aligning  its  processes.  Dependence  increased  when  Birkbys 
invested  in  a  new  plant  in  Scotland,  located  near  to  Sun,  but  reduced  when  the  Scottish 
orders  stopped  (refer  to  6.3.2,  page  24  1). 
In  the  third  alliance,  Shell  Expro's  outsourcing  strategy  also  involved  considerable 
teamwork  between  the  client  and  contractors.  This  was  to  have  been  controlled  by 
milestones  in  the  contract,  to  signal  when  the  contractors  scope  should  be  extended  to  take 
on  more  responsibility.  In  reality,  this  was  not  as  straightforward  as  the  contract  intended, 
nevertheless  there  was  incontrovertible  evidence  that  the  contractor  and  the  client  were  both 
developing  new  capabilities  along  these  lines  (refer  to  5.3.3,  page  197). 
305 P2.3  As  alliances  evolve,  the  degree  of  interdependence  adjusts  to  suit  changing 
circumstances  as  thepartners  learn  how  to  manage  the  relationship. 
7.3.4  Learning  and  Alliance  Skills 
A  lot  of  pressure  to  produce  results  came  from  the  steering  groups  in  the  IDV/Killeen  and 
SCA  and  the  teams  not  only  had  to  be  cohesive  as  regards  tactics  but  also  decisive  and 
commercially  aware.  Sun  and  Birkbys  eventually  recognised  the  necessity  for  a  steering 
committee  to  structure  and  order  the  change  process.  Communication  skills  involved 
presentations  to  a  wide  cross  section  of  people  and  all  in  all  the  Stage  II  was  a  time  of 
intense  learning  with  little  time  for  reflection  (refer  to  chapter  4.2.3,  page  139;  5.3.4,  page 
198;  6.3.3,  page  242). 
In  each  case  teams  proved  to  be  adept  at  research  outwith  their  own  organisations. 
Significantly  however,  internal  boundary  spanning  tended  to  be  limited. 
In  terms  of  learning,  IDV  was  beginning  to  thoroughly  understand  the  corrugated  industry 
and  by  this  time  knew  a  great  deal  more  about  making  the  outer  case  than  it  had  at  the 
outset.  This  was  to  stand  IDV  in  good  stead  in  future  negotiations  and,  for  its  part,  Killeen 
capacity  and  efficiencies  (driven  by  the  alliance)  had  improved  to  such  an  extent  that  it  was 
forced  to  introduce  a  programme  of  cost  review  and  strict  control  just  to  keep  on  top  of  all 
the  changes.  The  purpose  was  to  differentiate  costs  amongst  different  customers  and  spread 
them  proportionately,  rather  than  working  with  averages,  as  they  had  in  the  past. 
Cooperation  helped  the  firms  learn  from  each  other  and  this  accelerated  knowledge 
acquisition.  Although,  difficult  to  transfer,  nevertheless,  the  alliances  encouraged  effective 
use  of  specific  knowledge  to  develop  joint  processes,  procedures  and  techniques. 
The  following  areas  of  learning  and  skill  development,  summarised  in  table  7.7,  applied  in 
varying  degrees  to  people  in  all  three  alliances:  - 
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Alliance  management  skills,  e.  g.  Persuading 
negotiating  and  developing 
Logistics  process  improved 
Sharing  of  forecasting  and  planning 
information 
Evidence  of  improvement,  quick  wins 
Wider  technical  knowledge 
Increased  capacity  and  efficiency 
Trust  and  comnutment 
Network  learning 
Teamwork 
Understanding  of  industry  environment 
Process  orientation  rather  than  functional 














Fluctuating  commitment  and  confidence 
Lack  of  equity  between  risk  and  rewards 
Need  for  common  procedures 
Need  for  discipline  in  terms  of  cost  and  time 
Limited  formal  structure 
Perforniance  targets  too  easily  achieved 
Divergent  values 
Different  perceptions  of  power  relationships 
No  properly  defined  strategy 
Lack  of  openness 
Lack  of  trust 
Inadequate  communication 
Inconsistent  behaviour 
Failure  to  empower  partners 
Table  7.7:  Summary  of  Learning  and  Alliance  Skills 
P2.4  Learning  is  at  the  heart  of  affiance  management  and  knowledge  is  the  basis  of 
alliance  strength. 
7.3.5  Joint  Decision-Making 
Sharing  information  was  essential  to  the  entire  alliance  process  and  joint  decisions  and 
problem  solving  was  a  direct  outcome  of  this  new  openness.  Customers  and  suppliers 
worked  together  early  in  the  design  stage  of  new  products  and  analysed  the  process  that 
interfaced  between  the  organisations.  In  so  doing,  they  removed  waste  from  the  systems 
and  developed  new  capabilities  in  terms  of  teamwork  skills  and  heightened  technical  and 
commercial  awareness. 
All  the  alliances  introduced  some  form  of  co-location  or  transfer  of  personnel.  This  applied 
for  instance,  in  the  1DV  daily  operations  meeting  at  which  a  representative  of  Killeen  was 
in  attendance.  In  terms  of  operations,  this  has  been  a  great  success  since  the  meetings 
began.  In  Sun  the  introduction  of  the  resident  planner  was  of  major  benefit  as  was  the  case 
307 in  the  Aberdeen  SCA.  The  fact  that  all  three  partners  were  represented  in  the  Torry  base 
offices  proved  to  be  very  significant. 
Sharing  forecasting  and  scheduling  information  was  critical  to  the  entire  process.  The  allies 
were  sharing  more  and  more  market  information,  giving  them  a  better  insight  into  future 
trends. 
Misinterpretations  and  misunderstandings  were  a  problem,  especially  when  dealing  with 
technical  matters  and  even  when  everyone  thought  that  he  had  got  the  point.  Messages  and 
intentions  easily  became  distorted  as  information  was  passed  on,  especially  by  persons  not 
involved  in  technical  details.  This  kind  of  problem  was  resolved  when  people  directly 
involved  in  projects  got  together  to  agree  tactical  issues  (refer  to  chapters  4.2.4,  page  143; 
5.3.5,  page  198;  6.3.4,  page  244). 
Effective  decisions  depended  upon  teams  cooperating  and  on  inter-organisational  team 
members'  ability  to  draw  upon  a  larger  social  and  knowledge  network.  Alliance  success 
was  heavily  dependent  on  building  social  relationships  and  these  encouraged  breaking 
down  barriers  to  communication.  Table  7.8  summarises  factors  affecting  joint-decision 
making. 
Communication  and  information  sharing 
Increased  technical  and  commercial  awareness 
Transfer  of  personnel 
Inter-organisational  team  projects 
Improved  market  knowledge 
Problem  solving 
Champion  or  key  contacts  to  disseminate 
information 
Increased  confidence  in  supplier  performance 
Lack  of  trust  and  openness 
Misinterpretations  and  misunderstood 
communication 
Limited  technical  knowledge 
Table  7.8:  Summary  of  Factors  Influencing  Joint  Decision  Making 
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of  networks. 
7.3.6'  Personal  Satisfaction  and  Motivation 
So  far  the  alliances  had  fostered  better  understanding  of  the  organisations  and  during  stage 
HI  learning  was  mostly  as  a  result  of  doing.  Quick  successes  were  exhilarating  for  team 
members  and  people  were  beginning  to  think  and  behave  differently,  especially  when  the 
frenetic  pace  slackened  and  day  jobs  again  became  easier  to  manage. 
Instead  of  only  looking  at  their  own  work,  people's  perspective  had  changed  and  this  was 
manifested  in  a  new  cooperative  outlook.  In  each  alliance,  participants  saw  their  day  to 
day  jobs  becoming  easier  due  to  team  effort  and  more  frequent  communication.  However, 
although  overall  the  alliance  was  making  jobs  more  interesting,  people's  enthusiasm  was 
sometimes  dampened  because  of  the  intense  eff6rt  and  time  required,  over  and  above  their 
day  jobs. 
The  social  aspect  of  team  working  involved  interaction  between  people  normally  engaged 
in  distinctly  different  activities.  Increased  knowledge  provided  the  capability  for 
generation  of  novel  solutions,  while  the  social  dimension  of  teamwork  encouraged 
dissemination  (refer  to  chapters  4.2.5,  page  144;  5.3.6,  page  200;  6.3.5,  page  248). 
P2.6  Teamwork  is  important  to  personal  satisfaction  and  in  most  cases  the  scope  of 
people'sjobs  increased,  became  more  interesting,  potentially  creative  andfun  to 
do. 
Figure  7.5  below  summarises  the  themes  in  Stage  II. 
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Joint  value  better  understood 
Joint  problem  solving 
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High  energy 
Early  supplier  involvement 
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Capital  investment  LEARNING  AND  ALLIANCE  SKILLS 
Joint  performance  measures 
PERSONAL  SATISFACTION 
AND  MOTIVATION 
Better  understanding  of  partner's 
business 
Quick  successes  exhilarating 
Responsibility  increases 
Feedback 
Increased  social  relations 
Team  achievements 
Improved  communication  behaviour 
Day  job  becomes  easier 
JOINT  DECISION 
MAKING 
Reduced  uncertaintV 
Project  planning 
Access  to  information  enables 
longer-term  planning 
Sharing  market  information 
Involvement  reduced  misinterpretations 
Openness 
Problem  solving 
Joint  team  projects 
Technical  and  process  know-how  transferred 
Members  acquire  better  communication  skills 
Teams  encourage  learning  and  adaptability 
Internal  and  external  networks  begin  to  form 
Transfer  of  knowledge  among  participants 
Team  skills 
Understanding  joint  processes 
Understanding  partner's  business 
Figure  7.5:  Thematic  Grouping  in  Stage  11 
7.4  STAGE  IH 
Characteristic  features  in  the  Stage  III  are  listed  alphabetically  as  follows:  - 
"  Adapting  cultures 
"  HR  assessment 
"  Performance  plateau 
"  Process  and  cost  understanding 
e  Reflection  and  learning 
7.4.1  Adapting  Cultures 
Without  exception,  none  of  the  companies  involved  in  the  three  alliances  that  are  the 
subject  of  this  study  had  any  previous  appreciation  of  the  relevance  of  business  culture,  or 
310 how  it  might  influence  alliance  development.  Apart  from  IDV  and  Killeen,  each  company 
had  very  different  organisational  cultures  and  this  contributed  to  disagreement  and 
misunderstandings  in  the  early  stages  (refer  to  chapter  4.3.1,  page  147). 
The  allies  intensively  promoted  a  philosophy  of  cooperation.  Despite  ups  and  downs,  the 
companies  saw  teamwork  as  a  method  of  working,  and  as  a  superior  way  to  achieve  cost 
reduction.  Teams  were  self-disciplining  and  worked  to  a  common  set  of  norms.  In  order  to 
build  on  achievements,  objectives  and  targets  were  periodically  re-appraised  by  the 
members.  With  regard  to  IDV  and  Killeen,  values  among  individuals  directly  involved  in 
the  alliance,  were  more  or  less  compatible,  trust  had  been  raised  and  despite  occasional 
anxieties,  on  the  whole  individuals  remained  loyal  to  the  alliance  concept. 
In  Sun  and  Birkbys  and  also  in  the  SCA,  cooperative  working  changed  the  way  people  were 
managed  and  this  shift  in  company  attitude  reinforced  staff  commitment.  Differing  cultures 
was  no  longer  the  problem  that  it  previously  was  and  people  learnt  to  deal  with  tensions 
from  collaborative  work  (refer  to  chapters  5.4.1,  page  204;  6.4.1,  page  25  1). 
Power  was  always  an  issue  between  customer  and  supplier  and  powerful  customers 
invariably  maintained  dominance,  which  was  a  factor  that  influenced  the  supplier's 
business  culture.  One  positive  aspect  was  that  association  with  a  strong  customer  could 
boost  the  supplier's  influence  within  his  own  industrial  environment.  Table  7.9 
summarises  relevant  factors. 
"  Inter-organisational  teamwork 
"  Open  communication  channels 
"  Trust  and  commitment 
"  Changing  attitudes  and  working  philosophy 
Common  values 
Table  7.9:  Summary  of  Factors  Promoting  Cultural  Alignment 
311 P3.1  Developing  an  alliance  culture  involves  changing  individual  and  organisational 
mindset  to  embrace  a  cooperative  philosophy. 
7.4.2  HR  Assessment 
HR  policy  and  alliance  objectives  overlapped  in  the  sense  that  continuous  learning  and 
training  was  as  important  for  an  individual's  future  as  it  was  for  the  alliance  companies. 
The  question  was  how  to  best  develop  skills  and  capabilities  appropriate  to  changing  needs, 
maintain  people's  motivation  and  at  the  same  time  nurture  innovative  and  creative  ability. 
in  all  cases  people's  jobs  increased  in  scope  and  responsibility  although  formal  Human 
Resource  policies  remained  unaffected  by  alliancing.  In  some  instances,  for  example  in 
IDV  and  Sun  Microsystems,  individual  performance  appraisal  incorporated  tearnworking, 
but  on  the  most  part  reward  and  career  development  were  not  directly  influenced  by  the 
alliances  (refer  to  chapters  4.3.2,  page  147;  6.4.2,  page  253). 
The  SCA  attempted  to  impact  on  the  wider  organisations  by  incorporating  an  HR  policy  in 
the  alliance  strategy  document  and  in  this  way  tried  to  cascade  the  principles  to  the 
workforce  (refer  to  chapter  5.4.2,  page  205).  Alliance  related  HR  Policy  should  cover  such 
aspects  of  recruitment,  induction,  coaching,  performance  measures,  appraisal,  training  and 
career  development.  Seetable7.10. 
To  link  strategy  with  tactics 
To  develop  a  common  purpose 
To  prepare  employees  for  change 
To  motivate  people  and  nurture  innovative  and 
creative  ability 
To  convince  the  workforce  that  continuous 
learning  is  important  to  the  alliance  future 
To  develop  skills  and  capabilities  appropriate 
for  the  alliance 
Use  performance  evaluation  and  rewards  to 
promote  motivation  and  team  membership 
Rotate  team  members  and  leaders 
Shift  team  goals  to  match  changing 
circumstances 
"  Team  goals  and  objectives  should  reflect 
continuous  performance  improvement 
"  Take  corrective  action  based  on  performance 
results 
"  Look  out  for  project  duplication  in  the  teams 
I'aDle  -/.  Iu:  summary  of  HR  Policy  to  Promote  Alliance  Skills 
312 P3.2  Although  reward  and  career  structures  promote  new  skills  and  encourage 
individuals  to  learn,  HR  policies  remained  unaffected  by  the  alliance. 
7.4.3  Performance  Plateau 
There  came  a  point  in  each  alliance  when  momentum  slowed  and  business  became  part  of 
the  day  to  day  routine.  The  prevailing  opinion  was  that  all  had  reached  a  sustainable 
performance  at  an  operational  level  (refer  to  chapters  4.33,  page  147;  5.4.3,  page  206; 
6.4.3,  page  254). 
People  almost  welcomed  the  loss  of  momentum.  There  were  so  many  other  areas  of 
business  to  concentrate  on  that  the  alliance  was  pushed  to  one  side.  The  significance  of 
Stage  III  was  that  the  single  economic  objective  in  the  Stage  I  had  the  potential  of  being 
expanded  into  a  multiplicity  of  new  projects. 
The  alliances  were  evolving  under  the  impact  of  external  and  internal  forces.  Table  7.11 
synthesises  factors  contributing  to  the  plateau. 
Objectives  achieved  and  new  objectives  not  yet  identified 
Individual  energy  diminished 
Too  many  projects 
Nhstrust  and  interpersonal  conflict 
Loss  of  focus  on  alliance 
Conflicting  priorities 
Influence  of  corporate  policies 
Supplier  costs  not  clear 
Insufficient  formal  authority  and  empowerment 
Table  7.11:  Synthesis  of  Factors  Contributing  to  the  Alliance  Plateau 
P3.3  The  plateau  stage  is  a  time  when  the  alliance  loses  momentum  and  it  is  necessary 
to  review  past  achievements,  consolidate  remaining  projects  and  look  to  the 
future 
313 7.4.4  Process  and  Cost  Understanding 
In  all  cases,  as  the  alliances  matured,  the  participants  became  knowledgeable  about  the 
processes  that  interfaced  between  the  organisations.  Communication  of  forecasting  and 
planning  information  had  an  immediate  and  positive  effect.  Knowledge  and  understanding 
as  regards  business  operations  had  been  heightened  because  of  the  common  base  created  by 
collaboration  (refer  to  chapters  4.3.4,  page  150;  5.4.4,  page  208;  6.4.4,  page  255). 
The  alliances  have  required  people  to  coordinate  their  work.  Between  IDV  and  Killeen  and 
Sun  and  Birkbys,  tasks  and  responsibilities  for  developing  new  products  were  shared  and 
this  reliance  on  others  intensified  as  the  relationship  developed.  Birkbys  and  Killeen 
offered  expertise  during  the  preliminary  design  work,  whereas  previously  they  would  have 
been  presented  with  a  design  and simply  asked  to  model  the  tools,  mould  a  sample 
enclosure  or  prepare  a  new  box  prototype  for  testing. 
A  main  concern  was  capturing  and  implementing  innovation  because  there  were  just  too 
many  simultaneous  projects.  IDV  set  up  an  innovation  team  to  evaluate  new  ideas  and 
consolidate  the  remaining  projects.  However,  the  team  struggled  to  prove  its  worth  and  it 
was  debatable  whether  or  not  the  ideas  it  came  up  with  could  be  considered  genuinely 
innovative.  In  an  atmosphere  of  declining  interest,  the  eventual  outcome  was  that  not  a 
great  deal  happened. 
In  all  cases,  alliance  teams  had  great  difficulty  in  identifying  costs,  although  improved  cost 
understanding  reinforced  personal  relations  and  the  glue  that  held  the  alliances  together  was 
expectation  of  trust  and  openness. 
P3.4  By  this  stage  alliance  partners  are  more  knowledgeable  about  processes  thatform 
the  interface  between  the  organisation  with  performance  improvement  embedded 
in  the  day-to-day  routines. 
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By  the  time  Stage  IN  was  reached,  there  was  a  lot  of  cross-fertilisation  of  operational 
knowledge  and  the  companies  better  understood  the  partner's  business  processes  and  needs. 
In  particular,  people  were  much  more  customer  focused  (refer  to  chapters  4.3.5,  page  15  1; 
5.4..  5,  page  210;  6.4.5,  page  257). 
Other  learning  was  mainly  in  terms  of  development  of  individual  skill  and  competence, 
team  skills  and  increased  technical  and  commercial  know-how.  As  the  alliances  matured, 
the  companies  absorbed  embedded  knowledge  and  combined  skills  to  create  new 
capabilities. 
As  well  as  developing  close  personal  contacts,  the  companies  created  a  series  of  joint 
institutions  to  manage  the  relationships  which  began  to  formalise  rules  and  procedures 
concerning  collaboration. 
All  parties  recognised  the  need  to  learn  from  past  achievements  and  to  consolidate  existing 
projects.  IDV  /  Killeen  meetings  took  place  to  review  and  clarify  the  term  innovation  and 
how  to  manage  the  process  for  capturing  new  ideas.  This  demanded  a  more  structured 
approach  to  project  evaluation  and  it  also  became  evident  that  much  learning  from  the 
collaborative  work  had  been  lost.  This  was  not  simply  because  of  inadequate  recording  but 
was  frequently  due  to  failure  to  disseminate  or  feedback. 
The  suppliers  had benefited  greatly  from  association  with  substantial  customers,  had 
become  more  capable  and  consequently  had  been  able  to  improve  performance.  Overall 
alliance  skills  had  developed  and  this  cannot  be  under  estimated  as  the  partners  had  taken 
advantage  of  the  new  knowledge  in  their  dealing  with  other  companies.  In  general  terms, 
the  alliances  had  helped  to  increase  partners'  capacity  to  win  new  business  and  become  far 
more  competitive. 
315 By  the  end  of  this  stage,  each  participant  was  under  pressure  to  prove  the  monetary  value  of 
the  alliance  to  corporate  stakeholders.  Although  the  companies  were  still  struggling  to 
evaluate  cost  reduction,  the  biggest  challenge  was  how  to  quantify  the  total  service  in 
financial  terms,  including  intangible  aspects  of  the  service,  not  just  the  cost  issue  in 
isolation.  Alliance  learning  encouraged  industry  and  market  awareness  in  the  partners  and 
promoted  agility  and  speed  of  response.  In  other  words,  learning  enabled  managers  to 
recognise  the  need  for  change  and  manage  that  change  proactively.  In  this  way,  learning 
generated  innovation  in  products,  processes  and  services  and  promoted  organisational 
growth.  Table  7.12  summarises  these  factors. 
"  Cross-fertilisation  of  technical  and  operational  knowledge 
"  Understanding  of  partner's  business  processes  and  needs 
"  Increased  customer  focus 
"  Team  skills  and  increased  technical  and  commercial  know-how 
"  Importance  of  reflection  to  review  and  consolidate  achievements 
"  Formal  procedures  to  support  the  alliance 
"  Personal  networks  improve  communication  channels 
"  Improved  cost  understanding 
Table  7.12:  Summary  of  Alliance  Learning 
P3.5  Alliances  are  permanently  precarious  and  alliance  learning  enhances  flexibility 
in  taking  strategic  decisions.  Companies  have  to  re-consider  the  effectiveness  of 
their  present  strategy. 
316 Figure  7.6  summarises  the  main  characteristics  in  Stage  III. 
PROCESS  AND  COST 
UNDERSTANDING 
Partners  knowledgeable  about 
interfacing  processes 
Costs  drivers  remain  difficult  to 
quantify 
Dense  communication  network 
Operations  now  routine 
Daily  scheduling  and  planning  information  available 
HR  ASSESSMENT 
Continuous  learning  and 
training  important. 
Develop  skills  and  capabilities 
appropriate  to  changing  needs 
Training  needs  assessment 
Companies  maintain  own  HR  policies 
ADAPTING  CULTURES 
Dense  communication  network 
Shared  norms  and  values  due  to 
continuous  commitment 
Teamwork  promotes  philosophy 
of  co-operation 
Individuals  become  more  flexible 
Skills  appropriate  for  changing  needs 
Increasing  trust 
Common  values  at  operational  level 
Suppliers  become  more  adaptable 
Figure  7.6.  Thematic  Grouping  in  Stage  III 
7.5  STAGE  TV 
The  following  characteristics,  illustrated  in  figure  7.7,  on  page  323,  are  featured  in  the 
Stage  IV- 
"  Cooperating  cultures 
"  Development  of  alliance  skills 
"  Joint  innovation  and  continuous  improvement 
"  Joint  tacit  and  explicit  learning 
"  Process  alignment  at  interface 
/ 
ae1fl 
REFLECTION  AND  LEARNING 
Customer  focused 
Acquisition  and  development  of  intangible 
assets 
Increased  technical  and  commercial 
know-how 
Learning  from  past  achievements 
Education 
Strategic  integration  contemplated 
Potential  rewards  of  alliance  better  undLrstood 
Understand  need  for  structure  and  groundruleý 
'11\  PERFORMANCE  PLATEAU 
Communications  become  increasingly  routine 
Operational  and  strategic  integration 
Teams  loose  momentum 
Performance  sustainable 
Stretched  resources 
Internal  organisational  pressure  shifts  focus  from  allianc( 
Partner  commitment  questioned 
Alliance  strategy  questioned 
317 0  Strategic  review 
7.5.1  Cooperating  Cultures 
In  all  cases  new  values,  beliefs  and  assumptions  about  how  work  should  be  done  impacted 
positively  on  business  performance.  Increased  communication  encouraged  greater 
cooperation  between  individuals.  Daily  routines  such  as  planning  and  scheduling  were  part 
of  the  alliance  operating  environment.  Clearly,  relationship  specific  skills  had  developed 
and  it  was  important  that  this  knowledge  was  harnessed  and  dispersed.  The  big  concern 
was  what  would  happen  if  one  of  the  key  players  left?  Could  the  alliances  sustain  such  a 
loss?  (refer  to  chapters  4.4.  l,  page  154,5.5.1,  page  215,6.5.1,  page  261). 
The  inter-organisational  teams  were  constituted  so  that  people  from  separate  organisations 
could  develop  new  strategically  significant  capabilities.  Aligning  these  skills  with 
corporate  objectives  meant  that  supply  issues  and  business  decision-making  processes  were 
integrated  to  maximum  effect.  See  table  7.13  for  factors  affecting  adapting  cultures. 
"  Management  commitment 
"  Going  the  extra  mile 
"  Support  from  the  board 
"  Explicit  in  corporate  strategy 
"  Trust 
"  Alliance  success 
"  Communication  networks 
"  Teamwork  ethos 
"  Education  and  training 
"  Managing  the  change 
Lack  of  visible  commitment 
from  board  and  managers 
Corporate  ethos  inclined  towards 
competitive  bidding 
Vision  not  supported  by 
appropriate  behaviour 
Table  7.13:  Summary  of  Factors  that  Influence  Adapting  Cultures 
P4.1  As  alliances  evolve,  individual  and  organisational  values  become  more 
compatible  within  the  alliance  domaitL 
318 7.5.2  Development  of  Alliance  Skills 
Cooperative  skills  learnt  by  all  alliances  over  the  past  few  years  (1991-2000)  became 
increasingly  important  and  the  ability  to  think  creatively  and  develop  solutions  continued  to 
benefit  the  allies.  Each  company  experienced  considerable  learning  that  was  also  used  to 
good  effect  with  other  customers  and  suppliers.  In  essence  therefore  alliancing  changed  the 
way  they  work  together  (refer  to  chapters  4.4.2,  page  156;  5.5.2,  page  215;  6.5.2,  page  261). 
Intangible  resources  were  classified  as  assets  or  competencies  and  included  not  only 
intellectual  property  rights  or  brand  names,  but  also  skills  or  competencies  absorbed  by 
employees,  customers  and  suppliers.  Table  7.14  summarises  such  knowledge. 
"  Technical 
process  knowledge 
specific  technical  knowledge 
"  Commercial 
understand  costs 
performance  measures 
business  knowledge 
"  Management 
inter-personal 
team  working 
proactive  decision  making 
problem  solving 
strategic  focus 
leadership  and  planning 
visionary  and  adaptive 
change  oriented 
intellectual  independence 
exploit  opportunity 
Table  7.14:  Summary  of  Alliance  Skills 
P4.2  Inter-organisational  teamwork  encourages  learning  at  many  levels  andfunctions 
in  business  and  the  increasing  skills  base  develops  relationship  specific  know- 
how  in  both  the  customer  and  supplier  organisations. 
319 7.5.3  Joint  Innovation  and  Continuous  Improvement 
High  performance  stemmed  from  bringing  together  people  with  the  right  mix  of 
intellectual  skills  to  address  complicated  problems.  Cross-functional  teamwork  was  a 
means  by  which  skills  within  separate  organisations  combined  to  develop  new  strategically 
significant  capabilities  (refer  to  chapters  4.4.3,  page  157-,  5.5.3,  page  216). 
As  this  was  difficult  to  transfer  and  costly  for  rivals  to  copy,  ally  businesses  became  jointly 
more  efficient  by  facilitating  continuous  transfer  of  knowledge  and  new  joint  capabilities. 
Likewise,  learning  was  promoted  as  customer  and  personnel  in  both  companies  better 
understood  each  other's  processes.  Thus,  on  going  innovation  and  continuous  improvement 
became  embedded  in  the  alliance  philosophy. 
The  growth  of  innovation  was  in  most  cases  an  incremental  development  of  processes  and 
people's  expertise,  rather  than  dramatic  breakthroughs.  However,  the  speed  of  change 
meant  that  much  of  the  innovation  was  not  captured.  The  lesson  to  be  learnt  was  that  it 
required  active  management  support  to  evaluate  ideas  and  to  decide  between  those  that 
were  commercially  viable  and  others  that  were  not.  When  it  turned  out  that  a  project  which 
at  first  glance  looked  as  if  it  was  going  to  result  in  creating  a  significant  saving,  did  not, 
such  learning  was  not  wasted  and  the  information  was  able  to  be  resurrected  when  the 
timing  was  right.  See  table  7.15. 
Harness  and  unify  separate  strengths 
"  Pool  resources 
"  Inter-organisations  teams  drive  innovation 
"  Innovation  needs  active  management  support 
"  Streamline  process  and  remove  waste 
"  Extend  supply  chain  network 
"  Promote  continuous  improvement  and  competitive 
advantage 
"  Innovation  and  learning  are  bound  together 
Table  7.15:  Summary  of  Joint  Innovation 
320 P4.3  Harnessing  and  unifying  collective  strengths  is  recognised  as  the  most  important 
means  ofseeking  innovation  and  maintaining  competitive  edge. 
7.5.4  Joint  Tacit  and  Explicit  Learning 
Individual  knowledge  and  skill  positively  contributed  to  achievement  of  collective 
objectives  through  people's  utilisation  of  all  available  resources.  The  critical  factor  was  the 
knowledge  and  understanding  gained  from  closer  working  relations  and  much  improved 
communication  between  the  companies.  The  new  way  of  working  directly  impacted  on  jobs 
and  attitudes  and  contributed  to  the  organisations  doing  business  better.  Sharing  ideas  and 
openness  reduced  fear  of  failure  and  people  realised  that  knowledge  could  be  gained,  even 
from  mistakes  (refer  to  chapters  4.4.4,  page  160;  5.5.4,  page  217;  6.5.2,  page  261). 
Joint  learning  which  was  not  fully  exploited  has  been  one  of  the  big  failings  so  far.  This 
was  mainly  due  to  poor  documentation  as  well  as  managers  not  really  understanding  the 
implications  of  knowledge  generation  and  retention,  consequently  much  of  the  joint 
learning  in  the  alliances  was  tacit  and  therefore  its  diflusion  was  limited.  In  all  three 
instances,  relationship  specific  competencies  have  been  acquired. 
P4.4  Alliance  learning  develops  relationship  specific  competencies. 
7.5.5  Process  Alignment  at  Interface 
All  parties  acknowledge,  to  a  lesser  or  greater  extent,  that  the  improvements  from  the  past 
work  were  now  embedded  in  day  to  day  activities.  To  most  people,  efficient  practices 
appear  to  have  happened  automatically  and  this  may  have  contributed  to  the  general  loss  of 
interest  and  momentum  in  the  change  process  (refer  to  4.4.5,  page  160;  5.5.5,  page  218; 
6.5.3,  page  262). 
P4.5  Processes  at  the  interface  between  the  partners  eventually  become  routine. 
Process  alignment  continues  to  improve  as  the  alliance  matures  only  when 
motivation  remains. 
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With  regard  to  the  IDV  /  Killeen  alliance,  two  factors  had  a  devastating  effect  on  the 
alliance.  Firstly  Grand  Metropolitan  and  Guinness  merged  to  form  the  Diageo  group. 
International  Distillers  and  Vintners  (IDV)  then  became  known  as  United  Distillers  and 
Vintners  (UDV)  and  Killeen's  managing  director  left  (refer  to  chapter  4.4.7,  page  162). 
The  Aberdeen  SCA  alliance  environment  had  changed  since  the  outset  due  to  the  dramatic 
fall  in  the  price  of  oil  in  1998  bringing  about  the  need  to  become  leaner  and  more 
competitive.  UESL  had  been  forced  to  re-define  its  entire  strategy.  The  management 
structure  of  Shell  Logistics  changed  from  being  a  series  of  functional  departments  to  being 
horizontally  oriented  (refer  to  chapter  5.5.6,  page  218). 
Sun's  entire  world-wide  organisation  had  undergone  two  internal  changes  since  1997.  The 
Sun  operation  became  less  functionally  orientated  and  worked  using  cross-functional 
product  groups.  Within  three  years  Sun  intended  to  re-organise  its  entire  supply  chain, 
rather  than  just  its  supply  base  and  this  would  mean  fewer  points  of  contact  between  Sun 
and  its  suppliers  (refer  to  chapter  6.5.4,  page  263). 
Throughout  the  history  of  these  alliances,  the  customer  has  always  been  dominant.  The 
time  had  come  for  the  companies  to  discuss  the  joint  future  and  to  decide  the  path  they  wish 
to  take  including  broader  issues  of  responsibility,  dominance  and  control. 
P4.6  Strategic  reviews  held  at  regular  intervals  consolidate  current  and  past  activities 
and  identify  new  alliance  objectives.  In  so  doing,  the  alliance  utilises  knowledge 
gained  tofurther  develop  and  invest  in  innovative  methods  of  delivery,  production 
.,  andjoint  core  processes. 
Strategic  reviews  were  undertaken  periodically,  however,  by  this  fourth  stage,  many  of  the 
initial  objectives  had  been  achieved.  For  example  in  all  the  studies  costs  had  been  reduced, 
productivity  improved  and  planning  and  scheduling  information  was  freely  available. 
322 Organisational  culture  had  been  modified  to  a  lesser  or  greater  extent,  reflecting  varying 
degrees  of  collaboration. 
Results  were  what  counted  and  in  the  fourth  stage  of  the  alliance,  costs  became  even  more 
important.  Costs  had  been  reduced  to  a  sustainable  level  and  the  alliances  could  make  use 
of  new  knowledge  acquired  to  further  develop  and  invest  in  innovative  methods  of  delivery, 
production  and  joint  core  processes. 
P4.7  Alliances  change  and  evolve  all  the  time.  It  is  essential  to  continually  assess 
external  and  internal  environments  in  order  to  appreciate  the  strategic  position  of 
the  alliance 
P4.8  The  alliance  re-adjusts  to  suit  contingent  circumstances;  the  assumption  being 
that  relations  will  continue  in  the  light  of  strategic  re-definition. 
Figure  7.7  describes  the  main  characteristics  in  Stage  IV. 
COOPERATING  CULTURES 
Build  upon  trust,  commitment  and 
reputation 
Increased  communication 
Collective  identity  Social  capital  STRATEGIC  REVIEW 
Teamwork  ethos  Re-definition  of  goals 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  ALLIANCE  SKILLS  Changing  attitudes  Adapting  to  external  and  internal  dynamics 
commercial  and  Increased  technical 
New  objectives  re-invigorate 
, 
management  capabilities 
alliance 
Exploit  inherent  resources  Alliance  mindset  Tap  potential  for  innovation 
Team  skills  Fine  tuning 
Problem  solving  and  analysis 
........  Step  change  -  opportunity  for  alliance  to  become 
operational  knowledge 
......  truly  strategic 
JOINT  INNOVATION  AND 
CONTINUOUS  IMPROVEM 
.............  ... 
ENT 
PROCESS  ALIGNMENT  AT 
Teamwork  drives  innovation  INTERFACE 
Networks  foster  innovation  JOINT  EXPLICIT  AND 
TACIT  LEARNING  Understanding  across  functions 
Improvements  routine  in  day  to  day 
Embedded  knowledge  resides  in  the  teams  activities 
Relationship  specific  skills 
Workforce  involvement  improves  operation 
Transfer  of  knowledge  and 
new  joint  capabilities 
Teams  have  considerable  knowledge  of  alliance 
partners  and  processes 
Figure  7.7:  Thematic  Grouping  in  Stage  IV 
323 7.6  STAGE  V 
Having  achieved  most  of  the  objectives  and  following  a  strategic  review,  the  allies  came  to 
the  realisation  that  they  were  at  a  crossroads.  They  faced  the  choice  to  either,  maintain  the 
current  level  of  expenditure  of  resources  in  the  cooperative  process  or,  to  dissolve  the 
alliance  and  terminate  the  contacts  hitherto  established.  Also,,  in  each  of  the  cases  they 
could  use  the  experience  gained  to  found  new  alliances.  it  should  be  noted  that  the  freedom 
to  withdraw  was  implicit  at  all  stages  and  it  did  not  follow  that  decision  to  part  could  only 
be  made  in  Stage  V 
The  management  option's  were  to:  - 
Withdraw 
9  Use  knowledge  gained  to  foster  new  relations 
The  research  question  relevant  to  this  section  is  "what  happened  when  alliances  ended?  " 
7.6.1  Use  Knowledge  Gained  to  Foster  New  Relations 
In  each  of  the  separate  cases  the  alliance  created  the  blueprint  for  closer  working  relations 
with  other  customers  and  suppliers.  EDV  applied  cooperative  principles  in  its  dealings  with 
glass  and  label  suppliers.  The  Sun/]Birkbys  alliance  in  the  U.  K.  was  unique  within  the 
global  Sun  organisation  and  the  resultant  learning  had  been  passed  on  to  other  suppliers. 
Latterly  there  were  seven  resident  planners  directly  employed  by  outside  parties,  working 
in  the  Sun  facility.  With  regards  to  UESL,  alliancing  was  involving  groups  other  than 
Logistics. 
It  was  noteworthy  that  individuals  directly  involved  championed  the  new  alliances, 
although  alliancing,  as  a  change  management  tool,  was  regarded  with  suspicion  by 
everyone  else.  The  continual  need  to  provide  the  board  with  incontrovertible  evidence  that 
the  best  deal  was  still  being  promoted  did  not  help  the  efforts  aimed  at  continuous 
improvement  and  removal  of  waste. 
324 P5.1  Knowledge  is  used  to  develop  new  alliances  and  support  a  portfolio  of  relations. 
7.6.2  Withdraw 
The  cases  under  study  demonstrated  that  withdrawal  and  recovery  were  not  exclusive 
options.  The  declining  pace  of  activity  in  all  three  alliances  set  counter  forces  in  motion. 
The  presence  of  trust  made  exit  less  likely  by  providing  a  greater  chance  of  recovery.  Trust 
prevented  deterioration  from  becoming  irreversible  and  created  the  expectation  that 
negotiations  could  resolve  concerns. 
Each  alliance  had  its  strategic  goals,  some  more  explicit  than  others,  and  in  order  to  achieve 
these  targets  the  alliance  had  to  be  maintained,  provided  the  cost  was  acceptable.  In  each 
case,  a  series  of  crises  threw  up  the  need  for  subtle  management  and  usually  it  was  the  first 
of  these  events  that  had  the  most  severe  impact.  A  crisis  generated  conditions  that 
encouraged  the  alliance  partners  to  review  the  current  status  and  to  question  what  was 
causing  instability. 
A  crisis  of  confidence  was  manifest  in  the  very  early  stages  of  both  the  SCA  and  the  Sun 
and  Birkbys  alliance.  The  SCA  attempted  too  much  to  soon  and  this  had  an  adverse  effect 
on  customer  service.  Similarly,  although  Birkbys'  work  was  subject  to  a  high  standard, 
quality  control,  was  not  rigorous  enough  for  Sun.  The  exception  appeared  to  be  the  IDW 
Killeen  alliance  which  ran  smoothly  in  the  early  days,  possibly  because  of  the  explicit 
objectives  and  programme  of  planned  objectives  written  into  the  agreement. 
During  turbulent  times,  the  alliance  partners'  role  became  one  of  problem  solving  and 
through  joint  discussion  the  issues  were  generally  resolved. 
The  Sun  /  Birkbys  alliance  had  not  been  confirmed  in  any  formal  agreement  or  written 
ground  rules  and  the  strategy  that  developed  was  reactive  in  response  to  emergent  issues, 
rather  than  the  product  of  advanced  planning.  This  strained  the  alliance  as  the  supplier  was 
325 taking  on  more  and  more  Sun  work,  thereby  becoming  increasingly  dependent  on  Sun  the 
one  customer. 
The  Shell  alliance  was  very  turbulent  throughout  its  entire  existence  and  this  was  due  to  the 
complexity  of  the  three  party  alliance.  Despite  frequent  personal  clashes,  the  participants 
worked  hard  to  improve  the  logistics  process  and  reduce  costs.  Open  dialogue  and 
commitment  to  the  alliance  prevented  the  SCA  from  reverting  back  to  traditional  contractor 
/  client  relations. 
P5.2  The  very  act  of  considering  to  withdraw  can  lead  to  corrective  action  and 
consequent  revitalisation  of  the  collaboration. 
7.7  TRANSITION  BETWEEN  STAGES 
The  purpose  of  this  research  was  to  investigate  the  possibility  of  a  staged  development  in 
alliances  as  they  matured.  The  foregoing  has  described  the  findings  of  three  case  studies 
which  demonstrate  how  the  alliances  moved  througfi  particular  phases.  Dominant 
characteristics  in  each  stage  and  the  transition  between  stages  have  been  documented  within 
each  case. 
The  following  surnmarises  the  conditions  during  transition  in  each  alliance.  The  research 
question  pertinent  to  this  section  is,  "didparficular  events  signal  the  relationship  change 
to  anotherphase?  " 
The  transition  from  Stage  0  to  Stage  I  in  all  three  alliances  is  signalled  by  the  end  of 
information  gathering  and  analysis.  Partners  had  been  selected  and  a  formal,,  or  informal 
alliance  agreement  successfully  negotiated.  The  allies  moved  to  implement  the  alliance  in 
Stage  I. 
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With  regard  to  IDV  and  Killeen,  the  explicit  objectives  set  out  during  Stage  0  meant  that 
the  dedicated  teams,  established  in  Stage  I,  were  able  to  effectively  plan  how  they  were 
going  to  manage  and  resource  each  project.  The  passage  to  Stage  II  was  smooth  and  saw 
the  project  teams  working  at  full  capacity  (see  table  4.2,  page  136). 
The  initial  objectives  were  accomplished  much  sooner  that  anticipated  and  a  lull  in  activity 
followed.  Project  teams  running  out  of  steam,  indicated  the  transition  from  Stage  Il  to 
Stage  III  (see  table  4.5,  page  169).  New  strategic  objectives  were  as  yet  unclear  and  the 
teams  needed  direction  to  meet  the  new  and  changing  internal  and  external  environment. 
The  transition  to  Stage  IV  was  characterised  by  a  structured  review  of  current  projects  and 
a  process  planning  exercise  to  identify  a  new  agenda  for  change  (see  chapter  4.4,  page  153). 
Transition  Between  Stages  -  SCA 
With  regards  to  the  SCA,  life  was  more  complex.  Although  the  alliance  agreement  was  the 
most  formally  established  of  all  the  three  cases  and  laid  out  contractual  expectations  in 
detail,  there  was  no  reference  to  ground  rules,  communication  mechanisms  and  operational 
procedures. 
The  contract  specifically  set  out  performance  milestones  which  when  achieved,  were  to 
release  more  control  to  the  contractors.  In  this  early  part  of  Stage  I  there  were  times  when 
LTESL  seriously  considered  if  it  was  doing  the  right  thing  by  being  in  an  alliance  and  felt 
that  things  would  improve  it  they  had  greater  control.  To  address  the  looming  impasse, 
UESL  therefore  reviewed  what  was  happening  in  the  alliance  and  drew  up  a  "Pause  Plan!  '. 
Recommendations  from  the  latter,  were  then  shared  with  SMIL  and  ARRC,  and  this  had  the 
effect  of  concentrating  efforts  aimed  at  improving  the  situation.  The  transition  to  Stage  II 
was  also  characterised  by  changes  in  attitudes  and  behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  partners, 
with  increased  communication  and  a  greater  degree  of  openness  (see  table  5.4,  page  193). 
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SML  and  ARRC  had  never  been  properly  addressed.  Team  members'  motivation  was 
difficult  to  sustain  because  objectives  had  not  been  clearly  articulated.  On  the  most  part, 
people  expected  things  to  change  quickly  and  they  attempted  too  much  too  soon.  In  reality, 
enthusiasm  was  not  enough  and  the  Stage  Iff  was  characterised  by  loss  of  energy  and  failed 
targets  (see  table  5.6,  page  203). 
Attempts  to  confront  these  problems  heralded  the  transition  to  Stage  IV  (see  table  5.8,  page 
214).  In  the  first  instance,  the  main  contract  had  at  last  been  signed  by  the  Halliburton 
group,  which  meant  that  there  was  a  substantial  degree  of  commitment  from  SML's  parent 
company.  Also,  within  the  SCA  itself,  procedures  to  monitor  team  projects  had  been 
established,  as  well  a  monthly  management  report.  This,  in  itself,  was  a  significant  step 
forward  as  the  statistics  for  the  report  was  drawn  from  SML  and,  up  until  this  time,  it  had 
been  very  difficult  to  gain  access  to  SMIL's  database  or  make  sense  of  the  fragments  of 
information  released.  The  whole  operation  was  assisted  by  the  assignment  of  a  Shell 
contracts  manager  to  the  SML  site.  Once  again  the  alliance  seemed  to  have  moved  on  and 
new  objectives  would  mean  a  return  to  Stage  L 
Transition  Between  Stages  -  Sun/  Birkbys 
The  crisis  of  confidence  in  this  alliance  was  mainly  due  to  Sun  questioning  Birkbys  quality 
of  performance.  Birkbys  had  no  notion  of  just  how  much  it  would  have  to  change  in  order 
to  meet  Sun's  demands.  Also,  Sun  did  not  appreciate  the  amount  of  development  Birkbys 
would  require  to  achieve  the  standards.  Strained  relations  was  the  prevailing  condition, 
although  this  soon  changed  when  Sun  engineers  began  to  support  Birkbys. 
Communications  improved  and  Sun's  confidence  in  Birkbys  improved.  These 
circumstances  marked  the  progression  from  Stage  I  to  Stage  II  (see  table  6.3,  page  239). 
Sharing  forecasting  information  was  critical  to  the  entire  alliance  process  and  Sun  was,  by 
that  time,  sharing  market  information  with  Birkbys.  Nevertheless,  Sun's  attitude  to  the 
alliance  was  questionable  and  its  key  people  regularly  failed  to  attend  meetings.  On  the 
328 other  hand,  Birkbys  was  once  again  getting  low  score  card  results,  which  fueled  Sun's 
scepticism.  This  on-going  situation  contributed  to  the  slow  down  in  alliance  activity  and 
suggested  the  transition  to  Stage  Iff  (see  table  6.5,  page  250). 
Lack  of  written  procedures,  vague  targets  and  success  criteria  continued  to  strain  relations. 
Both  companies  made  concerted  efforts  to  change  the  situation  by  implementing  specific 
alliance  related  projects.  This  marked  the  beginning  of  Stage  IV  (see  chapter  6.7,  page 
260). 
By  this  time,  the  alliance  had  matured  to  the  extent  that  Sun  was  able  to  withdraw  from 
day-  to-  day  operations.  Birkbys  was  taking  on  more  work  for  Sun  and  as  a  direct  result  of 
this  alliance,  Birkbys  had  developed  from  a  middle-sized  UK  engineering  business  to  be  a 
major  company  operating  internationally.  Also,  Sun  was  able  to  follow  its  intended 
strategic  direction,  developing  high  value  products  without  having  to  rely  exclusively  on 
Birkbys.  The  Sun/Birkbys  alliance  ended,  when  Birkbys  focus  changed  to  working  directly 
for  the  Sun  parent  organisation  in  the  USA.  The  following  summarises  findings  from  Stage 
V. 
P5.3  The  very  act  of  considering  withdrawal  can  lead  to  correction  that  results  in 
revitalisation  of  the  collaboration. 
P5.4  Serious  obstacles  to  moving  on  to  the  next  stage  include,  but  are  not  limited  to, 
incompatibility  between  objectives  and  rewards. 
P5.5  The  most  significant  factor  threatening  the  future  of  an  alliance  is  lack  of 
investment  in,  or  commitment  to,  a  long-termfuture. 
PS.  6  Factors  emanating  from  parent  companies,  or  other  environmental  changes, 
beyond  the  control  of  the  immediate  allies,  may  dictate  withdrawal, 
329 7.8  RESEARCH  QUESTIONS  -Summarised 
Each  question  had  been  addressed  in  the  foregoing  chapter  and  summarised  in  turn:  - 
1.  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
2.  Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itself  from  another? 
3.  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops,  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
4.  Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in  another 
5.  What  factors  identify  the  transition  fforn  one  stage  to  another? 
6.  What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
9  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
The  foregoing  chapter  describes  and  summarises  the  three  alliances'  development  through 
progressive  stages  as  illustrated  in  figure  7.2,  page  280. 
*  Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itsep'from  another?  - 
Case  studies,  presented  in  chapters  four,  five  and  six,  define  the  conceptual  framework  and 
support  research  objectives  by  demonstrating  that  the  alliances  evolved  gradually, 
developed  and  matured  with  the  passage  of  time.  In  order  to  capture  the  distilled  meaning 
of  each  stage,  the  author  has  renamed  them  as  follows:  - 
Stage  0  Prelude  involved  preconditions  prior  to  the  alliance  commencement 
Stage  I  Purpose  was  concerned  with  understanding  basic  principles  and  raising 
awareness  of  the  level  of  commitment  to  be  required. 
Stage  II  Process  was  notable  for  the  intensity  of  inter-organisational  activity. 
330 Stage  III  Achievement  of  team  objectives  and  subsequent  stagnation,  or  slowing  of 
the  process,  was  evident  in  Plateau. 
Stage  IV  Progress  was  characterised  by  process  alignment  at  the  communication 
interface  and  by  enhanced  managerial  skill  and  know-how. 
Stage  V  The  process  culminated  in  Parting,  when  dissolution  of  relations  between 
partners  was  considered. 
*  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops,  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
The  characteristics  that  differentiate  each  stage  are  discussed  and  contrasted  in  chapter  7.1- 
7.6,  pages  280-324.  Table  7.16,  page  330,  presents  the  characteristics  in  each  stage  or 
phase. 
Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in 
another? 
Most  were  present  throughout  the  duration  of  each  alliance,  and  stages  were  distinguished 
by  the  type  of  activities  undertaken  by  the  alliance  partners  (refer  to  chapters  four  -  six). 
e  Didparticular  events  signal  the  relationship  change  to  anotherphase? 
In  each  alliance  it  was  possible  to  detect  subtle  changes  in  participants'  behaviour  when 
relations  improved,  or  declined,  at  a  different  level  in  the  phasing  (see  chapter  7.7,  page 
320). 
What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
331 Consideration  was  given  to  the  ending  of  alliances.  Implicit  in  each  stage  was  the 
possibility  of  parting,  however,  in  each  alliance  investigated,  the  conditions  which 
prompted  such  considerations  were  defused  as  a  result  of  management  intervention. 
It  would  therefore  not  be  necessary  to  go  through  Progress  in  order  to  withdraw  from  the 
alliance.  The  Plateau  stage  might  be  a  most  likely  exit  point,  given  that  each  of  the 
alliances  had  by  that  time  completed  the  objectives  that  initiated  the  collaborative  strategy 
in  the  first  instance.  Management  options  at  that  point  would  clearly  be  to  progress  and 
grow  or  dissolve  and  choosing  the  latter  option  would  result  in  looping  back  to  Purpose. 
With  respect  to  the  IDV/Killeen  and  SCA  alliances,  both  returned  to  Purpose,  confirmed 
new  goals  and  targets  and  moved  into  a  new  cycle  and  higher  level  of  knowledge.  Sun  and 
Birkbys  ,  on  the  other  hand,  parted  after  the  Progress  stage. 
Reporting  and  articulating  dynamic  evolutionary  processes  is  complicated.  Hence,  the 
framework  may  appear  linear  with  rigid  and  structured  reporting.  In  reality,  the  alliances 
fluctuated  back  and  forth  as  illustrated  in  figure  7.2,  page  280.  Boundaries  were  often 
bluffed  and  transition  between  stages  was  often  recognised  through  reflection  rather  than  at 
the  moment  when  the  step  change  was  triggered. 
Nevertheless,  the  aim  of  the  thesis  has  been  achieved  and  research  questions  answered. 
The  alliance  stages  have  been  mapped  with  dominant  characteristics  presented  in  each 
stage.  Table  7.16,  page  330,  represents  a  framework  of  the  progressive  development. 
332 "  Alliance  agreement 
"  Environmental  analysis 
"  History  of  Working  together 
"  Partner  Selection 
"  Previous  alliance  experience 
"  Strategic  intent 
JEAU  Adapting  cultures 
HR  Assessment 
Perfon-nance  Plateau 
Process  and  Cost  Understanding 
Reflection  and  Learning 
"  Cooperating  Cultures 
"  Development  of  Alliance  Skills 
"  Joint  Innovation  and  Continuous 
Improvement 
"  Joint  Tacit  and  Explicit  Learning 
"  Process  Alignment  at  Interface 
"  Strategic  Review 
Use  Alliance  gained  Knowledge  to 
Foster  New  Relations 
Withdraw 
Table  7.16:  Framework  of  Progressive  Relationship  Development 
Chapter  eight  evaluates  the  findings  in  comparison  with  the  literature  review  in  Chapters 
one  and  two.  It  also  continues  to  refine  the  framework  and  to  consider  the  research 
questions  further. 
333 Chapter  Eight 
Discussion  -  Part  11 8.0  DISCUSSION:  PART  11 
Aim:  To  continue  the  discussion  by  evaluating  findings  in  relation  to  academic  literature 
The  objectives  are  to  :  - 
*  consider  the  evolutionary  process  of  alliance  development 
e  assess  whether  dominant  characteristics  in  the  conceptual  framework  agree  with, 
relevant  literature 
e  establish  whether  findings  from  this  study  have  been  corroborated  by  past  research 
*  present  a  framework  of  alliance  evolution 
8.1  THE  EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS  OF  ALLIANCE  DEVELOPMENT 
According  to  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982:  9-10),  organisations  are  usually  much  better  at 
self-maintenance  than  they  are  in  situations  of  major  change.  These  authors  explain  that 
the  broader  meaning  of  "evolutionary"  includes  a  concern  with  the  process  of  long-term 
progressive  change.  Furthermore,  they  go  on  to  suggest  that  stability,  observable  in  the 
present,  may  result  from  past  routines  and  dynamic  processes  and  that  quite  a  different 
future  than  expected  may  emerge  as  a  consequence  of  those  same  processes  (ibid.  10). 
Harrigan  (1986),  states  that  joint  ventures  are  a  transitional  form  of  management;  an 
intermediate  step  on  the  way  to  something  else. 
This  evolutionary  perspective  is  consistent  with  other  authors  whose  work  supports  stages 
in  alliance  development  (see  for  example  Ellrarn  1991;  Murray  and  Mahon  1993;  Spekman 
et  al  1998,  also  refer  to  chapter  two,  pages  52-80)  and  in  this  context,  Ford  (1980:  341),  for 
example,  cites  five  stages  in  the  evolution  of  an  alliance.  The  idea  that  an  evolutionary 
pattern  may  exist  has  important  implications  as  regards  managers'  and  academics' 
understanding  of  the  key  aspects  of  forming  and  managing  strategic  alliances  (Lorange  and 
Roos  1993:  92).  Ford  (1980:  341)  suggests  that  because  of  ongoing  adaptations  as  the 
alliance  matures,  it  is  as  important  to  analyse  the  overall  relationship,  as  well  as  the 
separate  incidents  which  comprise  it. 
334 Hence,  the  overall  development  process  was  as  important  as  the  daily  dynamics  of  the 
ventures.  Events  described  in  the  case  studies  took  place  within  the  context  of  maturing 
alliances,  and  were  influenced  by  relationship  norms  and  attitudes.  The  point  at  issue  is 
that  many  different  forces  were  exerted  throughout  the  duration  of  the  alliances  and  some 
were  more  important  at  specific  times.  Consequently,  although  there  appeared  to  be 
dominant  characteristics  within  each  stage,  many  of  these  attributes  were  present  in  varying 
degrees  of  intensity  in  every  stage  (see  table  7.16,  page  330).  Trust  and  commitment  were 
such  characteristics  and  Wilson  (1995)  describes  these  as  latent  constructs,  which  depended 
on  the  atmosphere  of  cooperation,  or  conflict,  prevailing  at  that  particular  time. 
A  number  of  scholars  have  recognised  that  strategic  alliances  develop  in  phases,  however 
the  obvious  difference  amongst  models  cited  in  chapter  two  is  the  number  of  stages 
identified  and  the  names  and  characteristics  attributed  to  each  stage.  With  respect  to  this 
study,  the  data  supports  six  distinct  phases,  which  have  been  termed  Prelude,  Purpose, 
Process,  Plateau,  Progress  and  Parting.  Thýse  will  now  be  summarised  in  the  light  of  the 
literature  bearing  on  the  subject.  Dominant  characteristics  within  each  stage  will  also  be 
discussed  and  distilled  further,  where  appropriate,  to  present  a  framework  of  alliance 
development,  which  is  the  principal  objective  of  this  thesis. 
8.2  STAGE  0-  PRELUDE 
This  stage,  setting  the  preconditions  for  the  alliance,  has  been  well  documented  in  literature 
pertaining  to  exchange  relationships  (see  for  example  Ford  1990;  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman 
1987;  Frazier  Spekman  and  OWeil;  1988;  Dwyer,  Schurr  and  Oh,  1987).  Most  of  these 
scholars  have  suggested  that  this  preliminary  stage  has  a  path  dependent  influence  on  an 
alliance  and  upon  its  final  outcome  (for  example  Cohen  and  Levinthal  1990,  Gomes  and 
Casseres  1996). 
The  attributes  in  Prelude  appeared  to  be  linked  and  to  have  exerted  an  influence  on  each 
other  to  varying  degrees  as  the  alliance  evolved.  In  the  first  instance)  alliance  objectives 
had  a  greater  tendency  to  elaborate  the  customer  organisation's  strategy  as  compared  with 
335 that  of  the  supplier.  Even  if  joint  discussion  had  taken  place  by  this  stage,  suppliers  were 
not  absolutely  clear  about  the  rationale  behind  the  changes  or  their  own  performance 
expectations.  It  was  only  when  the  alliances  began  to  operate  in  earnest,  that  anomalies  in 
the  agreement  became  obvious  (see  also  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman  1987;  Gray  1989). 
Alliance  Agreement 
The  alliance  agreement  was  an  important  document,  no  matter  how  explicit  or  informal,  as 
it  should  have  laid  out  the  rules  regarding  expectations  of  behaviour  and  performance  by 
all  the  parties.  If  the  agreement  was  flawed  or  lacking,  for  whatever  reason,  during  the 
formative  stages  the  alliances  were  put  under  stress.  Misperceptions  led  to  mistrust  and 
contributed  to  problems  of  poor  communication  and  performance  (refer  to  1.1.7,  page  10; 
section  1.5,  page  43) 
The  necessity  for  a  clear  and  detailed  alliance  agreement  has  been  emphasised  in  the 
majority  of  the  process  models  summarised  in  Chapter  two  of  the  literature  review  (see  also 
Macbeth  and  Ferguson  1994:  171).  Ring  and  Van  de  Ven  (1994)  and  Murray  and  Mahon 
(1993),  specifically  mention  a  contractual  agreement,  while  others,  (for  example  Frazier  et 
al  1988,  and  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman  1987),  describe  how  rules,  procedures  and 
expectations  must  be  articulated  between  the  parties;  although  the  agreement  may  be  either 
a  formal  or  a  psychological  one.  On  the  whole,  scholars  were  consistent  in  that  the  contract 
must  include  the  ground  rules,  define  purpose  and  structure,  cover  membership  criteria  and 
performance  expectations. 
Cherrett  (1994)  points  out  that  if  the  contract  is  fonnal  and  the  anticipated  duration  explicit 
within  the  agreement,  sufficient  confidence  was  likely  to  be  generated  to  persuade  the 
partners  to  continue  to  invest  in  the  alliance.  However,  whether  formal  or  informal,  close 
working  relations  over  an  extended  period  of  time  depended  on  trust  (see  for  example  Sako 
1992)  1998)  and  teamwork  (see  for  example  Barney  and  Hansen  1994). 
336 Joint  performance  targets  need  to  be  established  through  an  ongoing  process  of  negotiation 
and  re-evaluation  (see  Zajac  and  Olsen  1993,  Doz  1996).  In  accordance  with  literature, 
repeated  interaction  and  adaptation  by  the  allies  stimulated  the  transfer  of  knowledge 
between  the  partners  (refer  to  Dodgson  1991;  Mohr  and  Spekman  1994;  also  chapter  1.3, 
page  36).  In  the  opinion  of  Zajac  and  Olsen  (1993)  know-how  was  more  easily  transferred 
through  relational  rather  than  a  transactional  exchanges. 
Environmental  Analysis 
Long-term  strategic  planning  can  be  very  difficult  in  a  turbulent  industrial  environment. 
This  affected  each  of  the  alliances  examined  and  meant  that  the  companies  were  subject  to 
regular  re-organisation.  Mission  statements  declared  in  the  alliance  agreements  reflected 
both  present  and  future  aspirations  and  acted  as  a  reminder  of  the  way  the  companies 
intended  to  behave.  In  this  way,  strategy  and  objectives  could  be  adapted  to  fit  together  as 
internal  and  external  conditions  dictated  (see  also  Murray  and  Mahon  1993;  Dyer  and 
Singh  1998). 
The  business  case  and alliance  rationale  were  also  reflected  as  part  of  the  strategic 
objectives  in  the  agreement,  which  should  have  been  signed  off  by  all  partners  (see  for 
example  Lorange  and  Roos  1993).  Other  characteristics,  namely  previous  alliance 
experience,  history  of  working  together,  organisational  readiness  and  cultural  compatibility, 
all  had  an  influence  on  attitudes  within  the  companies  towards  cooperative  working  (see 
chapter  1.1.7,  page  10  and  1.1.13,  page  20). 
Partner  Selection  (including  cultural  compatibility,  history  of  working  together  and 
previous  alliance  experience) 
Partner  selection  was  seen  as  a  principal  activity  prior  to  the  alliances  and  an  issue  critical 
to  success  (See  Tenbrunsel  et  al  1999).  All  the  process  models  have  this  characteristic  in 
common  (see  chapter  two).  The  procedure  used  by  each  alliance  founder  identified  the 
337 attributes  of  the  potential  partner  in  terms  of  specific  criteria,  such  as  performance 
evaluation,  proximity,  complimentary  skills  and  knowledge  (refer  to  1.1.7,  page  I  I). 
Cultural  compatibility  was  a  matter  that  might  have  been  given  more  careful  consideration 
by  companies  seeking  alliance  partners  (see  for  example  Brouthers  et  al  1995).  This  point 
is  deemed  as  most  important  by  a  number  of  authors,  for  example  Gray  (1989). However, 
the  organisational  cultures  seemed  to  have  been  scarcely,  if  at  all,  influenced  by  the 
alliances,  although  with  the  passage  of  time,  shared  values  fostered  positive  attitudes 
regarding  the  alliances  and  led  to  greater  commitment  by  the  participants  (refer  to  1.1.7, 
page  10  and  page  23).  In  all  cases,  companies  that  had  little  or  no  experience  of  alliances, 
were  breaking  new  ground. 
In  each  of  the  alliances  investigated,  participants  gradually  learned  skills  appropriate  to 
managing  the  alliance  (refer  to  chapter  1.3;  also  Doz  1996;  Spekman  et  al  1998).  Thus 
selecting  a  partner  with  alliance  management  experience  may  provide  a  basis  for  a  more 
long-term  and  stable  relationship  than  one  with  none  at  all.  Although  the  results  from  this 
study  indicate  that  the  allies  did  not  attach  any  significance  to  selecting  partners  who  had 
alliance  experience,  the  individuals  who  initiated  the  strategy  brought  their  alliance 
knowledge  to  the  new  alliance. 
It  would  therefore  seem  when  considering  a  potential  partner,  that  skill  in  managing 
successful  alliances  would  be  as  important  a  selection  criteria  as  choosing  partners  with 
reputations  for  technical  ability  or  quality.  Only  in  Gray's  (1989)  model  was  previous 
alliance  experience-  mentioned  as  an  important  criterion  in  alliance  success. 
Ellram  (1991)  suggests  that  the  decision  to  enter  into  a  strategic  alliance,  especially  for 
firms  with  little  previous  experience  of  such  relationships,  may  represent  a  major 
philosophical  shift.  With  respect  to  this  study,  although  changes  in  attitudes  were  evident 
among  those  directly  involved  in  the  relationship,  the  wider  organisation  was  little 
influenced.  Competitive  tendering  and  traditional  contracts  were  still  considered  a  more 
acceptable  way  of  seeking  suppliers,  as  apparent  safeguards  from  exploitation. 
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This  study  appears  to  contradict  previous  research  findings  on  the  importance  of  past 
working  relations  to  alliance  success.  Indeed,  experience  based  on  traditional,  arms-length 
working  relations,  may  have  required  unlearning  in  the  first  instance,  to  break  down  old 
attitudes  and  perceptions  (see  Huber  1996,  also  section  1.3).  A  comparison  suggests  that  all 
the  organisations  examined  started  from  roughly  the  same  point,  despite  a  varied  history  of 
previous  working  relations. 
Strategic  Intent  (including  organisational  readiness) 
Alliance  literature  maintains  that  the  strategic  motivation  to  cooperate  is  influenced  by  an 
organisation's  environment  and  stresses  the  need  to  seek  competitive  advantage.  The 
lifecycle  models  of  Wilson  (1978),  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman  (1987)  and  Gray  (1989) 
advocate  evaluation  of  the  trading  conditions  facing  the  firm  prior  to  forming  and  alliance. 
Strategic  intent  was  discussed  as  an  alliance  precondition  and  motive  in  all  the  process 
models  cited  in  chapter  two.  The  predominant  incentive  was  either  organisational.  survival, 
environmentally  derived,  or  as  means  of  achieving  competitive  advantage  (see  for  example 
Murray  and  Mahon  1993;  see  also  1.1.4).  The  decision  to  enter  into  a  strategic  alliance 
represents  in  itself  a  major  issue  for  study. 
In  certain  circumstances  it  may  not  be  certain  whether  the  alliance  route  is  necessarily  the 
most  appropriate  strategy  to  achieve  objectives.  This  was  particular  to  the  SCA,  which  had 
a  very  turbulent  history  throughout.  Paradoxically,  this  alliance  was  abrasive  and  yet 
remained  stable,  in  that  the  participants  continued  to  work  towards  joint  goals. 
Understanding  currently  prevailing  conditions  and  anticipating  the  future  market 
environment  was  essential  to  ensure  that  developing  the  alliances  was  the  most  appropriate 
strategy.  The  initial  motivation  for  all  three  alliances  in  response  to  competitive  pressures 
or  market  turbulence  was  to  endeavour  to  reduce  costs  (refer  to  chapter  1.1). 
Although  each  alliance  began  with  the  intent  to  reduce  costs,  over  time,  this  narrow  focus, 
although  always  present,  was  superseded  by  ways  to  create  joint  value  through  innovative 
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and  1.4,  page  39). 
External  and  internal  evaluation,  prior  to  the  alliance  commencement,  might  have  saved 
time  and  perhaps  helped  to  avoid  mistrust  and  disappointment.  Much  loss  of  time  and 
energy  could  have  been  avoided  by  anticipating  problems  and  by  better  planning.  Lorange 
and  Roos  (1992-51)  emphasise  the  need  for  detailed  analytical  efforts  culminating  in  a 
business  plan.  As  it  was,  early  negotiations  encouraged  the  partners  to  interact  and  the 
alliances  took  off  quickly,  and  with  great  enthusiasm. 
Taking  the  time  to  evaluate  whether  the  organisation  is  ready  for  such  a  radical  change, 
analysing  the  cost  and  benefits  of  implementing  and  operating  an  alliance  strategy,  as  well 
as  selecting  partners  carefully,  means  that  organisations  are  more  likely  to  overcome  some 
of  the  inherent  problems  in  the  early  stages  (see  also  Dwyer  et  al  1987,  page  59,  D'Aunno 
and  Zuckerman  1987,  page  57;  Schmitz  et  al  1995,  page  69). 
Alliance  Fit  represents  the  dominant  characteristics  and  associated  sub-criteria  in  the  first 
stage.  Each  characteristic  influenced  another  and  ongoing  evaluation  of  both  external  and 
internal  requirements  ultimately  changed  the  structure  and  focus  of  the  alliances.  The  final 
distillation  of  characteristics  in  this  stage,  are  illustrated  in  table  8.1. 
External  Fit 
--  -  --------  --  ----------- 
................ 
Internal  fit 
.. 
Alliance  fit 
Partner  selection  including 
"  Cultural  compatibly 
"  History  of  working  together 
Environmental  *  Previous  alliance  experience  Alliance  agreement 
analysis 
Strategic  intent  including 
"  Organisation  readiness 
assessment 
"  Cost  /  benefit  analysis 
Table  8.1:  Alliance  Fit 
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During  the  Purpose  stage,  people  began  to  understand  the  principles  motivating  the 
organisations  and  they  also  became  aware  of  the  considerable  commitment  involved  in 
business  alliances.  Although  trust  between  members  fluctuated  during  this  stage,  it  could 
have,  and  should  have,  been  promoted  by  senior  management.  Investment  requirements  in 
terms  of  number  of  people  and  resource  requirements  might  not  have  been  accurately 
calculated  and  performance,  as  compared  with  hoped  for  potential,  had  changed  little.  Cost 
drivers  and  waste  had  not  yet  been  identified  and  were  still  embedded  in  the  supply  chain. 
Equally  important  were  a  strong  performance  focus,  accurate  measurement  and  continuous 
reporting,  as  well  as  a  professional  work  ethic.  The  Purpose  stage  was  where  participants 
built  trust,  identified  resource  requirements,  learnt  strategic  objectives  and  started  to 
understand  the  ally  company  (see  chapter  2.1,  page  52,  where  these  characteristics  are  also 
present  in  the  process  models). 
The  Purpose  stage  proved  to  be  enervating  for  all  parties  and  everyone  had  to  reconsider 
his  effectiveness  as  a  team  player.  In  large  measure,  lack  of  openness  and  mistrust  was  able 
to  be  resolved  primarily  because  of  the  high  level  of  interaction  and  people  feeling  more  at 
ease  with  one  another. 
Building  Trust  (including  Commitment  and  Leadership) 
Trust  was  as  much  an  ingredient  of  cooperation  as  a  product  of  it  and  gradually  confidence 
increased  as  parties  got  to  know  each  other  (see  Ellram  1991).  Reciprocity  was 
demonstrated  by  changing  behaviour  and  by  tangible  benefits  in  the  form  of  increased 
profit  or  reduced  costs  (refer  to  chapter  1.5,  page  43). 
According  to  Granovetter  (1985)  and  Etzioni  (1988),  trust  is  fundamental  to  our  social 
fabric  and  an  essential  factor  in  all  market  transactions.  Trust  is  at  the  heart  of  good 
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(refer  to  chapter  1.5). 
In  the  cases  examined  by  the  author  and  corroborated  by  D"Aunno  and  Zuckerman  1987), 
confidence  created  favourable  conditions  for  developments  that  had  not  been  anticipated  by 
the  actors  at  the  outset.  Time  and  experience  had  an  important  bearing  as,  only  when  it  was 
evident  that  the  alliance  was  benefiting  the  participants,  did  trust  improve  and  interaction 
increase. 
In  a  cooperative  atmosphere  the  companies  were  eventually  able  to  look  beyond  cost 
minimisation,  to  longer  term  value  creating  relations  (see  also  Zajac  and  Olsen  1993;  Doz 
1996).  However,  the  alliances  required  sensitive  management  when  lack  of  apparent 
progress  led  to  frustration.  In  a  hostile  environment  trust  was  easily  undermined  and 
stimulated  a  reduction  in  communication  and  loss  of  confidence  (chapter  1.5.4,  page  48). 
Trust  helped  to  stabilise  relations  and  promoted  information  exchange.  Maintenance  of 
confidence  between  the  companies  was  an  essential  element  in  such  periods  of  crisis.  In 
each  alliance,  communication  was  fundamental  to  confidence  and  sharing  technical 
information  demonstrated  this.  Often  sharing  confidential  information  can  be  difficult  but 
information  disclosure  between  senior  management  helped  the  partner  companies  break 
down  communication  barriers.  As  a  result  of  cooperation  at  a  senior  level  this  cascaded 
down  into  the  teams  as  corroborated  by  the  work  of  Ford  1984  and  Gulati  1995  (see  also 
chapter  1.1.7,  page  10  and  1.5,  page  44). 
When  trust  was  at  a  high  point  the  alliances  achieved  mutual  benefits  by  exploiting 
opportunities  and  encouraging  innovation  and  creativity.  Literature  (for  example  Gomes- 
Casseres  1996)  has  provided  evidence  supporting  the  propositions  that  alliancing  involves 
continual  investment  of  effort  and  pooling  of  the  partners'  capabilities  to  mould  current  and 
future  alliance  strategies. 
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forms  and  management  philosophies  shape  issues  of  trust  in  organisations.  Trusting 
behaviour  required  cooperating  firms  to  sacrifice  short-term  gains  for  longer  term  benefit. 
This  initially  involved  increased  transaction  costs  in  terms  of  time  and  effort.  However, 
literature  supports  the  notion  that  lack  of  trust  is  costlier.  In  conditions  of  declining  trust, 
transaction  costs  increase  as  companies  make  provision  for  having  to  contend  with 
opportunistic  behaviour  (see  also  chapter  1.5,  page  44). 
Transaction  cost  economics  refers  to  a  behavioural  assumption  concerning  bounded 
rationality  (1.1.10,  page  14).  When  bounded  rationality  is  great,  companies  will  increase 
transaction  costs  by  imposing  costly  control  mechanisms.  Trusting  relations  reduced 
behavioural  uncertainty  and,  according  to  Bradach  and  Eccles,  (1989)  is  seen  as  a 
mechanism  of  social  control  (refer  chapter  1.5). 
Commitment  was  individually  driven  as  opposed  to  being  an  explicit  part  of  corporate 
strategy.  The  role  that  directors  took  was  vital  in  each  alliance.  They  set  initial  objectives, 
communicated  a  vision,  influenced  stakeholders,  steered  the  change  process,  negotiated  for 
resources,  brought  key  individuals  together,  and  encouraged  ownership  and  commitment. 
Commitment  and  leadership  were  considered  critical  in  successful  business  alliances. 
Commitment  was  seen  as  a  measure  of  the  importance  of  the  relationship  in  terms  of  the 
inputs  each  party  was  prepared  to  make  (see  Hardwick  and  Ford  1986).  Perceptions  of 
partner's  commitment,  affected  behaviour  and  set  precedents  for  future  action,  good  or 
bad.  According  to  Brouther  et  al  (1995),  commitment  can  be  measured  by  the  degree  of 
risk  the  parties  are  prepared  to  take.  If  nothing  is  at  risk  then  there  is  little  incentive  to 
cooperate.  Commitment  is  an  important  component  of  the  process  models  summarised  in 
chapter  two. 
Commitment  and  leadership  from  top  management  must  be  evident  and  continuously  and 
clearly  articulated  to  every  level  (see  Dodgson  1991).  This  feature  of  role  and  personal 
interaction  has  been  described  by  Ring  and  Van  de  Ven  (1994). 
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Metrics) 
Spekman  et  al's  (1998)  approach  to  strategic  alliances  reinforced  the  need  for  team  leaders 
and  managers  to  positively  communicate  the  corporate  strategy  and  to  encourage  an 
alliance  mindset.  This  involved  seminars  and  training  meetings  to  communicate  alliance 
strategy  and  objectives  and  to  clarify  roles  and  responsibilities  in  a  comprehensive 
programme  of  education.  In  the  particular  cases  studied,  only  the  supplier  partner 
undertook  such  activities. 
Mechanisms  for  co-ordination  and  control  are  crucial  in  business.  Literature  supports  this 
study,  in  that  control  mechanisms  changed  and  became  more  rigorous  as  the  alliance 
developed.  Initial  terms  of  governance,  set  out  in  a  formal  contract  or  informal 
understanding,  should  include  mechanisms  to  assess  alliance  performance. 
I 
Changing  expectations  were  inevitable  (see  Zajac  and  Olsen  1993).  In  practice,  control 
was  fine-tuned  to  suit  the  particular  alliance  as  a  result  of  cycles  of  learning,  adjustment 
and  revaluation  (see  Doz  1996),.  According  to  Larson  (1992),  effective  control  and  co- 
ordination  is  also  achieved,  and  opportunism  avoided,  by  sticking  to  moral  obligations  and 
preserving  reputations. 
Proponents  of  transaction  costs  theory  (e.  g.  Williamson  1975;  1985),  recognise  the 
importance  of  socially  oriented  forms  of  governance.  From  a  resource  based  theoretical 
perspective  (see  for  example  Penrose  1959,1985;  see  also  1.1.9,  page  13),  trust  is 
considered  an  isolating  mechanism,  or  hidden  capability  that  differentiates  one  firm  from 
another  (1.1.13,  page  20).  This  only  applied  if  both  parties  in  the  alliance  gained  advantage 
and  were  confident  of  not  being  exploited  (see  for  example  Barney  and  Hansen  1994). 
A  potential  source  of  conflict  was  the  fact  that  the  partners  were  unsure  how  much,  and 
what  information,  could  be  disclosed  to  an  ally.  This  could  be  dealt  with  in  the  alliance 
agreement  as  each  company  had,  to  a  certain  degree,  to  protect  itself  from  creating  a 
344 competitor.  Gray's  (1980)  collaboration  model  stipulated  that  mechanisms  for  protection 
and  transfer  of  intellectual  property  must  be  considered.  However,  in  the  cases  in  this 
study,  the  matter  of  protecting  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (IPR)  was  not  considered  at  all. 
According  to  inter-organisational  exchange  literature,  for  example  Gray  (1989),  Zajac  and 
Olsen  (1993),  Schmitz  (1995)  and  Doz  (1996),  it  takes  time  for  companies  to  establish  new 
mechanisms  to  operate  effectively  and  this  has  also  been  borne  out  in  the  author's  study. 
Through  a  process  of  mutual  exchange  and  with  the  passage  of  time,  the  value  of  the 
alliance  became  clearer.  Although  at  the  outset  performance  measures  may  have  been 
biased  or  inaccurate,  by  periodic  evaluation,  the  alliance  metrics  improved  and  evolved  to 
more  accurately  assess  performance.  Ongoing  monitoring  and  evaluation  provided  the 
basis  for  more  auditing  (refer  to  chapter  1.1.7,  page  10). 
Learning 
In  all  three  cases  informal  networks  were  built  up  and  people,  who  would  never  have  talked 
to  one  another  in  the  past,  had  been  doing  so.  This  is  in  line  with  the  work  of  Debresson 
and  Arnmesse  (1991),  which  says  that the  exchange  of  ideas  between  ally  companies 
stimulates  the  search  for,  and  analysis  of,  opportunities  and  that  the  result  is  the  generation 
of  collective  knowledge  (refer  to  chapterl.  1.13,  page27;  1.2,  page3  0-3  6) 
It  was  not  just  that  technical  skills  were  prized  in  the  alliance  environment;  individual 
social  skills  were  equally  important  (refer  to  1.3,  page  36;  1.4,  page  39)).  Central  to  alliance 
governance  was  trust  and  social  cohesion  and  the  need  for  these  became  evident  as  the 
participants  interacted  (refer  to  chapter  1.5,  page  43).  Through  teamwork,  potential  savings 
were  identified  which  reinforced  continued  commitment  to  the  alliance.  Information 
exchange  in  turn  reduced  uncertainty  and  risk  among  the  allies  and  at  the  same  time 
interdependency  between  the  allies  generated  shared  values.  The  start  of  value  creation  was 
when  inter-organisational  teamwork  on  cost  saving  and  process  improving  cut  waste  and 
increased  quality  (see  chapter  1.2,  page  20). 
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sharing  has  been  shown  to  contribute  to  bringing  down  costs,  eliminating  waste  and 
encouraging  the  transfer  of  knowledge  that  enables  development  of  joint  processes  and 
procedures.  Also,  emphasised  in  literature,  is  that  such  advantages  are  only  realisable 
throughtearnwork  and  shared  trust  between  the  partners  (see  section  1.1.12,  pagel9;  chapter 
1.2,  page  20;  1.5,  page43). 
The  alliances  encouraged  transfer  of  knowledge,  and,  in  so  doing,  developed  unique 
relationship  specific  intangible  assets,  such  as  understanding  processes.  According  to 
literature,  acquisition  of  knowledge  relies  on  social  and  economic  networks,  as  companies 
develop  routines  and  dynamic  capabilities  (see  chapter  1.3,  page  36  and  1.4,  page  39). 
From  a  resource  based  perspective  the  firm  is  considered  to  be  a  pool  of  productive  and 
interdependent  resources  (Penrose  1959;  see  chapter  1.1.11,  page  16). 
The  importance  of  learning  is  explicit  in  the  process  models  of  Zajac  and  Olsen  (1994), 
Doz  (1996),  Ring  and  Van  de  Ven  (1994),  Spekman  et  al  (1998).  Alliance  literature 
supports  the  notion  that  collaboration  accelerates  knowledge  exchange  and  creates  channels 
for  acquiring  new  knowledge  (see  chapter  1.1.3,  page  22;  1.3,  page36).  Learning  is 
therefore  considered  an  important  outcome  of  collaboration  and,  according  to  scholars 
including  Mody  (1990)  and  Ciborra  (1991),  knowledge  helps  firms  to  deal  with 
uncertainty.  At  the  same  time,  alliances  enabled  partners  to  gain  both  tacit  and  explicit 
organisational  know  how. 
Setting  Objectives  (including  Resource  Planning) 
Strategy  scholars  suggest  that  setting  clear  objectives  is  one of  the  key  features  that 
contribute  to  strategic  success  (see  for  example  Andrews  1980,  Grant  1995).  Alliance 
literature  cites  that  clarity  of  focus  is  vital.  According  to  Lynch  (1991)  ambiguous 
objectives  and  uncoordinated  activities  are  the  main  reasons  for  alliance  failure. 
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automotive  industry,  concludes  that  frequent  and  planned  dialogue  reduced*  transaction 
costs  and  eliminated  inefficiency  (refer  to  chapter  1.1.6,  page  8).  This  is  supported  in  inter- 
organisational  exchange  literature  which  stresses  that  objectives  and  goals  must  be 
compatible  and  subject  to  continual  modification  throughout  an  alliance  (  refer  to  chapter 
1.1.7,  page  12;  Gray  1989;  Ring  and  Van  de  Ven  1994;  Doz  1996  in  chapter  2.0,  page  32). 
Long-term  objectives  and  strategies  help  to  continually  reaffirm  and  maintain  people's 
enthusiasm  and  facilitate  grasping  of  opportunities. 
In  this  way,  in  the  alliances  which  were  the  subject  of  this  study,  long-term  objectives  were 
maintained  and  short-term  ones  modified  to  meet  changing  circumstances.  This  enabled 
the  participants  to  assess  changes  in  the  strategic  position  of  the  alliance,  the  capabilities  of 
the  partners  and  to  identify  how  to  adjust  objectives  appropriately. 
The  importance  of  adequate  resources  is  supported  in  alliance  literature  (see  section  1.1.11, 
page  16).  At  the  outset,  resources  allocated  to  the  alliance  process  have  to  be  considerable 
and  there  needs  to  be  a  continual  and  on-going  re-evaluation  as  the  alliance  evolves. 
These  findings  are  reinforced  by  Monczka  (1993;  1998),  where  team  effectiveness  is 
directly  related  to  key  resources  (see  chapter  1.5,  page  43).  Boddy  et  al's  (1998)  survey  of 
barriers  to  partnering,  identified  that  adequate  resources  are  essential  to  alliance  success. 
In  the  study  cases,  resource  requirements  were  planned  and  managed  efficiently  and 
constant  interaction  by  the  partners  meant  an  early  involvement  in  product  development,  in 
search  for  alternative  methods  of  manufacture  and  sourcing  of  new  materials  (see  chapter 
1.1.4,  page  4). 
Table  8.2  summaries  the  dominant  characteristics  and  sub  criteria  in  Purpose  which  have 
been  further  distilled  from  table  7.16,  page  330. 
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Table  8.2:  Main  Characteristics  in  Purpose 
8.4  STAGE  11  -PROCESS 
The  Process  period  in  alliances  usually  involved  intense  team  activity  when  players  were 
keenly  driven  and  motivated.  Trust  increased  as  people  became  more  accustomed  to  each 
other  and  when  it  was  plain  that  everyone  was  working  towards  mutual  goals  (refer  to 
chapter  1.1.7,  page  12).  Demonstrations  of  trust  generated  a  sense  of  responsibility  and 
commitment.  Performance  improved  as  information  sharing  reduced  bottlenecks  in 
communication  and  particular  encouragement  came  from  quick  success. 
Realisation  dawned  that,  although  still  unspecified,  there  was  a  multiplicity  of  opportunities 
for  cutting  costs.  Much  inefficiency  was  still  in  the  system  and  the  focus  of  the  process 
stage  was  to  identify  and  eliminate  wasteful  activities.  Generally,  there  was  a  rise  in 
alliance  expenditure,  that  is,  an  increase  in  transaction  costs  due  to  increased  use  of 
resources  as  inter-organisational  teams  tackled  ambitious  projects  to  raise  quality  and 
increase  flexibility. 
Communication  barriers  were  lowered  or  even  removed  and  there  was  a  new  awareness  of 
the  interdependency  of  work  between  the  partner  companies.  Secondment  of  personnel 
provided  opportunities  to  accelerate  understanding  of  alliance  partners'  business,  while 
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together. 
Academic  literature  supports  the  broad  thrust  of  this  study,  in  that  as  benefits  of  knowledge 
exchange  began  to  become  apparent,  shared  values  and  expectations  were  reinforced  and  as 
a  result  both  actual  and  perceived  commitment  to  the  alliance  process  grew  (see  chapter 
1.1.7,  page  10). 
Compelling  Purpose  (includes,  inter-organisational  teamwork,  personal  satisfaction  and 
motivation) 
Teamwork  was  the  force  driving  the  parties.  In  an  atmosphere,  described  by  Wilson  (1978) 
of  social  and  structural  bonding  that  discouraged  opportunistic  behaviour,  governance  was 
based  on  optimism  and  trust  during  the  Process  phase.  According  to  Barney  and  Hansen 
(1994)  if  team  members  cannot  trust  one  another,  unwillingness  to  cooperate  and  to  share 
information  will  sabotage  future  decisions.  As  trust  was  directly  related  to  frequency  of 
interaction,  communication  and  feedback  was  therefore  critical  in  maintaining  momentum 
(see  also  chapter  1.5,  page  43). 
Despite  the  fact  that  transaction  costs  may  have  increased  during  the  Process  phase  due  to 
the  level  of  resources  the  alliance  demanded,  projects  were  starting  to  identify  cost  drivers 
and  waste.  This  meant  that  the  inter-organisational  teams  were  beginning  to  calculate 
estimates  of  potential  savings  and  technical  and  process  know-how  was  starting  to  be 
exchanged.  In  this  context,  according  to  Parkhe  (1991;  1993),  relation-specific  assets 
accumulate  over  time  as  the  alliance  partners  investigated  new  ways  of  improving 
performance. 
Conflict  Management 
The  alliances  were  often  abrasive  and  even  acrimonious.  Zajac  and  Olsen's  (1993), 
transactional  value  model  supports  the  finding  that,  although  conflict  between  alliance 
349 partners  was  an  obstacle  to  value  maximisation,  nevertheless  norms  for  managing  conflict 
were  required.  Despite  the  wrangling,  ongoing  re-evaluation  and  negotiation  to  minimise 
conflict  and  come  to  consensus  solutions  were  implicit  in  all  alliance  lifecycle  models. 
Gray  (1989)  suggests  that  because  of  continual  efforts  to  resolve  conflict,  a  priori, 
compatibility  between  partners  is  not  necessarily  a  pre-requisite  for  successful  alliances. 
Interdependence  (including  joint  decision  making) 
Interdependence  was  linked  with  the  partners'  shared  ambition  to  maximise  value. 
According  to  Fiol  and  Lyles  (1985)  interdependence  gives  rise  to  associations,  cognitive 
systems  and  memories,  that  become  a  repository  for  organisational  learning  (refer  to 
chapter  1.3,  page  36). 
Literature  supports  the  evidence  from  this  study  that  the  alliances  evolved,  passing  through 
a  sequence  of  interactive  cycles  of  learning,  reevaluation  and  adjustment  in  which  people 
were  encouraged  to  be  innovative  and  creative  (  see  for  example  Doz  1996,  chapter  2.1.13, 
page  68). 
Joint  decision  making  was  intrinsic  to  alliance  success,  as  is  borne  out  in  process  literature 
(see  chapter  2.0,  page  52).  Effective  decisions  depended  upon  cooperation  and  on  an  inter- 
organisational  team  members'  ability  to  draw  upon  a  larger  social  and  knowledge  network. 
Informal  networks  and  growing  interdependence  meant  that  decisions  could  be  made  on  the 
spot  (see  chapter  1.4,  page  39). 
Learning  and  Alliance  Skills 
Projects  were  stretching  people's  capabilities  and  problem  solving  skills.  According  to 
Wageman  (1997),  inter-organisational  teams  encouraged  learning  and  adaptability,  while 
Clark  and  Wheelwright  (1992)  suggest  that  such  teams  improve  commitment  and 
performance. 
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organisations,  so  that  people  were  beginning  to  influence  others  outwith  the  immediate 
alliance  (see  chapter  1.4,  page  39).  Inter-organisational  team  activities  encouraged 
information  sharing  and  problem  solving  and  this  was  the  start  for  managing  the  dynamic 
process  of  knowledge  creation  (see  chapter  1.3,  page  36). 
Although  experience  was  difficult  to  transfer,  nevertheless  cooperation  encouraged  more 
effective  use  of  specific  knowledge  to  develop  procedures  and  techniques.  In  this  sense, 
operational  and  business  strategy  were  no  longer  separate  in  the  alliance  environment  (see 
also  Larson  1992  and  Shmitz  et  al  1995) 
. 
Research  into  networks  has  provided  evidence  that  exchange  of  knowledge  and  mutual 
learning  was  a  network  embedded  capability  and  critical  to  competitiveness.  According  to 
Liparini  and  Sobrero  (1994)  cooperation  among  firms  maximises  firm-specific  capabilities. 
Ancona  and  Caldwell  (1988)  state  that  team  performance  is  related  to  the  degree  of 
boundary  spanning  activity  and  successful  results  usually  involve  dependence  on  other 
groups.  According  to  Szulanski  (1996)  communication  across  boundaries  stimulates 
learning  because  issues  are  better  understood  and  objectives  more  clearly  defined 
. 
With  regard  to  the  thesis  studies,  instead  of  only  looking  at  their  own  work,  people's 
perspective  had  changed  and  this  was  manifested  in  a  new  cooperative  outlook.  Monzcka 
(1993)  suggests  that  understanding  what  drives  effort  is  very  important,  as  team  members 
are  not  always  guaranteed  to  exert  themselves  to  complete  assignments.  Other  factors 
associated  with  Lawler's  (1986,1992)  work,  recommends  that  management  commitment, 
adequate  resources,  empowerment,  training  and  rewards  related  to  performance  are  also 
important  factors  that  contribute  to  satisfaction  and  motivation. 
Table  8.3  below  summarises  the  main  characteristics  and  sub-criteria  in  Process,  distilled 
from  table  7.16,  page  330. 
351 Table  8.3:  Main  Characteristics  and  Sub-Criteria  in  Process. 
8.5  STAGE  III  -  PLATEAU 
Although  a  sense  of  optimism  persisted,  many  of  the  teams  had  by  now  completed  their 
projects.  A  plateau  was  attained  and  new  objectives  were  undefined.  A  dip  in  both 
resource  spend  and  team  activity  appeared  symptomatic.  Nevertheless,  the  alliance 
companies  overall  performance  was  higher  than  it  had  been  at  the  beginning  and  the 
improvements  were  sustainable. 
By  this  important  stage,  improvements  had  achieved  the  goals  of  costs  and  waste  reduction 
from  processes  and  systems.  It  therefore  was  a  watershed  in  the  cooperative  relations, 
although  detailed  issues  still  remained  unresolved.  The  Plateau  was  a  time  of  consolidation 
when  the  companies  required  to  re-examme  original  values  that  had  stimulated  the  alliance 
in  the  first  instance. 
Adapting  Cultures 
Academic  literature  pertaining  to  inter-organisational  exchange  emphasises  the  importance 
of  shared  values  in  business  exchanges.  For  example  Dwyer  et  al  (1988)  reinforces  the 
finding  of  this  study,  in  that  norms  tend  to  develop  over  time  and  are  more  likely  to  be 
adhered  to,  if  organisations  expect  collaboration  to  extend  into  the  future.  Larson  (1992) 
calls  these  reciprocal  norms.  Academics,  for  example,  Ghemawat  1991  and  Morgan  and 
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between  the  partners. 
Teams  were  self-disciplining  and  held  work  expectations  in  common.  In  order  to  build  on 
achievements,  the  members  periodically  re-appraised  objectives  and  targets.  Polley  and 
Dyne  (1994)  suggest  this  is  a  characteristic  of  self-managed  teams  and  that  control  over 
norms  impacts  on  overall  effectiveness. 
Scholars  such  as  (Larson  1992)  support  this  study,  which  found  that  individuals  who 
believed  in  the  power  of  cooperation,  contributed  their  values  and  philosophy  into  the 
organisation.  Steers  (1981)  defines  norms  as  mutual  shared  standards  that  serve  to 
regulate.  This  is  echoed  by  Larson  (1992),  who  notes  that  norms  act  as  social  bonds 
helping  to  maintain  alliance  stability. 
Gray's  (1989)  collaboration  model,  emphasises  that  internal  learning  stimulates 
modifications  in  human  resource  profiles  also  reassignment  of  roles  or  changes  in  team 
composition.  These  findings  are  further  corroborated  by  Buchanan  (1975),  who  suggests 
that  organisational  experience  must  satisfy  individual  needs  in  areas  such  as  scope  of  the 
job.  Equally  important  to  an  individual's  job  satisfaction  was  the  building  of  cohesive 
work  groups,  communicating  the  corporate  mission  to  both  individuals  and  groups  and 
designing  career  development  structures. 
Dodgson  (1991),  maintains  that  human  resource  management  systems,  such  as  reward  and 
appraisal,  need  to  be  in  line  with  the  company  culture.  In  all  cases,  people's  jobs  increased 
in  scope  and  responsibility  although  formal  Human  Resource  policies  remained  unaffected 
by  business  cooperation  (refer  to  Spekman  et  al  1998,  chapter  2.1.15,  page7l). 
Performance  Plateau 
Murray  and  Mahon  (1993)  consider  the  Plateau  stage  to  be  a  maintenance  phase.  Similarly 
Ford  (1980)  and  Larson  (1992)  describe  it  as  a  period  in  the  alliance  characterised  by 
routine  operations  and  reporting,  when  .a  steady  exchange  of  information  and 
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operational  and  strategic  integration. 
In  the  first  instance,  participants  were  concerned  with  smoothing  the  process  that  interfaced 
the  organisations.  Once  this  was  complete,  a  set  of  high  level  objectives  were  necessary 
and  as  the  alliances  developed  and  governance  structures  matured,  strategic  integration 
became  possible.  According  to  Larson  (1992),  strategic  integration  extends  well  beyond 
routine  administrative  co-ordination  to  new  joint  projects  to  improve  old,  or  to  develop 
new,  products  and  systems.  Structures  and  systems  between  the  companies  were  seen  to  be 
linked  in  mutually  beneficial,  strategic  ways 
Reflection  and  Learning 
Recognising  the  importance  of  learning  is  stressed  in  inter-organisational  exchange 
literature  and  this  is  quite  explicit  in  a  number  of  models  (see  Doz  1996;  Spekman  et  al 
1998). 
Personnel,  in  particular,  were  much  more  customer  focused.  Alliance  literature  supports 
this  finding  and  scholars  such  as  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982),  Itami  (1987)  and  Spender 
(1996),  suggest  that  a  company's  competitive  advantage  depends  mainly  on  its  knowledge 
based  intangible  assets.  Yves  Doz  (1989)  considers  the  acquisition  and  development  of 
unique  non-tradable  assets,  or  knowledge,  to  be  a  key  factor  in  differentiating  successful 
and  unsuccessful  strategies. 
Supplier  companies  better  understood  the  vagaries  of  the  customers'  market  place  as  a 
result  of  access  to  detailed  market  information.  Improvements  due  to  sharing  operational 
practices  eventually  became  routine  (refer  to  chapter  1.1.13,  page  20).  There  were 
considerable  opportunities  to  transfer  know-how  and  process  understanding  between  the 
alliance  partners  (refer  to  chapter  1.3,  page  36).  This  focus  on  operational  and  process 
efficiency  helped  reduce  cost  and  enabled  the  partners  to  concentrate  on  adding  value  and 
creating  better  products  and  services.  Emphasis  on  the  process,  rather  than  managing 
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interaction  across  company  and  group  boundaries  encouraged  the  use  of  a  common 
language.  Transference  of  information  between  organisations  meant  that  individuals  and 
teams  gained  knowledge  from  a  wide  set  of  people  which  would,  in  the  course  of  time, 
diffuse  within  and  between  the  organisations. 
As  well  as  developing  personal  contacts,  the  companies  created  a  series  of  joint  institutions 
to  manage  the  relationships.  This  is  in  agreement  with  Ford's  (1980)  description  of  the  final 
stage  of  an  alliance,  when  institutional  1  sation  is  to  be  expected.  Table  8.4  summarises  the 
characteristics  in  Plateau. 
ADAPTING  CULTURES 
Relationship  nonus 
Human  Resource  Management 
PERFORMANCE  PLATEAU 
Relationship  maintenance 
Operational  routines 
REFLECTION  AND  LEARNING 
Process  and  cost  understanding 
Table  8.4.  Characteristics  and  Sub-Criteria  in  Plateau 
8.6  STAGE  IV  -  PROGRESS 
The  Progress  stage  was  the  springboard,  when  performance  improved  as  a  whole,  rather 
than  sub-optimally,  within  each  organisation.  Serial  activities  and  redundant  steps  were 
eliminated  and  costs  reduced.  Companies,  were  able  to  move  into  the  Progre.  vs  stage,  and 
had  the  opportunity  to  sustain  the  alliance  on  a  continuous  basis.  The  relationships  were 
mature  enough  to  accept  radical  change  in  terms  of  structures  and  processes,  although  a 
step  change  is  needed  to  move  forward.  The  Progress  stage  was  characterised  by  a 
cooperative  culture  at  the  alliance  interface,  unique  relationship  specific  competencies  and 
355 by  integrating  management  skill  and  experience  into  a  joint  organisational  memory. 
Accountability  for,  and  identification  of,  failure  was  a  powerful  element  in  the  process  of 
learning.  However,  the  objective  was  to  encourage  risk  transparency  and  to  reduce 
uncertainty  in  the  pursuit  of  improved  performance. 
Early  analysis  by  all  involved  ensured  that  cause  and  effect  could  be  more  accurately 
linked.  On  these  occasions  companies  learned  and  gained  by  dissemination  of  learning  to 
internalise  new  routines  and  avoid  unnecessary  repetition.  A  shared  sense  of  purpose 
transcended  individual  ambition.  Rather  than  wasting  resources,  a  new  way  forward  was 
identified  together  to  achieve  common  goals.  Such  behaviour  served  to  strengthen  the 
alliance  during  difficult  times. 
Cooperating  Cultures 
The  alliances  were  built  upon  agreements  by  business  partners  which  depended  on  trust, 
commitment  and  reputation.  According  to  Ring  and  Van  de  Ven  (1994)  the  development 
of  such  institutions  evidently  demonstrates  that  it  occurs  in  environments  where  collective 
identity,  commitment  and  values  were  shared.  Lewicki  and  Bunker  (1996),  describe  this  as 
identification-based  trust.  This  is  echoed  by  Deutsch  (1957)  and  also  Sheppard  and 
Sherman  (1998)  who  propose  that  time,  proximity,  shared  identity,  common  incentives  and 
negotiation  of  a  mutual  ethos  are  factors  that  lead  to  the  evolution  of  similar  goals  and 
beliefs. 
This  cooperative  culture  relied  on  positively  motivating  people  and  encouraging  a 
teamwork  ethos.  The  inter-organisational  teams  were  constituted  so  that  people  from 
separate  organisations  could  develop  new  strategically  significant  capabilities.  Aligning 
these  skills  with  corporate  objectives  meant  that  supply  issues  and  business  decision- 
making  processes  were  integrated  to  maximum  effect  (refer  to  chapter  1.2,  page  30). 
Embedded  or  tacit  knowledge  resided  primarily  in  individuals  and  teams.  In  particular,  it 
depended  on  norms,  attitudes,  information  flows,  and  decisions  that  shaped  dealing  with 
356 others.  While  this  is  sometimes  termed  "culture",  Peter  Selznick  (1957)  describes  it  as 
"distinctive  competencies",  to  indicate  the  important  role  that  these  factors  play  in  an 
organisation's  success,  or  indeed  failure. 
Miles  and  Snow  (1994)  term  this  as  a  "fit"  between  the  internal  and  external  environments 
and  the  writers  say  that  to  achieve  that  "fit"  is  a  journey  rather  than  a  destination.  It  should 
be  appreciated  therefore,  that  a  firm's  strategy  has  to  be  flexible  and  creative  and  Tomer 
(1987)  and  Hastings  (1989)  recognise  the  role  played  by  organisational  values  and  goals.  A 
large  part  of  the  alliance's  stock  of  knowledge  was  tacit  and  social.  In  other  words,  that 
knowledge  was  produced  and  reproduced  in  a  social  setting  (refer  to  chapter  1.3,  page  36). 
Coleman  (1988)  describes  people's  ability  to  work  together  for  common  purpose  as  "social 
capital"'.  The  concept  of  "human  capital"  (see  Itami  1987)  recognises  the  importance  of 
people's  knowledge  and  expertise  to  organisations.  Coleman  (1988)  contends  that  in 
addition  to  skills  and  knowledge,  social  capital  is  the  ability  to  develop  shared  norms  and 
values  (refer  to  chapter  1.4,  page  39). 
Development  of  Alliance  Skills 
According  to  Amit  and  Schoemaker  (1993),  these  capabilities  are  developed  through 
exchanges  of  information  between  personnel.  The  processes  are  firm  specific  and  are  built 
up  with  the  passage  of  time.  (see  chapter  I-I-  11,  page  16). 
The  basic  concept  of  the  resource-based  view,  is  that  a  firm's  competitive  position  is 
derived  from  a  bundle  of  unique  resources  and  relationships.  Resources,  categorised  in 
research  literature,  include  physical  capital  (Williamson  1975),  human  capital,  both 
tangible  and  intangible  (Itami  and  Roehl  1987),  and  organisational  capital  (Tomer  1986). 
The  task  of  managers  is  to  renew  these  resources  and  relationships,  as  time,  competition 
and  change  erode  their  value  (Rumelt  1984:  557-58). 
357 Relating  this  to  cooperative  management,  commercial  rewards  can  only  be  realised  if  firms 
partner  with  organisations  with  "complementary  assets"  (Teece  et  al  1997).  Collaboration 
between  people  with  diverse  talents  enabled  specialist  skills  to  be  available  and  complex 
tacit  knowledge  to  be  transferred  and  technologies  released  (Barney  1986). 
Cooperative  skills  learnt  over  the  past  few  years,  became  increasingly  important  and  the 
ability  to  think  creatively  and  develop  solutions  continued  to  benefit  all  the  alliance  parties 
(see  chapter  1.3,  page  36).  Each  company  experienced  considerable  learning  that  it  could 
also  use  to  good  effect  with  other  customers  and  suppliers.  In  essence  therefore,  alliancing 
had  changed  the  way  the  companies  worked  together.  Prahalad  and  Bettis  (1986)  describe 
this  as  "dominant  general  management  logic";  a  cognitive  concept  operationalised  through 
shared  activities  that  create  interdependence  between  the  businesses. 
Spekman  et  al's  (1998)  approach  to  strategic  alliances,  specifically  emphasised  that 
managers  involved  must  develop  an  "alliance  mindset".  Managers  who  hold  to  this 
perspective,  mark  out  learning  and  creativity  as  the  makings  of  the  strongest  alliances 
Therefore,  strategic  decisions  are  not  only  choices  about  allocation  of  resources,  but  also 
about  what  a  company  can  learn  and  the  extent  to  which  it  can  do  so,  alone  or  through 
collaborative  agreement  (Badaracco  1991:  14). 
Knowledge  was  generally  recognised  as  being  a  crucial  component  in  the  struggle  to 
improve  competitiveness,  to  enable  an  Organisation  to  go  through  a  process  of  self-renewal 
and  expand  its  boundaries.  One  of  the  objectives  of  cooperation  between  customers  and 
suppliers  is  the  generation  of  internal  knowledge  (Richter  and  Vettel  1995).  According  to 
Peteraf  (1993),  growth  and  renewal  is  consistent  with  the  Ricardian  view  of  rents  and 
competitive  advantage.  Quasi-fixed  resources  may  be  renewed  and  expanded 
incrementally  by  the  firms  using  them. 
The  resource  based  view  of  an  enterprise  depends  upon  the  latter  developing  distinctive 
capability.  It  provides  a  better  understanding  of  the  uniqueness  of  firms,  as  well  as  the 
crucial  role  that  teamwork  and  cooperation  has  in  the  matter  (see  chapter  1.1.11,  page  16). 
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Innovation  had  now  been  recognised  as  the  most  important  means  of  seeking  and 
maintaining  competitive  edge  (see  also  chapter  1.4,  page  39).  Creativity  lay  at  the  heart  of 
this  change  and  inter-organisational  teams  were  the  vehicles  driving  innovation. 
Inter-organisational  teamwork  encouraged  learning  at  many  levels  and  functions  in 
business  and,  in  so  doing,  developed  relationship  specific  know-how  in  both  the  customer 
and  supplier  organisations.  As  this  was  difficult  to  transfer  and  costly  for  rivals  to  copy, 
affiliate  businesses  became  jointly  more  efficient  by  facilitating  continuous  transfer  of 
knowledge  and  new  joint  capabilities.  Likewise,  learning  was  promoted  as  customer  and 
personnel  in  both  companies  better  understood  each  other's  processes.  Thus,  incremental 
and  on  going  innovation  and  continuous  improvement  became  embedded  in  the  alliance 
philosophy  (see  chapter  1.2,  page  30  and  1.3,  page  36). 
Also,  creative  activity  had  a  knock  on  effect  on  the  supply  chain  networks  where  loose  or 
strong  links  were  forged,  depending  on  the  expertise  required  at  a  particular  point  in  time. 
Teubal  et  al  (1968)  argue  that  networks  foster  innovation  beyond  the  scope  of  bilateral 
supplier-buyer  links. 
The  most  commonly  held  notion  of  knowledge  and  ability  was  that  these  intangible  assets, 
deep-seated  within  the  firm,  were  controlled  by  routines,  practices,  cultures  and  working 
relationships.  However,  it  also  appeared  that  close  relations  between  a  firm  and  an  external 
organisation,  such  as  a  customer  or  supplier,  often  provided  an  opportunity  for  specialised 
knowledge  and  abilities  to  take  root,  grow  and  be  assimilated  (see  chapter  1.3,  page  36). 
Theorists  have  tried  to  distinguish  between  various  levels  of  learning,  such  as  higher  and 
lower  level  learning  (Fiol  and  Lyles  1985),  adaptive  and  generative  learning  (Senge  1990), 
single-loop  and  double-loop  and  deutero-learning  (Argyris  and  Schon  1978;  1992).  Single- 
loop  learning  involves  error  detection  and  correction  that  allows  companies  to  continue  to 
359 use  current  policies.  In  this  way,  organisations  added  to  their  knowledge  base  and  routines 
without  altering  important  structural  characteristics. 
Double-loop  learning  occurs  when  mistakes  are  detected  and  corrected  in  a  way  that 
involves  immediate  change,  or  modification,  to  processes  (see  for  example  Doz  1996). 
Deutero-learning  involves  reflection  and  analysis  of  previous  experiences,  considering 
when  and  how  to  change  and  inventing  appropriate  new  strategies.  This  may  require  a  step 
change  where  innovation  is  more  radical.  It  is  at  this  juncture  that  teams  tackle  problems  in 
a  different  way,  and  in  order  to  do  so  successfully,  organisations  encourage  the  team 
members  to  think  in  novel  ways.  It  is  suggested  that  in  the  IDW  Killeen,  Sun  /  Birkbys  and 
also  the  SCA,  deutero-learning  was  taking  place. 
This  also  raised  issues  as  to  just  how  far  the  organisations  were  actually  prepared  to 
encourage  and  allow  costly  implementation  of  change  to  structures  and  practices  that  would 
also  affect  individual  job  security. 
Capabilities  (Teece  et  al  1997;  Teece  1998)  are  described  as  firm-specific  competencies 
(Pavitt  1991)  and  also  as  core  competencies  (Prahalad  and  Hamel  1990).  Aoki  and 
Rosenberg  (1987)  argue  that  the  firm's  research  agenda  should  be  powerfully  shaped  by  a 
motivation  to  exploit  its  accumulated  stock  of  in-house  knowledge. 
The  relationship  between  skill  nurturing  and  value-adding  is  important  in  order  to 
understand  a  firm's  core  competencies  (Lei  1993:  39).  Organisations  are  fundamentally 
idiosyncratic  and,  over  time,  they  accumulated  unique  combinations  of  resources  and 
abilities  that  allowed  competencies  to  develop.  Firms  could  expect  to  outperform  less 
capable  organisations  by  accumulating  and  developing  processes  and  skills  into  a  strategy 
that  constituted  capability  (Fitzpatrick  1996)  and  by  use  of  resources  and  skills  as  the 
source  of  advantage.  Process  alignment  helped  the  partners  focus  on  their  core  capabilities. 
Imai  et  al  (1985)  emphasise  the  importance  of  learning  across  multiple  levels  and  across 
multiple  functions.  The  existence  of  transaction  specific  knowledge  and  expertise  and  the 
360 difficulties  of  skill  transference,  mean  that  it  is  costly  for  an  alternative  supplier  to  copy 
such  knowledge  (Teece  1980). 
March  et  al  (1991),  describe  the  importance  of  critical  incidents  in  shaping  learning. 
Unlearning,  or  forgetting  redundant  or  unsuccessful  behaviour,  is  very  significant  for  firms 
(Clark,  Hayes  and  Lorenz,  1985;  Huber  1991,1996)  and  is  an  important  feature  in 
Hedberg's  (1981:  3-27)  analysis. 
I'  ...  as  knowledge  grows,  simultaneously  it  becomes  obsolete  as  realities  change. 
Understanding  therefore  involves  both  learning  anew  and  discarding  obsolete  and 
misleading  knowledge.  Discarding  activity,  or  unlearning,  is  as  important  a  part  of 
understanding  as  is  adding  new  knowledge.  In  fact,  it  seems  that  slow  unlearning  is  a 
crucial  weakness  of  many  organisations.  " 
By  sharing  knowledge  and  hopes,  by  confronting  differences  and  by  dealing  with 
ambiguities  people  became  committed  to  teamwork  and  began  to  understand  what  they  had 
do  to  succeed. 
in  accordance  with  strategy  literature,  forecasting  the  external  environment  and  ensuring 
maximum  utilisation  of  resources  are  fundamental  to  strategic  planning  (e.  g.  Grant  1995). 
However  difficult  it  was  to  design  long-term  strategies,  because  of  the  speed  of 
technological  change,  market  conditions  and  the  evolution  of  future  trends)  nevertheless  the 
companies  found  that  they  had  no  choice  other  than  to  exploit  inherent  resources  and  tap 
the  potential  for  innovation. 
Strategic  Review 
The  findings  of  this  study  are  supported  by  those  in  previous  alliance  process  models  (see 
chapter  two).  Strategic  reviews  usually  involved  strategy  re-definition  once  the  alliance 
had  attained  its  stated  goals,  or  when  it  had  to  respond  to  new  contingencies,  whether 
internal  or  external.  Rather  than  simply  looking  at  transaction  cost  minimisation  (Zajac  and 
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maximise  value  further. 
Accordingly,  this  triggered  changes  in  either  the  process  of  interaction  or  by  adjustment 
and  revision  of  the  entire  project.  When  the  alliance  was  continued,  Progress  looped  back 
to  Purpose  so  that  objectives  and  forecasts  were  re-specified  and  strategic  motivations 
clarified,  for  the  newly  forecasted  period.  This  is  in  line  with  the  re-configuring  stage  in 
Zajac  and  Olsen's  (1992-142)  model  which  emphasises  the  dynamic  developmental  nature 
of  the  exchange,  where  the  processes  themselves  are  subjected  to  change.  Table  8.5, 
summarises  characteristics  in  Progress. 
Table  8.5:  Characteristics  and  Sub-Criteria  in  Progress 
8.7  STAGE  V-  PARTING 
The  conceptual  findings  of  this  study  have  been  borne  out  by  a  number  of  lifecycle 
scholars,  for  example  Dwyer  et  al  (1987)  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman  (1987  -.  543),  Murray  and 
Mahon  (1993:  109)  and  Spekman  et  al  (1998).  In  D'Aunno  and  Zuckerman's  model  of 
362 organisational  federations,  this  stage  is  described  as  the  critical  crossroads.  Members  may 
be  motivated  to  withdraw  because  of  reduced  autonomy,  or  on  the  other  hand,  they  may 
believe  that  the  benefits  of  persistence  outweigh  the  cost  of  separation  and  consequently 
incline  towards  merger,  or  common  ownership,  or  continued  alliance. 
Murray  and  Mahon  (1993)  note  that  invariably  endings  are  crucial  and  that  there  are  three 
possibilities;  (1)  to  end  the  specific  relationship  with  exploration  of  other  areas  of  mutual 
interest;  (2)  an  amicable  separation  and  winding  up  of  the  alliance  with  no  immediate  joint 
plans;  (3)  bitter  divorce. 
8.7.1  Strategic  Withdrawal 
Strategic  withdrawal  has  been  a  subject  that  Hirschman  (1970)  Harrigan  (1984)  and  Hurst 
(1995)  have  written  about.  It  may  appear  inconsistent  to  talk  of  long-term  business 
relations  and  withdrawal  in  the  same  context,  however  both  are  inextricably  linked. 
Incorporating  a  withdrawal  clause  in  a  partnering  agreement  has  more  positive  advantages 
than  negative  connotations.  It  is  a  social  governance  or  safeguard  by  which  the  companies 
can  maintain  strategic  flexibility.  That  is,  if  they  are  to  attain  their  economic  objectives, 
the  option  to  exit  from  an  investment  which  is  no  longer  valued,  is  essential. 
Dwyer  et  al  (1987:  20),  suggest  that  the  possibility  of  withdrawal  or  disengagement  has  to 
be  implicit  throughout  the  whole  relationship,  although  the  actual  process  of  dissolution  is 
left  unexplained.  The  authors  go  on  to  suggest  that  there  are  probably  several  dissolution 
trajectories.  It  is  probably  to  risk  over  simplification  by  suggesting  termination  can  be 
concentrated  within  a  single  phase. 
Teece  et  al  (1997)  wrote  that  the  principal  vehicle  for  renewal  is  dynamic  capability  which, 
according  to  Wernerfelt  (1984),  is  a  firm's  source  of  distinctive  competence.  Baum  and 
Singh  (1994)  suggest,  that  even  in  turbulent  times,  shared  values  contribute  to  stability  and 
a  vision  of  strategic  action  is  vital  for  organisation  renewal  and  adaptation. 
363 Dwyer  et  al  (1987:  19-20),  state  that  termination  of  personal  relationships  is  a  significant 
source  of  psychological  and  physical  stress  and,  from  anecdotal  evidence,  suggests  that 
dissolution  of  commercial  relations  incurs  parallel  tolls. 
Dissolution  in  existing  models  appears  to  be  described  as  conceptual  in  nature  and  this 
study  was  only  able  to  gain  limited  evidence  about  it.  Evidence  suggests  that  Parting  is 
due  to  a  number  of  possibilities;  lack  of  clear  purpose  and  management  commitment; 
incompatibility  between  objectives  and  rewards,  turnover  of  personnel,  lack  of  investment 
or  commitment  to  a  long  term  future;  and  other  factors  beyond  the  control  of  ally 
companies  (refer  to  chapter  2.2,  page  74). 
8.8  SUAMARY 
The  empirical  evidence  from  this  study  has  served  to  explain  the  development  of  the 
alliances  as  taking  place  in  six  stages,  each  with  identifiable  characteristics.  Cooperation 
was  the  means  by  which  firms  could  gain  new  capabilities  and  the  findings  from  this  study 
provide  evidence  of  the  potential  advantage  in  shaping  inter-organisational  strategies,  thus 
learning  how  to  manage  and  implement  interfirm  cooperation  is  of  strategic  importance. 
Both  transaction  cost  and  resource-based  perspectives  have  been  considered  with  the 
objective  of  providing  a  theoretical  foundation  for  a  value  creating  alliance  strategy  (refer 
to  chapter  1.1.9,  page  13).  These  however,  fail  to  capture  the  influence  of  dynamic 
processes  that  motivate  alliance  formation  and  influence  its  development.  It  is  clear  that  no 
one  theoretical  perspective  is  sufficient  to  explain  cooperative  -alliance  development, 
growth  and  decline,  although  evolutionary  process  theory  goes  a  long  way  in  this  regard. 
Dyer  and  Singh  (1998:  670),  refer  to  a  small  but  growing  body  of  literature  on  transaction 
value  initiatives  between  alliance  partners.  This  thesis  provides  empirical  evidence  from 
the  case  studies  presented  that  each  alliance  generated  such  transaction  value. 
364 The  study  suggests  that  governance  should  not  depend  on  a  rigid  hierarchy  but  that  it 
should  be  allowed  to  alter  as  a  result  of  social  interaction  (for  example  see  Wilson  and 
Mummalaeni  1989).  Trust  was  an  important  element  and  created  the  conditions  for  value- 
generating  strategies.  Central  to  this  thesis  was  the  proposition  that  alliance  relationships 
generated  value  through  evolutionary  learning. 
8.9  CONCEPTUAL  DEVELOPMENT 
Figure  8.1  illustrates  the  final  version  of  a  framework  to  conceptualise  alliance  relationship 
development.  Characteristics  in  each  stage  have  been  systematically  distilled  throughout 
the  thesis  to  present  an  economical  overview  of  the  alliance  development  process  (see  table 
8.6,  page  368). 
The  case  studies  have  served  to  refine,  develop  and  evaluate  a  framework  progressively 
extended  from  an  initial  model  based  on  the  exploratory  research  phase.  Throughout  the 
discussion  chapters,  characteristics  have  been  further  combined  in  accordance  with  the 
methodology  described  in  chapter  three. 
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Figure  8.1  Framework  of  Progressive  Relationship  Development  in  Supply  Chain  Alliances 
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365 The  conceptual  framework  has  been  advanced  using  a  number  of  methodologies.  In  the 
first  instance  the  early  conceptualisation  was  built  upon  a  review  of  supply  chain  alliance 
literature  and  secondary  data  which  provided  the  foundation  to  focus  the  research  aims  and 
objectives  (see  appendices  IIA,  and  IVA). 
Data  gathering,  observation  and  interviews  continued  in  parallel  with  the  introduction  of  a 
second  field  site  and  in  this  instance,  there  was  little  historical  data  to  inform  the  model. 
This  presented  the  opportunity  to  apply  an  inductive  approach  and  allow  the  conceptual 
framework  to  emerge  empirically  from  field  research.  Finally,  secondary  data  from  the 
third  alliance  helped  to  test  and  further  build  the  framework. 
According  to  Wes  and  Huberman  (1994:  27)  qualitative  research  design  may  be  either 
tightly  pre-structured  or  loose  and  emergent  and  predictably  enough,  most  qualitative 
research  now  being  done  lies  between  these  two  extremes.  The  building  of  the  conceptual 
framework  for  this  study  reflects  this  middle  ground  and  the  labels  assigned  helped  guide 
the  data  gathering.  Thus  secondary  data,  on-going  observation  and  interviews  using  a 
range  of  questions  derived  from  systematic  inquiry  in  the  research  sites  developed  and  re- 
defined  the  framework. 
In  this  way  the  framework  focused  the  research,  while  a  flexible  design  encouraged 
openness  to  the  unexpected  as  it  was  revised  and  populated  with  characteristics  important 
in  each  stage.  Data  gathering,  analysis  and  framework  development  proved  to  be  a 
repetitive  activity. 
The  foregoing  chapters  explain  in  detail  the  conceptualisation  of  the  framework.  The 
overarching  aim  of  the  case  studies  was  to  explore,  describe  and  analyse  the  interactions 
and  processes  in  the  alliances  under  investigation. 
The  entire  research  process  comprised  overlapping  literature  reviews,  fieldwork,  analysis 
and  verification,  and  use  of  both  inductive  and  deductive  methods.  In  this  way  the 
conceptual  framework  was  systematically  built  upon  in  the  light  of  specific  characteristics 
366 and  interconnections  within  and  between  stages.  This  is  in  accordance  with  Miles  and 
Huberman's  (1994:  34)  conclusion  that  the  conceptual  framework  can  be  emphasised  at  the 
beginning,  at  the  end,  or  both,  but  it  is  always  there  and  often  implicitly  delimits  settings, 
actors,  processes  and  events  studied. 
All  stages  or  characteristics  may  not  as  apparent  in  each  of  the  alliances  as  the  latter  were  at 
different  levels  of  maturity  and  more  importance  may  have  been  given  to  certain  aspects 
than  others.  Nevertheless,  the  work  describes  how  characteristics  were  manifested  within 
and  between  stages  in  each  alliance  and  how  they  influenced  implementation  and  progress. 
Table  8.6  summarises  the  main  contribution  of  this  research  -  "a  framework  for  progressive 
development  in  supply  chain  alliances". 
367 ALLIANCE  STAGE  CHARACTERISTICS 
PRELUDE  0  Alliance  agreement 
0  Environmental  analysis 
0  Partner  Selection 
0  Strategic  intent 
PURPOSE  0  Building  Trust 
0  Co-ordination  and  control 
mechanisms 
0  Learning 
0  Setting  Oýjectives 
PROCESS  Compelling  Purpose 
Conflict  Management 
"  Interdependence 
"  Learning 
PLATEAU  0  Adapting  cultures 
"  Performance  Plateau 
"  Reflection  and  Learning 
PROGRESS  Cooperating  Cultures 
"  Development  of  Alliance  Skills 
"  Joint  Innovation 
"  Strategic  Review 
PARTING  Use  Alliance  gained  Knowledge  to 
Foster  New  Relations 
Withdraw 
Table  8.6:  Framework  of  Progressive  Relationship  Development  in  Supply  Chain  Alliances 
Chapter  nine  presents  the  conclusions  of  this  thesis  in  terms  of  implication  to  academic 
theory  and  management  practice. 
368 Chapter  Nine 
Conclusions 9.0  CONCLUSIONS 
This  chapter  describes  factors  identified  by  the  research  as  being  significant  to  strategic 
alliance  development 
The  objectives  are,  to:  - 
"  advance  the  discussion  concerning  the  evolutionary  development  of  alliances 
"  responds  to  research  questions  in  light  of  the  foregoing 
"  summarise  the  realities  of  cooperation 
"  outline  the  study's  potential  contribution  to  theory  and  practice 
"  suggest  future  research 
"  present  summary  conclusions 
9.1  ALLIANCE  DEVELOPMENT  AS  AN  EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS 
The  notion  of  an  evolutionary  or  life  cycle  pattern  to  alliance  development  has  important 
implications  for  understanding  why  business  alliances  are  formed  in  the  first  place  and  how 
they  are  managed.  Viewing  cooperation  in  this  way  highlights  the  importance  of  social 
interaction  necessary  for  the  inter-organisational  exchange  to  happen.  People  as  individuals 
and  in  teams,  are  the  driving  force  behind  the  exchange  and  it  is  their  attitudes,  values, 
hopes  and  expectations  which  contribute  to  the  success  or  failure  of  alliances. 
This  idea  that  alliances  develop  in  phases  seems  at  first  glance  to  contradict  the  notion  of 
dynamic  action.  In  a  context  of  a  changing  network  of  interaction,  the  idea  of  the  alliance  as 
fixed  and  rigid,  is  unlikely.  Participants  have  to  work  consistently  hard  maintaining 
balance  and  harmony  within  the  relationship,  thereby  emphasising  the  organic,  emergent 
qualities  of  the  alliance  process. 
From  the  outset,  people  negotiate  and  influence,  not  just  in  their  immediate  environment 
but  within  a  wider  stakeholder  community  as  well.  Thus,  dialogue  creates  order  in  the 
alliance  context.  Agreements,  regulatory  action  and  behaviour  in  the  exchange  also 
reinforce  the  importance  of  systematic  learning.  In  this  way,  conflict  is  managed 
369 proactively  as  participants  react  to  problems  by  concentrating  on  resolution  of  difficulties 
as  quickly  as  possible. 
In  the  alliance  domain  participants  strive  to  establish  strategic  orientation.  The  search  for 
solutions  generates  novel  ideas  which  stimulate  and  motivate  alliance  participants,  driving 
the  alliance  through  successive  stages.  Regulation  seems  fleeting  as  the  alliance  is  buffeted 
by  internal  and  external  events  which  influence  the  delicate  social  structure,  forcing 
participants  to  work  out  new  ways  of  achieving  difficult  objectives. 
9.2  RESPONSE  TO  RESEARCH  QUESTIONS 
The  purpose  of  the  research  was  to  investigate  the  notion  of  phased  evolutionary 
development  in  strategic  alliances  and  to  attempt  to  answer  the  following  questions:  - 
1.  How  do  alliances  evolve  over  time? 
Are  progressive  stages  evident  as  the  alliance  matures  and  in  what  way  does  one  stage 
differentiate  itself  from  another? 
3.  Given  that  the  degree  of  interaction,  learning  and  innovation  may  alter  as  the  alliance 
relationship  develops,  what  characteristics  are  evident  within  each  of  the  stages  ? 
4.  Are  certain  characteristic  more  important  in  one  phase  of  the  evolution  than  in  another 
5.  What  factors  identify  the  transition  from  one  stage  to  another? 
6.  What  factors  trigger  stability  and  instability  in  alliances  and  what  happens  when  the 
alliance  ends? 
The  research  became  focused  when  it  was  observed  that  a  particular  alliance  seemed  to 
have  passed  through  different  phases  since  its  inception  and  that  each  phase  had  distinct 
characteristics  (refer  to  chapter  3.11-3-13  pages  106-107). 
At  the  same  time  a  literature  review  revealed  that  understanding  how  relationships 
developed  with  the  passage  of  time  had  been  largely  ignored.  A  few  studies  (conceptual 
and  empirical)  of  inter-organisational  exchange  did  explain  stages  in  alliance  development 
over  a  period  of  time.  That  is,  although  empirical  evidence  supported  alliance  stages  and 
370 characteristics,  there  was  growing  recognition  amongst  scholars  that  alliance  development 
remained  under  researched. 
Furthermore,  few  studies  considered  how  an  alliance  advanced  from  one  phase  to  another, 
or  the  conditions  that  might  cause  it  to  end. 
Two  levels  of  data  were  being  gathered,  at  a  macro  level  the  main  questions  helped  guide 
the  research,  while  at  the  micro  level  questions  asked  in  the  interviews  provided  data  on  the 
day  to  day  dynamics  and  factors  affecting  the  inter-personal  and  inter-organisational 
relations. 
The  research  questions  set  out,  have  been  answered  and  the  study  does  provide  empirical 
evidence  of  evolutionary  alliance  development  (see  chapter  7,  pages  279-330  and  chapter  8, 
page  334). 
The  study  describes  how  alliance  processes  and  behaviour  transformed  over  time  and 
identifies  the  characteristics  within  each  stage.  Objectives  were  continually  re-shaped  and 
fine-tuned  in  response  to  the  dynamics  of  the  organisations'  internal  and  external 
environments.  Each  partner  entered  the  alliance  with  explicit  and  shared  expectations  at  an 
early  stage  and  clues  were  gathered  to  validate,  challenge  or  redefine  initial  expectations. 
Behavioural  indicators,  such  as  reduced  communication  and  information  flow,  identified 
transitions  between  the  stages  (refer  to  chapter  7.7,  page  326). 
Dissolution,  or  withdrawal,  was  implicit  in  many  of  the  models.  However,  concepts  were 
based  mainly  on  opinion  and  this  is  an  area  requiring  empirical  investigation.  Explanations 
of  dissolution  in  existing  models  appeared  conceptual  in  nature  and  the  study  begins  to  look 
at  the  background  to  these  phenomena.  Recognition  of  the  need  for  strategic  withdrawal 
was  important  to  direct  managers,  when  it  became  apparent  that  dissolution  was  probable. 
The  study  indicates  that  withdrawal  and  recovery  are  not  exclusive  options  and  that  a 
middle  course  means  painfully  sorting  the  problem  (refer  chapters,  7.6.2,  page  325  and  8.7, 
page  362). 
371 As  demonstrated  by  manifestations  in  the  study,  the  underlying  principle  is  that  strategic 
and  social  explanations  of  value  creation,  were  as  important  as  transaction  minimisation. 
The  thesis  has  provided  empirical  evidence  that  an  alliance  relationship  was  a  source  of 
significant  advantage  and  firms'  boundaries  were  extended  by  creating  relation-specific 
assets. 
Such  relation-specific  capital  was  embedded  in  the  processes  and  routines  of  a  particular 
alliance.  Organisational  routines  defined  a  regular,  predictable  pattern  of  activity,  which 
resulted  from  collective  learning  and  represented  valuable,  relation-specific  knowledge. 
The  cooperative  process  generated  norms  and  shared  beliefs  within  the  alliance  domain, 
leant  legitimacy  to  the  relations  and  formed  the  foundation  for  institutionalisation. 
Knowledge  transfer  increased  understanding  and  the  locus  for  innovation  and  creativity 
was  the  inter-organisational  team.  The  teams  built  communication  conduits  and,  as  skills 
improved,  team  members  were  able  to  recognise  the  value  of  new  information  obtained,  to 
evaluate  it  and  apply  it  to  commercial  ends.  Thus,  in  Cohen  and  Leventhal's  (1990)  terms, 
they  demonstrated  absorptive  capacity.  Teams  naturally  integrated  learning  and  innovation 
and  provided  measurement  of  performance.  Through  problem  solving  activities,  routines 
changed,  improved  and  became  more  efficient.  They  were,  in  this  sense,  truly  dynamic. 
Findings  from  the  study  suggest  that  mutual  commitment  by  ally  organisations  and  the 
teams  was  the  key  factor  encouraging  learning  and  successful  project  outcomes.  Building 
an  alliance  culture  required  positively  motivated  people  and  encouraged  a  teamwork  ethos. 
Continual  support  by  senior  management  in  terms  of  visible  commitment  provided  the 
organisational  structures  in  support  of  teamwork;  namely  ease  of  communication,  strategic 
objectives  and  the  time  and  resources  required  to  successfully  perform  team  tasks. 
The  thesis  also  demonstrated  that  alliance  members  began  to  understand  where  critical 
expertise  resided  in  the  partner  organisations.  Individual  knowledge  and  skills  positively 
influenced  the  joint  alliance  objectives  as  a  result  of  identification  and  utilisation  of 
resources  available  and  by  bringing  these  into  play. 
372 The  study  highlights  how  alliances  were  contextually  different.  For  example,  factors  that 
might  increase  environmental  turbulence  included,  but  were  not  limited  to,  technological 
change,  increased  competition  and  globalisation.  Accordingly,  the  study  emphasises  that 
alliance  managers  needed  to  apply  a  range  of  skills  in  order  to  negotiate  the  cooperative 
process  although  often  exploratory  and  shifting  pathways. 
The  empirical  evidence  captures  the  development  of  alliance  value  to  provide  a  deeper 
awareness  of  inter-organisational  strategies.  Cooperation  is  a  means  by  which  firms  can 
learn  new  capabilities.  Therefore  developing  an  understanding  of  the  evolutionary  path  of 
interfirm  cooperation  is  of  strategic  importance.  Viewing  alliances  is  this  way,  emphasises 
the  cognitive  and  creative  character  of  relations. 
Within  the  alliance,  networks  generated  social  capital,  improved  and  facilitated 
coordination  and  reduced  uncertainty  and  bounded  rationality.  A  central  proposition  of  the 
thesis  is  that  alliance  relationships  generated  value  through  evolutionary  learning. 
Notwithstanding  such  improvements,  coordination  required  frequent  negotiation  which  was 
time  consuming  and  costly. 
The  study  indicates  that  governance  should  not  only  be  based  on  structural  explanations 
but  that  it  will  also  alter  as  a  result  of  social  interaction  (for  example  see  Wilson  and 
Mummalaeni  1989).  Trust,  as  the  dominant  form  of  control,  created  the  incentives  for 
value-generating  strategies.  The  demonstration  of  trust,  through  reciprocity  had  the  power 
to  generate  a  sense  of  responsibility  and  commitment.  Coordination  and  control  was 
imposed  with  reference  to  joint  performance  indicators.  These  identified  continuous 
improvements  that  transcended  organisational  boundaries. 
Levels  of  trust  were  directly  related  to  the  close  interaction  between  partners. 
Paradoxically,  personal  trust  between  allies  overcame  initially  incompatible  cultures. 
Organisational  trust  was  manifested  by  openness  which  created  the  conditions  to  sustain 
shared  norms  and  values.  As  interaction  increased,  good  personal  relations  resulted  in  a 
sense  of  shared  confidence. 
373 Focusing  on  the  social  processes,  it  became  clear  that  the  participants  had  to  consciously 
strive  to  maintain  a  balance  between  internal  and  external  influences.  That  is,  the  alliance 
process  involved  the  partners  in  jointly  designing  strategies  to  cope  with  conflicting 
influences  from  each  organisation  and  its  external  environment.  However,  the  catalyst  for 
alliancing  had  to  be  preserved.  As  market  conditions  improved,  motivation  at  board  level 
in  support  of  the  initiative  appeared  to  diminish. 
Evidence  from  this  study  suggested  that  collaborating  firms  needed  to  manage  complex 
inter-relations  simultaneously  in  different  environments,  for  example  internal,  inter- 
organisation  and  industrial.  Inter-organisational  teams  and  networks  of  personal  relations 
was  the  foundation  to  build  social  capital  as  an  organisational  competence.  Such  relations 
sometimes  even  went  beyond  organisational  structures  and  commercial  bonds  so  that 
people  became  firm  friends.  The  research  has  described  the  changing  dynamics  of  the 
alliance  relations  with  the  passage  of  time.  Overall,  there  was  a  fundamental  change  in  the 
way  people  behaved  while  conducting  business. 
Findings  suggested  that  knowing  how  to  manage  alliances  was  not  widespread  and  clusters 
of  individuals  promoted  the  concept  within  their  own  domain.  Transfer  tended  to  be  by 
chance  rather  than  via  planned  training  or  education.  Indications  were  that  managers,  who 
had  worked  in  networks  before,  were  more  likely  to  understand  alliance  logic.  Managers 
who  had  improved  efficiency  through  collaboration  appeared  more  inclined  to  promote  new 
alliances  as  compared  with  those  who  saw  adverse  economic  conditions  as  a  reason  or 
possibly  as  an  excuse,  to  revert  to  adversarial  control. 
The  study  showed  that  inter-organisational  teams  were  the  means  by  which  skills  of 
separate  organisations  combined  to  develop  new  strategically  significant  capabilities. 
Pressure  on  internal  structure  and  culture,  forced  the  companies  to  break  down  barriers  and 
cut  administrative  layers  to  become  more  flexible  and  team-reliant.  Teams  under- 
performed  when  objectives  were  unclear  or  could  not  be  translated  into  tasks. 
374 Alliance  teamwork  depended  on  trust  between  management  and  workers  and  on 
overcoming  organisational  boundaries  between  customers  and  suppliers.  It  was  therefore 
the  antithesis  of  traditional  adversarialism.  The  empirical  evidence  garnered  demonstrated 
that  through  inter-organisational  teamwork,  idiosyncratic  tacit  knowledge  and  alliance 
specific  know-how  was  generated.  In  this  sense,  the  inter-organisational  teams  were 
instruments  of  strategic  change. 
The  alliance  members  relied,  in  part,  upon  knowledge  that  individuals  had  and  could  fully 
exploit.  Yet  their  capability  also  depended  on  qualities  that  could  only  be  described,  in 
somewhat  clich6d  terms  such  as  good  judgement,  leadership  or  intellectual  ability. 
At  the  outset  of  the  action,  little  consideration  was  given  to  knowledge  generation  because 
the  parties  did  not  understand  the  extent,  or  implications,  of  such  joint  knowledge 
transference  and  development.  Indeed,  only  in  instances  when  Intellectual  Property  was 
exploited  was  the  issue  of  ownership  and  opportunism  even  thought  about.  Conflict 
between  corporate  expediency  and  personal  interest  had  to  be  resolved  and  valuable 
knowledge  protected.  Collaborating  parties  in  the  alliances  did  not  seem  to  consider  how  to 
prevent  allies  from  profiting  opportunistically  from  joint  learning  or  how  to  safeguard  core 
competencies. 
Ownership  of  knowledge  was  therefore  an  area  of  concern  and  it  was  unclear  how  expertise 
could  be  transformed  into  an  asset  with  a  book  value.  it  was  even  more  important  to  know 
how  that  asset  was  to  be  protected.  Alliancing  firms  had  to  be  able  to  protect  their  core 
skills.  In  apparent  contradiction,  alliances  encouraged  the  flow  of  knowledge  across 
boundaries  so  that  managers  had  to  exploit  it  as  quickly  as  possible,  rather  than  dwelling  on 
how  to  protect  the  asset. 
9.3  THE  REALITIES  OF  COOPERATION 
Findings  from  this  study  testify  to  the  fact  that  alliances  are  difficult  to  manage,  and  allies 
can  be  abrasive,  antagonistic  and  prone  to  conflict.  In  the  first  instance,  and  crucial  to  the 
outcome  is  how  far  up  the  organisational  hierarchy  the  mandate  for  the  alliance  goes. 
375 Major  organisational  change  needs  to  be  declared  in  the  organisation's  strategy,  to  ensure 
unreserved  commitment  to  the  project.  In  reality  this  might  not  be  the  case  and  alliances 
may  be  initiated  by  senior  managers  who  are  personally  driven  to  lead  the  project. 
A  question  to  be  considered  may  be  whether  "strategic  alliances"  are  really  "strategic"? 
Findings  from  this  study  indicate  that  each  alliance  began  with  a  close  customer  /  supplier 
association  and  concentrated  on  operational  processes  at  the  interface  between  the 
companies. 
It  is  proposed  that  alliances  may  be  considered  either  intermediate  or  long-term.  In  an 
intermediate  alliance  objectives  are  mainly  operational  in  nature  and  a  long-term  alliance  is 
one  in  which  objectives  may  become  strategic.  Thus  partnering  or  customer/supplier 
relations  would  fall  into  the  description  of  an  intermediate  alliance,  as  it  is  functionally 
oriented  and  enables  partners  to  increase  interaction,  share  information,  and  integrate 
processes. 
A  strategic  alliance  on  the  other  hand  has  greater  implications  for  the  corporation  in  terms 
of  changing  the  work  philosophy  and  organisational  culture.  As  relations  matured,  once 
initial  operational  objectives  were  attained,  participants  were  then  able  to  bring  their  minds 
to  bear  on  problems  of  a  more  strategic  nature  that  would  involve  the  wider  organisation. 
Thus,  it  may  be  postulated  that  the  alliance  not  only  passed  through  horizontal  process 
stages  but  also  vertical  levels;  from  operational,  through  tactical  to  strategic. 
Awareness  of  levels  of  development  in  alliances  may  be  important  in  terms  of  the  expected 
duration  and  perceived  success  rate.  Indeed,  intermediate  alliances  might  be  considered  a 
first  step  in  the  change  process,  allowing  the  participants  to  learn  how  to  manage  the 
alliance  before  considering  more  challenging  strategic  problems. 
At  the  outset,  partners  failed  to  anticipate  the  potential  of  the  alliance  and  how  it  would 
grow.  Findings  suggested  that  at  the  start  of  an  alliance,  neither  party  had  any  idea  of  the 
scope  forjoint  development.  Learning  was  a  major  outcome  of  the  alliances  and  testified  to 
376 the  evolutionary  growth.  This  only  became  clear  as  the  alliance  developed.  Leaming  how 
to  manage  cooperative  relations  was  invaluable  and  enabled  companies  to  improve 
efficiency  and  develop  much  needed  collaborative  skills.  The  ultimate  aim  was  not  just  to 
gain  a  reputation  for  being  a  good  partner  but  to  begin  to  manage  a  portfolio  of  cooperative 
relations  at  any  one  time,  some  more  strategically  important  than  others. 
Team  learning  was  fundamental  to  building  cooperative  relations  and  the  significant 
outcome  of  this  teamwork  was  diffusion  of  knowledge,  innovation  and  the  capacity  to  bring 
about  change.  Successful  teams  supported  by  committed  managers,  were  embued  with  a 
common  purpose  and  understood  the  objectives,  were  able  to  muster  resources  to  carry  out 
the  task  and  were  empowered  with  the  authority  to  make  decisions.  Conversely, 
unsuccessful  teams  did  not  have  any  one,  or  all,  of  the  above  criteria. 
Appreciating  the  impact  of  the  alliance  can  be  a  particular  problem  for  some  participants  as 
the  changes  are  likely  to  affect  their  expectations,  behaviour  and  work  load.  Competition 
is  fundamental  to  the  human  psyche  and  the  motivation  underpinning  alliances  in  this  study 
was  to  improve  competitiveness.  Tension  in  the  individual  organisations  between  those 
who  supported  cooperation  as  against  proponents  of  competition,  created  difficulties. 
Ignorance  regarding  the  objectives  of  the  alliance  and  why  cooperation  was  deemed  a  more 
appropriate  strategy  than  traditional  competitive  tendering  exacerbated  the  situation. 
Inadequate  communication  led  to  misinterpretation,  misperception  and  low  trust. 
Complexity  and  information  asymmetry  went  hand  in  hand  with  poor  feedback  to  create 
these  conditions. 
Even  managers  who  had  actively  promoted  cooperative  working  appeared  to  misunderstand 
the  degree  to  which  each  organisations  had  to  change.  Trust  based  upon  reciprocity  helped 
customers  and  suppliers  modify  behaviour.  Perceived  loss  of  corporate  identity  was  a 
significant  issue,  partly  due  to  an  inability  to  visualise  the  alliance's  structure  and 
boundaries.  To  minimise  conflict,  partners  had  to  be  clear  about  the  scope  of  the  alliance 
and  needed  unambiguous  terms  of  reference. 
377 The  alliances  were  established  in  response  to  market  pressure  following  pragmatic 
decisions  by  customers  with  cost  saving  and  production  efficiency  firmly  in  mind.  In  all 
cases  the  customer  was  more  powerful  than  the  suppliers.  However,  it  did  not  follow  that 
he  exerted  overwhelming  control.  As  the  alliances  matured  and  interdependence  increased, 
the'balance  of  power  tended  to  adjust. 
Each  firm  involved  in  the  cooperative  exchange  was  influenced  by  its  own  particular 
circumstances.  It  was  very  difficult  for  the  alliances  to  be  kept  on  track  and  to  maintain 
momentum  when  the  firm's  internal  environment  was  turbulent.  Individuals  taken  off  the 
project  meant  that  the  focus  of  direction  changed.  Similarly,  when  external  negative 
factors  impacted  on  the  firm,  interest  in  the  alliance  waned. 
This  study  suggests  that  some  industries  appear  to  be  more  adversarial  than  others.  It  also 
shows  how  divergent  organisational  interests  can  be  shaped  into  collective  action.  A  well 
structured  and  managed  process  is  required  to  assist  alliances  through  such  difficulties. 
Resistance  to  change  is  a  predictable  human  response  to  situations  or  circumstances 
involving  uncertainty  and  novelty.  In  general,  and  to  varying  degrees  throughout  the 
alliances,  obstacles  to  successful  cooperative  relations  can  be  said  to  be  due  to  one  of  the 
following  factors:  -  cultural  and  institutional,  environmental,  historical,  ideological, 
political,  social  and  technical. 
9.4  CONTRIBUTION  TO  MANAGEMENT  THEORY 
This  study's  main  contribution  to  theory  is  advancement  of  the  notion  of  alliance 
development  in  phases. 
The  concept  of  fixed  transactions  under-represents  the  dynamics  and  uncertain  character  of 
inter-organisational  relationships.  Studying  the  process  of  cooperation  goes  some  way  to 
contribute  to  a  process-oriented  theory  of  inter-organisational  relations.  The  empirical 
findings  of  this  study  advance  the  proposition  that  cooperation  by  business  alliances  is  one 
means  by  which  businesses  are  likely  to  get  better. 
378 Fragmentation  in  literature  has  contributed  to  lack  of  acknowledgment  of  an  emergent 
inter-organisational  process  and  life  cycle  theory.  There  has  been  an  overemphasis  an 
structural  features  in  the  building  of  alliances  and  a  dearth  of  empirical  studies  concerning 
their  strategic  development.  One  reason  may  be  that  such  studies  have  to  span  over  a  long 
period  of  time  in  order  to  determine  significant  patterns. 
Several  inter-organisational  process  models  are  examined  in  this  work;  each  emphasising 
different  factors  to  explain  the  changing  characteristics  of  exchange  relationships  over  a 
period  of  time. 
Table  9.1  illustrates  the  conceptual  framework  derived  from  this  research  and  matches  a 
number  of  inter-organisational  process  models  against  it.  It  should  be  apparent  that  there  is 
considerable  diversity  in  the  models  and  that  the  framework  derived  from  this  study 
appears  more  comprehensive  than  others  to  date.  In  this  sense,  the  thesis  addresses  the  gap. 
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385 9.5  CONTRIEBUTION  TO  MANAGEMENT  PRACTICE 
In  the  first  instance  business  alliances  have  to  be  seen  as  central  to  the  strategy  of  the  firm. 
If  this  is  not  clearly  understood,  then  allies  cannot  take  the  decisions  necessary  for 
development  of  the  alliance  and  consequently,  efforts  will  either  break  down,  or  be  lost  in 
"no  man's  land'. 
An  understanding  of  alliance  development  may  be  a  useful  tool  in  change  management,  in 
the  context  of  customer  and  supplier  relations.  Windows  of  opportunity,  suggested  in  the 
study,  enabled  managers  to  regularly  review  issues  that  created  concern  and  to  deal  with 
potential  conflict  and  misconceptions  before  they  became  critical  to  the  alliance's  survival. 
At  the  same  time,  the  participative  nature  of  the  decision  making  process  involved  multiple 
actors,  and  was,  in  itself,  a  factor  reducing  resistance  to  organisational  change. 
This  theme  served  as  a  guide  during  the  implementation  process  given  that  managers,  more 
often  than  not,  had  to  manage  conditions  of  disequilibrium  or,  in  Schumpeterian  (1934) 
terms  "creative  destructiod'.  This  generated  two  scenarios;  one  within  relatively  stable 
industries  and  the  second,  in  turbulent  industries. 
In  the  former,  behavioural  guidelines  apparent  during  the  study,  gave  managers  confidence 
to  create  crisis,  so  as  to  wrench  the  companies  from  static  routines  and  before  individuals 
lapsed  into  "old',  pre-alliance,  behaviour. 
In  the  situation  where  organisations  were  in  a  constant  state  of  disequilibrium  or  creativity, 
the  notion  of  a  process,  or  life  cycle,  presents  a  structure  to  assist  the  companies  to  fulfill 
strategic  objectives  by  understanding  the  discipline  of  the  flow,  setting  the  rhythm  of  the 
cycle,  and  finally  honing  or  fine  tuning. 
Above  all,  the  notion  of  incremental  development  can  be  useful  in  understanding, 
predicting  and  influencing  the  growth  and  development  of  business  alliances. 
386 Managers  who  better  understand  how  to  formulate  and  manage  business  alliances,  can  hope 
to  implement  successful  alliances  and  gain  reputations  as  being  good  partners.  Awareness 
of  behavioural.  indicators  can  serve  to  navigate  managers  through  periods  of  crisis. 
Recognition  of  transition  points  between  the  stages  allows  identification  of  factors  that 
slow  down  the  process  and  the  means  for  timely  intervention  to  address  and  correct  them, 
achieving  objectives  more  quickly. 
Recognition  of  the  need  for  strategic  withdrawal,  is  also  important  to  provide  direction  to 
managers  when  the  need  for  withdrawal  becomes  apparent.  This  study  points  to  evidence 
that  withdrawal  and  recovery  were  not  exclusive  options.  Even  faint  grumbling,  or  silent 
protest,  can  come  to  management's  attention  and  alert  it  to  the  existence  of  a  problem.  That 
is,  the  process  of  decline  activated  counter  forces  and  the  presence  of  trust  made  exit  less 
likely  and  provided  a  greater  chance  of  recovery.  Trust  prevented  deterioration  becoming 
irreversible  and  allowed  prompt  action  to  be  taken  to  resolve  concerns  identified. 
As  is  the  case  in  any  alliance,  success  was  heavily  dependent  on  building  personal 
relationships  and  these  were  promoted  by  breaking  down  barriers  to  communication. 
Improvement  was  always  possible  and  ideas  could  come  from  anyone.  The  social  process 
of  teamwork  itself,  involving  interaction  between  people  normally  engaged  in  distinctly 
different  activities,  encouraged  innovation.  Betterment  also  demanded  persistent  and 
comprehensive  re-examination  of  productive  practices.  Truly  effective  teamwork  nurtured 
collective  commitment  to  solve  complicated  problems.  Equally  significant  achievements 
included  the  diffusion  of  knowledge,  innovation  and  the  ability  to  institute  and  sustain 
change. 
9.6  CONTREBUTION  TO  MANAGEMENT  POLICY 
This  research  has  identified  the  need  for  education  and  continuous  personal  development  at 
an  individual  level.  It  has  raised  awareness  that  new  and  different  skills  are  necessary  to 
manage  alliances.  It  is  no  longer  sufficient  for  senior  personnel  to  be  specialists  with 
387 expertise  in  one  area;  they  must  also  have  a  broad  understanding  of  all  aspects  of  a  business 
in  order  to  successfully  negotiate  for  scarce  resources  and  influence  development. 
This  reinforces  the  requirement  that  managers  should  be  of  the  highest  intellectual  ability, 
able  to  manage  diverse  cultures  and  the  politics  that  inevitably  result  from  tensions  in  the 
collaborating  environment.  Alliancing  is  about  managing  change  and  managers  who  learn 
alliance  skills  may  be  better  able  to  steer  the  organisation  through  the  inevitable  peaks  and 
troughs.  Managers  had  to  learn  to  think  strategically  and  to  manage  creatively,  by 
absorbing  ideas,  spotting  opportunities  and  responding  to  new  situations. 
The  study  has  implications  at  two  levels  in  the  organisations;  strategic,  in  terms  of 
corporate  strategy  and  knowledge  management,  and  operational,  in  terms  of  training  and 
development.  At  a  strategic  level,  understanding  of  the  evolutionary  development  in 
alliances  means  that  requirements  are  better  able  to  be  factored  into  the  corporate  strategy 
of  the  organisations.  The  implications  are  that  companies  wishing  to  embark  on  an  alliance 
strategy  have  a  clearer  insight  into  the  likely  events  and  requirements  at  various  stages  of 
development. 
This  study  emphasises  the  amount  of  learning  that  took  place  during  the  alliance  process 
This  had  implications  in  terms  of  supporting  corporate  wide  knowledge  management 
programmes,  as  well  as  training,  in  terms  of  developing  team  skills  at  an  operational  level. 
The  optimistic  outcome  was  a  community  of  practitioners  who  were  flexible,  motivated  and 
prepared  for  change.  Organisations,  best  prepared  to  face  uncertainty  in  the  future,  were 
those  that  built  social  capital  as  a  competence. 
Learning  was  recognised  as  being  fundamentally  important  in  the  struggle  to  achieve  and 
maintain  competitiveness.  Knowledge  generation  enabled  the  organisations  to  renew  and 
to  expand  boundaries.  Speed  of  knowledge  exploitation  was  crucial  to  gain  this  innovative 
edge.  Forming  collaborative  relationships  with  customers  and  suppliers  was  an  ideal 
environment  for  the  transference  of  knowledge.  This  was  particularly  relevant  in  the  case  of 
388 tacit  knowledge  held  by  employees  in  the  partner  organisations  and  in  the  technologies  the 
firms  possessed. 
Collaboration  helped  firms  to  learn  from  each  other  and  this  accelerated  the  movement  of 
knowledge.  Although  tacit  knowledge  was  difficult  to  transfer,  nevertheless,  collaboration 
encouraged  effective  use  of  partnering  specific,  tacit  knowledge  to  develop  joint  processes, 
procedures  and  techniques. 
if  two  organisations  wanted  to  create  new  capabilities  by  combining  individual  knowledge 
and  skills  in  a  unique  way,  they  first  had  to  allow  personnel  to  work  closely  together,  to 
develop  core  competencies  and  simultaneously  acquire  new  skills.  At  the  same  time,  they 
needed  to  recognise  that  teamwork  was  not  a  simple  mechanical  device  for  creating 
winning  solutions. 
As  well  as  this  study,  there  is  growing  agreement  amongst  researchers  (see  for  example 
Barney  1991),  backed  by  solid  evidence,  that  collective  knowledge  is  strategically 
powerful.  In  fact  many  theorists  go  as  far  to  say  that  organisational  knowledge  is  the  only 
way  to  sustain  competitive  advantage  (see  for  example  Levitt  and  March  1988;  Ciborro 
1991;  Huber  1996). 
Cross-functional  success  relied  on  a  team  structure  that  encouraged  individuals  to  work  as 
an  ensemble.  Team  behaviour  could  be  judged  by  examination  of  assets  such  as  leadership, 
problem  solving  and  interpersonal  skills. 
It  was  difficult  for  companies  to  plan  for  the  long-term  and  this  thesis  provides  evidence 
that  inter-organisational  team  projects  may  assist  in  strategy  redefinition.  Through  a 
continuous  business  improvement  programme,  objectives  were  continually  adjusted  as  the 
internal  or  external  circumstance  dictated.  Projects  demanded  knowledge  of  the 
competitive  environment  and  individuals  or  teams  were  constantly  searching  for 
information  outwith  the  firm's  boundaries  to  update  knowledge  of  competitor  activity. 
389 increased  industry  awareness  provided  the  teams  with  more  information  on  which  to  base 
decisions  and  ensured  that  strategy  remained  flexible  and  dynamic. 
Crucial  to  positive  performance  was  the  teams'  ability  to  communicate  orally  and  in 
writing,  within  the  group  and  with  others,  and  to  anticipate  the  reaction  the  information  was 
likely  to  receive.  Closely  associated  with  the  foregoing,  was  the  quality  of  the  decisions 
themselves.  This  depended  on  consultation  and  positive  exchanges  within  and  across 
departmental,  divisional  and  corporate  boundaries.  Leadership  was  often  considered  the 
single  most  important  factor  in  team  success  and  when  leadership  was  shared,  team 
capability,  understanding  and  dynamics  were  enhanced. 
When  solving  complex,  non-routine  problems,  multi-disciplinary  teams  with  diverse  skills 
and  perspectives  proved  to  be  invaluable  resources.  However,  people  with  such  a  variety  of 
backgrounds  often  generated  conflict  and  this  had  to  be  recognised  for  what  it  really  was. 
Resolving  such  conflict  promoted  problem-solving  skills  and  discovery  of  superior 
solutions. 
Senior  management  would  do  well  to  understand  the  strategic  significance  of  inter- 
organisational  teams.  Their  contribution  to  competitive  advantage  in  the  market  and  their 
ability  to  create  knowledge  was  limited  only  by  the  capabilities  of  the  individuals  within  the 
team  and  the  success  of  company  managers  in  providing  the  commitment,  resources  and 
empowerment  necessary  for  the  teams  to  achieve  the  companies'  objectives. 
Finally,  this  thesis  has  the  potential  to  contribute  to  the  economic  environment,  in  terrns  of 
infrastructure  support.  Local  government  is  responding  to  central  government  initiatives 
that  advocate  industry  sharing  and  cooperation.  The  findings  of  this  thesis  may  assist 
organisations  attempting  to  implement  alliances. 
Small  and  Medium  Sized  enterprises  (SME's)  are  often  overlooked  in  the  mainstream  of 
organisational  development,  despite  the  fact  that  they  face  similar  challenges  and  confront 
change  in  the  same  way  as  large  firms.  Given  the  evidence  that  communities  of  business 
390 associations  are  generated  through  collaborative  processes,  SME's  can  and  should  be 
provided  with  guidelines  and  their  awareness  raised  regarding  the  benefits  of  cooperative 
working. 
9.7  AGENDA  FOR  FUTURE  RESEARCH 
Areas  for  potential  future  research  exist  which  expand  on  the  thesis  findings. 
This  research  has  concentrated  on  observation  of  an  evolutionary  development  of  three 
alliances,  each  lasting  for  three  years  or  more.  It  provides  an  opportunity  to  continue  to 
study  these  alliances  as  they  continue  to  grow  and  change.  It  has  identified  the  relationship 
between  dyad  supply  chain  relations  and  collaborative  networks.  It  raises  the  question 
whether  the  conceptual  ftarnework  can  be  used  to  better  understand  cooperation  in  terms  of 
different  types  of  alliances,  in  different  industries. 
A  long-term  study  providing  objective  measures  of  achievements,  in  terms  of  precise 
economics,  would  add  to  credibility.  Although  profit  is  only  one  measure  of  success,  this 
examination  has  the  basis  to  assess  other  measures,  for  example  learning  or  commitment. 
'Research  into  the  duration  of  alliances  would  be  instructive,  given  that  not  all  alliances  are 
designed  to  be  long-term.  How  do  transitory  alliances  differftom  long-term?  Are  there 
different  dynamics?  Do  short-term  alliances  require  different  management  skills?  Do 
short-term  alliances  encourage  network  formation  and  how  important  is  the  ability  to 
manage  a  portfolio  of  relations? 
Conclusions  regarding  alliance  creation  have  been  based  on  evidence  taken  at  single  points 
in  time  (Spekman  et  al  1998),  and  rarely  has  a  study  followed  an  alliance  through  its  whole 
life  cycle.  Because  alliances  evolve  over  time,  internal  and  external  conditions,  alliance 
objectives  and  expectations  change  and  are  likely  to  differ  from  the  original  concept. 
391 A  process  framework  offers  an  opportunity  to  shape  research  as  motives,  environmental 
circumstances  and  partners'  objectives  adjust.  Changing  strategic  demands  and 
environmental  conditions  sometimes  necessitate  considerable  effort  and  that  it  is  often 
difficult  to  sustain.  To  overcome  these  difficulties,  alliances  should  be  reviewed  at  various 
points  in  the  process. 
Certain  characteristics  may  be  more  important  in  some  alliances  than  in  others.  Therefore? 
studies  using  different  theoretical  perspectives  may  highlight  new  variables.  For  example, 
integration  of  the  psychology  of  personal  relations,  cognitive  theory  and  teamwork,  could 
provide  richer  frames  of  reference. 
Further  research  is  required  to  understand  facets  of  influence,  such  as  the  dynamics  of 
power  within  the  stages,  coping  with  power  and  politics,  problem  solving  and  mechanisms 
for  conflict  resolution.  This  would  hope  to  capture  the  essential  role  of  leaders  in  alliance 
management,  their  individual  and  organisational  philosophies,  trust  and  how  all  such 
factors  influence  the  governance  structures  within,  and  between,  the  organisations. 
The  alliances  involved  a  web  of  multi-firm  relationships,  reflecting  complex  interaction. 
Inquiry  into  the  development  of  such  networks  would  be  beneficial  to  our  understanding  of 
alliance  development  practices. 
Some  scholars  suggest  that  the  trauma  of  crisis  is  an  inherent  part  of  change  and  that  it 
provides  opportunities  for  learning  and  change  (Pauchant  and  Mitroff  1992).  This  study 
suggests  that,  although  dissolution  is  implicit  in  each  stage  of  the  cycle,  there  is  greater 
pressure  on  players  to  adjust  rather  than  to  exit. 
Exchange  theories  have  already  provided  powerful  tools  for  the  analysis  of  business 
alliances.  Significantly,  the  factors  contributing  to  alliance  dissolution  seem  to  have  been 
neglected.  Disengagement  appears  to  be  a  poorly  understood  aspect  of  the  strategic 
alliance  process. 
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Attempts  to  conceptualise  alliances,  passing  through  particular  stages  on  the  road  to 
maturity,  capture  the  imperfect,  dynamic  and  developmental  nature  of  interorganisational 
relations.  The  following  details  taken  from  this  study  emphasise  the  complexity  of  the 
subject.  Alliances  are  -.  - 
"  inherently  perplexing  and  difficult  to  manage 
"  involve  collective  strategies  to  create  ownership  and  satisfaction 
"  empower  individuals  by  increasing  the  scope  and  job  responsibility 
"  assist  organisations  to  cope  with  environmental  pressures 
"  stimulating 
"  tools  for  managing  change 
"  agents  to  institutionalise  dynamic  improvements 
"  vehicles  for  strategic  change  through  learning  and  innovation 
"  able  to  create  relationship  norms  and  change  attitudes  and  behaviour 
"a  particular  organisational  design,  focusing  on  teamwork 
This  study  has  suggested  the  emergence  of  a  pattern  to  alliance  development  and  has 
advanced  understanding  of  strategic  alliances,  by  providing  a  more  thorough  framework  for 
the  development  of  a  business  alliance.  In  order  to  comprehend  and  deal  with  business 
alliances  in  a  dynamic  environment,  the  study  considered  inter-organisational  alliances  as  a 
developmental  process.  Examining  alliances  this  way,  rather  than  looking  at  them  "before 
and  after",  should  enable  companies  to  react  and  adapt  to  change  more  readily. 
It  has  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that  confusion  is  not  too  strong  a  description  of  the 
circumstances  at  the  inception  of  an  alliance.  Chaos,  in  varying  degrees,  was  a  prerequisite 
of  innovative  activity  and  order  often  arose  out  of  conflict  to  reveal  the  path  to  better 
performance.  Leadership  champions,  with  charisma  and  drive,  emerged  to  encourage  open 
communication  and  shared  vision. 
393 By  structuring  the  change  process,  management  attested  its  ability  and  emphasised  learning 
in  order  to  catalyse  further  action.  To  be  successful,  a  firm  had  to  have  coherent  strategies 
and  a  mode  of  governance  that  built  on  core  capabilities  essential  for  implementing 
effective  tactics. 
This  framework  was  not  meant  to  be  prescriptive  because  alliance  building  requires 
continuous  adaptation  to  changing  circumstances.  It  highlighted  a  partial  "to  do"  or 
f,  Gexpectatiorf'  list,  and  completion  depended  on  the  contextual  factors  of  each  alliance.  As 
the  relationship  developed,  it  was  noted  that  some  circumstances  applied  in  one  stage  and 
apparently  not  at  all  in  others. 
The  formative  months  of  the  fragile  alliances  demanded  constant  nurturing  and  attention. 
A  setback  very  quickly  saw  a  return  to  all  too  familiar  customer-supplier  relations.  At  the 
same  time  the  level  of  trust  could  fall  to  below  that  at  the  outset  and  confidence  to 
challenge  the  working  practices  of  the  partner  company,  vanished.  Behaviour  and 
individual  body  language  were  often  far  from  constructive  and  hints  of  adversarialism, 
preconceptions  of  agenda  setting  and  lack  of  cost  transparency  easily  undermined  positive 
signals.  Such  lack  of  openness  and  mistrust  was  resolved  in  large  measure  through  joint 
problem  solving  and  dialogue.  Many  factors  contributed  to  such  periods  of  turmoil,  which 
seemed  to  be  implicit  at  all  stages.  At  these  times,  commitment  to  continuous  improvement 
of  company  goals  and  business  values  was  the  guiding  light. 
Resistance  to  change  was  inevitable,  as  jobs  and  individual  power  bases  were  often  under 
threat.  It  was  therefore  critical  that  all  stakeholders  were  involved  in  the  change 
programme.  Blame  culture  thrived  in  organisations  undergoing  change.  The  "them  and 
us"  attitude  usually  presaged  a  return  to  traditional  management.  Alliances  flourished 
within  cooperative  cultures,  if  supported  by  an  appropriate  management  philosophy. 
Despite  the  essentials,  namely  senior  and  line  management  support  and  commitment,  to  be 
convincing  each  alliance  had  to  demonstrate  quick,  tangible  and  numerical  proof  that  it  was 
working.  Convincing  sceptics  therefore  demanded  visible  success,  in  conjunction  with 
394 rigorous  performance  and  cost  control  benchmarks.  Economies  of  scale  would  not  be 
realised  unless  the  alliance  was  able  to  integrate  resource  planning  across  the  companies. 
Success,  as  defined  by  continuity,  has  been  demonstrated  by  cost  savings  and  improved 
efficiency.  Evidence,  so  far,  suggests  that  when  managers  understand  what  is  required  of 
them  to  manage  the  alliance,  they  are  more  likely  to  do  so  successfully  and  more  quickly. 
Conflicting  goals  seriously  undermined  the  alliances  and  it  was  necessary  to  identify  the 
operating  boundaries  within  which  the  alliance  worked  and  the  impact  on  corporate  value 
streams  in  terms  of  cost  and  benefit.  This  meant  proffering  incentives  and  inculcating  both 
the  alliance  partners  and  company  staff  with  the  same  goals.  It  did  not  mean  budget 
orientation,  as  this  sent  confusing  signals  as  regards  cost  cutting,  instead  of  creating  value 
and  improvement.  Business  alliances  were  difficult  and  some  had  more  than  their  fair 
share  of  conflict.  Managers  adopting  the  alliance  route  had  to  anticipate  antagonistic 
situations  that  required  thinking  and  managing  in  new  ways.  This  called  for  management 
skills  to  foster  a  collaborative  philosophy. 
Taking  account  of  the  foregoing  summary,  a  relationship  development  framework  may  be  a 
useful  navigational  tool,  to  guide  companies  involved  in  business  alliances  through 
uncharted  waters,  to  reach  their  objectives  more  quickly.  Evidence  from  this  study 
indicates  that  there  is  a  rhythm  to  such  relationships  and,  once  this  is  recognised,  that  one 
should  respect  the  flow,  intervening  to  remove  obstacles  to  progress  before  the  dynamic 
momentum  is  lost. 
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SCA  ref  008 
Woodbank  SCA  conference 
BW 
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coalacv  Steve  Taylor  SLM 
Shell 
..........  ...  .  .......  .......  Woodbank  29.0.9 
.................  Setting  the  Scene 
MAIN  THEMES,  IMPRESSIONS,  SUMMARY  STATEMENT 
Over  view  bv  Steve  Taylor-  Shell  Perspective 
First  10  months  will  be  summansed  in  terms  of  success,  failures,  issues  and  future. 
Successý  Achieving  f  13M  savings.  This  is  what  the  SCA  is  all  about. 
"  Captured  the  Enterprise  business 
"  Altens  is  far  busier,  and  getting  full 
"  More  recent  efforts  with  the  "pause  plan" 
"  Getting  all  Seaforth's  business  into  Altens  as  well-as  the  office 
"  Continued  improvement  in  transport  efficiency 
Failures 
"  KPI's  at  outset  were  not  right.  They  were  not  easily  measured  or  well  defined. 
"  Incentives  were  not  driving  everyone  and  not  well  aligned. 
"  Profit  and  alliance  working  methodology  was  not  understood  by  all 
"  lot  more  work  to  be  done 
"  MMH 
"  tendency  to  work  in  silos 
Issues. 
Lease  when  Seaforth  moved  out  of  Nord  centre 
Contractual  clauses 
Staffing,  affected  Seaforth,  now  have  the  manpower 
SAP.  Major  change  internally.  Would  not  have  started  if  they  had  reallsed  the 
disruption  this  would  create.  It  has  been  significant  in  terms  of  staff  dilemma  and 
uncertainty. 
Shell  OCTG  issue  with  Altens. 
Future 
"  Lower  price 
"  Ultimate  benefit  to  Shell  is  to  reduce  our  costs. 
"  Free  open  communication  and  tnist 
"  teamworking,  attacking  and  delivering  some  of  the Shaping  up  the  incentives.  Get  the  KPI's  right.  Use  current  systems  so  that  tllcrc  is 
no  extra  work. 
last  14  months  have  been  peaks  and  troughs. 
"  Simple  concept  but  difficult  to  make  happen 
"  too  much  political  and  postunng 
"  different  goals.  objectives  and  agendas 
didn't  understand 
lacked  direction 
lacked  trust 
Now  come  through  a  muddy  patch.  -  Pause  Plan  -  drew  breath.  Moving  too  fast  in  the 
beginning.  This  slowed  everything  down.  Despite  the  complaining  It  has  worked  with 
improvements  in  even,  facility. 
KPI's,  note  well  set,  vet  even  so  still  managed  to  get  there. 
ARRC 
"  less  blinkered 
"  Think  differently  about  the  business 
"  Deal  differently  with  the  customers 
"  Talk  -  work  with  vou-  do  it  differently 
"  changed  how  they  worked. 
Verý,  difficult  to  keep  the  business  charging  on  worth  limited  resources-  getting  there, 
Positive  area  of  business  growth. 
Sceptical  at  the  outset,  but  kept  it  going 
Welcome  challenge  and  more  empowerment 
lot  of  work,  dramatic  and  traumatic. 
ASCo  market  leaders  with  sever  internal  problems. 
John  Inness  vision  proved  correct  in  hindsight. 
Complete  new  methodology. 
Both  contractors  will  benefit  from  open  book. 
SEAFORTH 
SCA  linchpin  to  Seaforth's  future. 
Radically  changed  the  way  they  do  business 
become  more  competitive 
using  top  class  facilities 
partners  are  market  leaders 
"  generates  wealth 
"  core  clients  managed  through  Shell  resources 
"  major  redeployment  problem 
slowly  becoming  trusted 
Move  from  Nord  centre 
IT  infrastructure 
New  management  team 
AOB  "Full" 
win  new  business 
Clients  looking  for  10  year  deal  based  on  progress 
Halliburton  now  on  board 
transfer  of  methodologies 
11 earlier  turmoil  is  changing 
............. ........  ...  SCA  works. 
Shanng  among  all  clients.  Clarifying  everything.  How  the  SCA  will  work  in  next 
year 
............. 
'11  be  managed  the  next  year  -1  -6  HoNN  tN 
............ 
xN  orkforce  tradition  to  be  overcome 
.......... 
Future 
One  big  shred  pool.  Regional  alignment.  Risk  of  monopoly?  Legal 
trust  no  longer  considered  an  issue. 
SPECULATIONS-,  PROPOSITIONS  EXPLANATION. 
Main  themes:  Objectives,  vision,  cornmunication,  teamwork,  transparency,  behaviour 
modification,  spin  out,  trust,  culture.  Objectives.  Cascade  the  principles,  risk  and  reward 
The  transition  between  the  stages  clear  from  the  behaviour  and  body  language. 
ALTERNATIVE  EXPLANATIONS,  CONFLICTING  REPORTS, 
DISAGREEMENTS 
A.  NEXT  STEPS  IN  DATA  COLLECTION 
Analyse  indicators  for  the  transition 
: 
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III APPENDIX  H:  INITIAL  LIST  OF  KEY  THEMES 
Thesis 
Subject-  Initial  list  of  themes  drawn  from  supply  chain  literature 
67  in  the  first  instance 
Re"'earcher  B.  Wagner 
27.06.97 
Theme, 
........  ..........  .............  ......  ......  Aligned  goals  Empowered  Process 
_  Alliance  partners  Environment  Procurement 
Alliance  agreement  Flexibility  Relationships 
Assets  Future  Reputation 
_  Attitude  Identity  Resources 
Background  Influence  Responsibility 
_  Behaviour  Innovation  Results 
Champion  Inter-dependence  Rewards 
Change  Investment  Risk 
Commitment  Learning  Roles 
Communication  Location  Spin-out 
Competencies  Market  Perception  Structure 
Competition  Motivation  Supply  chain 
Conflict  Negative  Teams 
Contract  Objectives  Technology 
Control  One-sided  Tendering  process 
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0 APPENDIX  III:  TEAM  QUESTIONNAIRE 
1.0  OBJECTIVES 
1.1  Are  the  strategic  objectives  clearly  articulated  to  the  team  by  the  senior 
executives? 
1.2  Are  you  aware  of  any  form  of  contract  or  agreement?  If  so,  do  you  fully 
understand  the  implications  of  the  agreement? 
1.3  Does  the  team  fully  understand  the  common  mission  and  shared  purpose? 
1.4  How  is  senior  management  commitment  manifest? 
1.5  Does  the  team  receive  direction  /  instruction  about  the  importance  of  external 
scanning  and  boundary  spanning  to  gain  information? 
1.6  Who  set  the  team  objectives?  Are  clear  benchmarks  identified? 
2.0  RESULTS 
2.1  What  are  the  results  of  the  team  activity?  Can  these  be  quantified? 
2.2  How  motivated  is  the  team?  What  has  contributed  to  this? 
2.3  Has  teamwork  affected  the  level  of  productivity? 
2.4  How  much  control  do  you  have  over  the  activities? 
2.5  Do  you  think  that  the  group  is  prepared  to  take  risk  in  order  to  develop  more 
creative  ideas? 
2.6  What  factors,  if  any  would  you  consider  contributed  to  innovation?:  for  example; 
Smooth  internal  processes;  diversity  of  expertise  within  the  team;  information 
redundancy: 
3.0  BUSINESS  PROCESSES 
3.1  How  well  do  you  understand  the  allies  business  and  business  needs? 
3.2  Do  you  fully  understand  the  cost  drivers  in  you  business? 
3.3  Do  you  understand  the  cost  drivers  between  the  alliance  partners  business? 
4.0  TEAM  PROCESSES  - 
4.1  Communication 
4.1.1  How  well  does  the  team  communicate  e.  g.:  - 
4.1.2  What  are  the  mechanisms  for  inter  and  intra  team  communication  e.  g.  minutes, 
memos,  informal  dialogue? 
4.1.3  Boundary  spanners  play  an  important  role  in  gaining  information  from  outsiders. 
How  does  the  team  manage  relations  outside  the  group? 
4.1.4  How  far  has  the  understanding  and  awareness  of  the  alliance  cascaded  to 
personnel  in  the  organisations? 
4.1.5  Is  there  an  obvious  information  flow/  direction  and  formality? 
4.1.6  Is  there  any  withholding  of  information? 
4.1.7  Do  you  know  everything  that  was  important  without  asking? 
4.1.8  Is  there  enough  information  exchange.  Did  individuals  and  teams  communicate 
both  orally  and  in  writing? 
ix 4.2  Cohesion/norms/socialisation 
4.2.1  How  did  your  team  begin  to  develop  working  relationships? 
4.2.2  How  are  new  comers  socialised  into  the  group? 
4.3  Decision  making/  listening/  questioning 
4.3.1  Are  you  encouraged  to  positively  contribute?  How? 
4.3.2  How  does  the  team  manage  it's  decision-making  process? 
4.3.3  Is  there  cooperation  between  members? 
4.3.4  Is  everyone  allowed  to  air  their  views? 
4.3.5  What  is  the  effect  of  different  cognitive  styles,  attitudes  and  values? 
4.3.6  Are  diverse  viewpoints  taken  on  board? 
4.3.7  Does  the  team  receive  enough  accurate  information  to  make  informed  decisions? 
4.4  Problem  Solving 
4.4.1  Have  you  developed  any  problem  solving  skills. 
-  Ability  to  gather  the  required  data? 
-  Are  you  able  to  make  sound,  free  and  informed  choices  and  decisions? 
-  Are  you  able  to  implement  the  decisions  with  commitment?  Was  the  team  decisive? 
-  Are  the  decisions  made  appropriate  and  effective? 
5.0  TEAM-DEMOGRAPHICS 
5.1  Do  you  think  that  the  teams  composition  affects  performance? 
5.2  Do  the  team  members  know  each  other? 
5.3  Have  the  members  had  similar  lengths  of  tenure? 
6.  OSTRUCTURE 
6.1  What  are  the  barriers  to  communication  at  this  time? 
6.2  Is  the  team  able  to  translate  the  strategic  objectives  into  operational  objectives? 
6.3  How  compatible  are  the  structures  between  the  alliance  companies  at  this  time? 
6.4  How  can  these  be  improved? 
6.5  Can  you  identify  any  road  block  in  the  alliance  at  this  time? 
6.1  Procedures  for  Administrative  Action-  coordinating  mechanisms 
6.1.1  What  institutional  reporting  mechanisms  are  in  place? 
6.1.2  Are  there  any  formal  procedures  for  communicating  between  the  teams? 
6.1.3  Do  people  out  with  the  team  understand  the  role  they  play  in  providing  support 
and  information  to  the  team? 
6.1.4  How  are  the  team  activities  reviewed  to  minimise  duplication  of  effort  and 
project  overlap? 
6.1.5  Does  the  wider  Organisation  support  the  teams? 
6.1.6  Does  the  team  receive  any  feedback? 
6.1.7  How  is  the  team  activity  monitored  and  controlled? 
x 6.2  Managing  Meetings 
6.21  How  well  are  the  team  meetings  managed?  For  example 
-  does  the  meeting  have:  - 
-a  clear  purpose  and  function? 
-  is  it  well  organised  and  controlled  -  Chairperson? 
-  are  issues  resolved  at  one  sitting? 
-  is  the  discussion  and  time  well  managed? 
-  is  the  outcome  of  the  meeting  formally  recorded? 
6.3  Managing  Performance  -  appraisal  and  rewards 
6.3.1  Who  sets  the  team  performance  targets?  How? 
6.3.2  How  are  the  performance  targets  measured? 
6.3.3  Are  their  financial  rewards  related  to  successful  projects? 
6.3.4  Do  you  expect  to  receive  any  financial  rewards? 
6.3.5  What  about  satisfaction  due  to  pleasant  interpersonal  relations  within  the  group 
or  satisfaction  due  to  successful  team  performance  outcomes? 
6.3.6  Are  any  type  of  sanctions  imposed  for  lack  of  performance  or  other 
transgressions? 
6.3.7  Are  targets  and  responsibilities  clear? 
6.3.8  What  happens  when  targets  were  missed? 
6.4  HRM  Policies 
6.4.1  Is  the  company  appraisal  scheme  linked  to  team  performance  as  well  as 
individual  performance? 
6.4.2  Have  you  received  any  training  in  team  skills? 
7.  OTECHNOLOGY 
7.1  Do  you  use  technology  to  communicate  with  other  team  members? 
7.2  Have  you  gained  any  technological  knowledge  due  to  your  participation  in  the 
cross  functional  team? 
7.3  How  compatible  are  the  technologies  between  companies? 
7.4  How  important  is  this  to  the  alliance? 
8.0  PEOPLE 
8.1  Knowledge/  Skill  of  individual 
8.1.1  Does  the  teamwork  give  you  the  scope  to  develop  new  capabilities  or 
competencies? 
8.1.2  Have  you  developed  any  influencing  skills,  for  example  persuasion? 
8.1.3  Have  you  developed  skills  in  terms  of  being  able  to  identify  outcomes  more 
effectively?  i.  e.  problem  solving 
8.1.4  Have  you  developed  any  skills  as  regards  managing  the  team  meetings? 
8.1.5  Have  you  developed  any  project  management  skills  e.  g.  setting  objectives, 
Identifying  roles,  Setting  milestones,  Analytical/planning  skills 
xi 8.2  Individual  needs/goals 
8.2.1  Are  you  personal  goals  aligned  with  the  alliance  goals? 
8.2.2  How  will  the  alliance  affect  your  career  development? 
8.2.3  Does  participation  in  the  team  increase  your  feelings  of 
-  self  awareness 
-  self  identity 
-  self  control 
-  feelings  of  recognition 
-  accomplishment 
-  influence  and  purpose 
8.3  Learning 
8.3.1  So  far  has  the  team  activity  added  to  either  individual  or  collective  learning? 
8.3.2  Has  it  been  a  catalyst  for  learning?  Give  examples  of  expanded  knowledge. 
8.3.3  Would  you  consider  your  team  as  a  successful  learning  community? 
8.4  Interpersonal  skills 
8.4.1  Are  there  any  personality  problems  in  the  team? 
8.4.2  How  is  this  dealt  with? 
8.5  Conflict  resolution 
8.5.1  How  do  the  team  members  overcome  conflict? 
8.5.2  How  is  individual  self  interest  managed? 
8.5.3  Would  you  consider  conflicting  ideas  are  potentially  productive  or  not? 
8.5.4  Is  there  conflict  or  was  there  on  the  whole  a  good  atmosphere? 
8.5.5  If  so,  what  is  the  usual  cause  of  this? 
8.6  Resources 
8.6.1  How  does  the  team  members  manage  internal  competition  for  limited  resources? 
8.6.2  Are  there  sufficient  resources  available  to  the  team  to  carry  out  their  job? 
Does  the  team  understand  the  resource  requirements  for  the  task  in  hand? 
8.7  Leadership 
8.7.1  Regarding  empowerment  and  autonomy  of  the  leader  and  leadership  style.  is 
there  interference  from  other  managers?  - 
8.7.2  Is  the  leadership  in  the  team  formal  or  informal? 
8.7.3  How  was  the  team  leader  chosen? 
8.7.4  Has  the  leadership  change  during  the  course  of  the  project?  Why? 
8.7.5  Is  the  team  leadership  good  or  bad?  Why? 
8.7.6  Does  the  leader  manage  closely  the  way  people  work? 
8.7.8  Does  the  leader  dominate  /  control  the  process? 
xii 8.8  Roles 
8.8.1  How  have  the  team  members  been  chosen:  - 
-  for  their  specialist  expertise? 
-  for  their  ability  to  work  in  a  team? 
-  for  their  skill  such  as  leadership,  giving  good  ideas.  coordinating  a  group, 
completing  a  task? 
8.8.2  Do  individuals  take  on  any  particular  role  in  the  team? 
8.8.3  Are  there  any  roles  missing  in  the  team? 
8.8.3  Does  this  affect  the  team  performance? 
9.0  POWER 
9.1  Has  the  alliance  disturbed  the  balance  of  power  between  the  companies? 
9.2  Has  the  team  been  sufficiently  empowered  to  make  and  act  on  their  own  decisions? 
9.3  Have  influential  stakeholder  all  been  identified? 
9.4  Do  you  think  this  is  important? 
9.5  Have  the  alliance  partners  began  to  modify  their  behaviour? 
9.6  Do  you  understand  the  sources  of  power  in  and  organisation  and  how  this  can  be 
harnessed  to  the  teams  benefit? 
9.7  Has  there  been  acceptance  of  the  democratic  process? 
9.8  Are  there  any  team  members  who  have  not  contributed  to  the  project? 
9.9  Have  personal  ambitions  aligned  with  the  project  goal? 
9.10  Does  anyone  think  that  a  certain  member  or  group/clique  is  carving  out  a  power 
base? 
10CULTURE 
10.1  Cohesion 
10.1.1  Is  there  visible  willingness  to  adapt  organisation  culture,  between  the  alliance 
members? 
10.1.2  How  is  this  demonstrated? 
10.1.3  How  does  the  team  maintain  morale,  are  you  satisfied  being  a  team  member? 
10.1.4  How  open  are  team  members? 
10.1.5  Do  team  members  look  after  each  other? 
10.1.6  Are  people  tolerant  and  did  they  share  information  and  acceptance  of  other 
peoples  annoying  foibles? 
10.1.7  Is  there  sensitivity  to  moods,  reconciling  and  reducing  tensions? 
10.1.8  Is  there  compromise  and  admission  of  error? 
10.1.9  Does  the  team  work  together  successfully? 
10.1.1  OWhat  are  the  problems? 
10.2  Trust 
10.2.1  It  takes  time  to  develop  trust  between  individuals.  How  is  trust  demonstrated? 
10.2.2  Do  you  have  trust  in  the  leader? 
10.2.3  Is  there  cooperation? 
10.2.4  Does  trust  exist? 
xiii 10.3  Commitment 
10.3.1  How  does  senior  management  manifest  commitment? 
10.3.2  How  does  team  members  feelings  towards  each  other  affect  decisions-making 
and  other  group  processes? 
10.3.3  What  was  the  level  of  commitment?  Do  people  delay  or  sabotage  initiatives? 
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cz APPENDIX  IV:  ALLIANCE  PROCESS  QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name  of  respondent  (Optional): 
Company  name: 
Position: 
Date: 
1.00  BACKGROUND 
1.01  When  was  the  company  founded? 
1.02  Describe  your  operations  5  years  ago  (10  years  ago)  and  compare  them  with 
today? 
1.03  What  has  been  your  revenue  growth  over  the  past  five  years? 
1.04  What  were  the  primary  drivers  for  that  growth? 
1.05  What  role  have  alliances  played? 
1.06  How  important  have  they  been  to  your  corporate  strategy? 
2.00  BUSINESS  DESCRIPTION 
2.01  What  are  the  company's  products  and  services? 
2.02  In  what  market  and  industries  does  the  firm  participate? 
2.03  How  competitive  are  these? 
2.04  What  does  your  firm  have  to  do  to  be  successful? 
2.05  Are  alliances  a  part  of  the  strategy  of  these  businesses? 
3.00  PRE  ALLIANCE  EVALUATION 
3.01  Prior  to  the  alliance  was  the  partners  cultural  compatibility  determined? 
3.02  Prior  to  the  alliance  was  the  partners  financial  viability  determined? 
3.03  Prior  to  the  alliance  was  there  an  internal  readiness  assessment  carried  out  in 
your  company? 
3.04  Prior  to  the  alliance  was  there  an  environmental  analysis  conducted? 
3.05  Did  you  do  a  cost/benefit  analysis  prior  to  the  alliance? 
3.06  How  did  you  select  the  partner(s)  for  this  alliance? 
3.07  Has  your  company  a  past  history  of  alliance  involvement?  Please  describe. 
4.00  ALLIANCE  HISTORY 
4.01  How  did  this  relationship  begin? 
4.02  What  triggered  the  motivation  within  your  organisation  to  form  an  alliance? 
4.03  Was  it  individually  or  corporately  driven? 
4.04  Are  they  the  same  factors  that  keep  you  involved  today?  How  have  they 
changed? 
4.05  In  what  way  has  your  organisation  history  or  management  philosophy 
contributed  to  the  success  (or  otherwise)  of  this  alliance? 
4.06  How  long  had  you  been  doing  business  with  your  partner  prior  to  the  alliance? 
4.07  What  kind  of  changes  in  Product  /  Service  where  you  (they)  looking  for? 
xix 4.08  How  important  was  the  alliance  to  your  business  when  it  first  began? 
4.09  Has  it  changed  over  time? 
4.10  Describe  the  exchange  in  the  early  days  and  any  important  stages  in  its 
evolution? 
5.00  GROUNDRULES 
5.01  Was  there  evidence  of  corporate  buy-in  from  the  respective  organisations? 
5.02  Is  there  a  written  contract? 
5.03  How  formal  /  informal  is  it? 
5.04  How  formal  /  informal  are  your  dealings  with  the  partner  (s)? 
5.05  Are  standard  operating  procedures  in  place? 
5.06  Are  there  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  documented? 
5.07  Do  you  use  any  non-market  pricing  variations? 
5.08  Are  these  variations  taken  account  in  the  cost  model? 
5.09  How  do  you  measure  performance? 
5.10  Have  these  changed  over  time? 
5.11  Have  the  terms  of  the  contract  changed  in  the  course  of  the  relationship? 
5.12  How  do  you  exercise  control? 
5.13  How  does  this  arrangement  compare  with  other  contractual  arrangements? 
6.00  PRESENT  SITUATION 
6.01  What,  is  the  present  economic  value  of  the  exchange? 
6.02  How  important  is  the  relationship  to  the  company? 
6.03  How  would  you  describe  the  benefits  you  get  from  the  arrangement? 
6.04  Are  they  only  economic? 
6.05  Were  these  benefits  always  present,  or  did  they  evolve  over  time? 
6.06  What  are  the  disadvantages  of  the  relationship? 
6.07  What  are  the  advantages  (disadvantages)  of  long  term  versus  short  term? 
6.08  Does  your  company  have  more  or  less  leverage  than  your  partner?  -  Why? 
6.09  Has  the  balance  changed  over  time?  How? 
6.10  Has  the  relationship  enhanced  your  competitive  position?  How? 
6.11  Has  it  helped  your  company  grow?  How? 
6.12  How  long  do  you  see  the  commitment  to  this  alliance? 
6.13  Describe  the  communication  between  the  firms 
6.14  Who  is  responsible  for  the  management  of  the  relationship? 
6.15  What  are  the  costs  of  maintaining  the  alliance? 
6.16  How  do  you  quantify  these? 
6.17  Have  there  been  any  disputes?  How  are  these  handled? 
6.18  Has  it  been  easy  /  difficult  to  maintain  the  alliance? 
6.19  Is  the  alliance  stable? 
6.20  What  are  the  factors  that  have  contributed  to  this  stability  /  instability? 
6.21  What  kind  of  investments  have  you  made  in  this  alliance? 
6.22  Have  these  investments  changed  over  time?  How? 
6.23  Were  the  alliance  objectives  clearly  articulated? 
6.24  Does  everyone,  including  those  not  directly  involved  in  the  alliance 
understand  the  common  mission? 
6.25  Were  the  measurements  of  these  objectives  clear  at  the  outset? 
xx 7.00  ALLIANCE  EVOLUTION 
7.01  Are  there  stages  in  the  development  of  the  alliance? 
7.02  Can  you  describe  these? 
7.03  Has  the  alliance  achieved  its  initial  objectives? 
7.04  Did  the  objectives  change?  What  happened? 
7.05  How  have  the  mechanisms  for  feedback  and  control  changed  over  time? 
7.06  Has  the  structure  of  the  alliance  changed? 
7.07  How  well  do  you  understand  the  partners  business  needs? 
7.08  Has  this  understanding  changed  over  time?  In  what  way? 
7.09  Do  you  fully  understand  the  cost  drivers  in  your  and  your  partners  business? 
7.10  Do  you  understand  the  cost  drivers  in  the  alliance? 
7.11  At  what  stage  in  the  alliance  did  you  find  out? 
7.12  Do  you  understand  your  partner's  business  processes? 
7.13  ,  How  was  commitment  manifest? 
7.14  How  did  this  change  over  time? 
7.15  How  did  trust  develop? 
7.16  How  has  this  changed  over  time? 
7.17  What  factors  contributed  to  fluctuating  trust? 
7.18  What  impact  did  this  have  on  the  alliance  performance? 
7.19  Were  all  stakeholder  interests  identified? 
7.20  How  were  stakeholders  interests  articulated? 
7.21  Have  the  stakeholders  changed  over  time? 
7.22  How  has  the  communication  between  partners  changed  over  time? 
7.23  What  are  the  barriers  to  communication? 
7.24  Does  the  wider  organisation  support  the  alliance? 
7.25  What  are  the  mechanisms  to  evaluate  team  as  well  as  individual  performance? 
7.26  What  are  the  mechanisms  to  evaluate  alliance  performance? 
7.27  What  are  the  mechanisms  of  review  and  feedback  in  place? 
7.28  Have  the  roles  and  responsibilities  in  the  alliance  changed  over  time?  How? 
7.29  Are  the  partners  prepared  to  commit  adequate  resources  to  the  alliance? 
7.30  What  type  of  resources? 
7.31  Has  this  changed  over  time? 
7.32  Has  there  been  any  evidence  of  a  performance  plateau? 
8.00  POWER 
8.01  Has  the  power  balance  between  the  partners  altered  over  time?  How?  Why? 
8.02  Have  the  companies  become  more  interdependent  during  the  course  of  the 
alliance? 
8.03  In  what  way? 
8.04  Does  this  affect  the  partners'  own  corporate  identity? 
8.05  Is  this  a  problem?  Why? 
8.06  Has  there  been  concern  about  the  equity  of  reward  or  commitment  of  the 
alliance? 
8.07  How  has  this  been  manifest? 
8.08  Has  the  issue  of  equity  been  properly  addressed? 
8.09  How  significant  has  individual  politicising  been  on  alliance  performance? 
8.10  Have  individuals  been  sufficiently  empowered  to  make  and  act  on  decisions? 
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9.01  How  compatible  is  the  alliance  partners  culture? 
9.02  How  important  is  this? 
9.03  Has  its  importance  changed  over  time? 
9.04  Has  the  partner's  organisational  culture  affected  the  alliance  performance? 
How? 
9.05  Have  the  participants  in  the  alliance  developed  shared  values  and  beliefs? 
How? 
9.06  What  factors  have  hindered  the  alliance? 
9.07  How  do  you  see  the  way  forward? 
10.00  TRANSITION 
10.01  Have  you  been  aware  of  changes  in  stages,  as  the  alliance  has  matured? 
When? 
10.02  What  critical  incidents  indicated  a  transition?  Please  describe  them. 
10.03  Were  there  typical  behavioural  indicators  during  these  transitions? 
11.00  LEARNING 
11.01  Has  the  alliance  been  a  catalyst  for  learning? 
11.02  Where  has  the  greatest  learning  taken  place?  e.  g.  people,  process,  technology, 
structure'etc. 
11.03  Has  the  type  of  learning  changed  during  the  alliance? 
11.04  Can  you  identify  some  examples  of  learning  directly  attributable  to  the 
alliance? 
11.05  Have  individuals  learnt  alliance  management  skills?  Please  describe  these? 
11.06  Has  the  alliance  identified  new  training  and  education  requirements?  Please 
describe 
11.07  Can  the  learning  in  the  alliance  be  measured? 
11.08  Has  the  alliance  stimulated  innovation?  Please  describe 
11.09  Are  there  mechanisms  or  structures  to  transfer  knowledge  to  other  alliances? 
11.10  What  are  they? 
11.11  Is  the  knowledge  mostly  tacit,  within  individuals  heads  or  explicit,  in 
procedures  etc?  -  Please  explain. 
11.12  Has  the  learning  from  previous  alliances  been  applied  in  more  recent 
alliances?  How? 
12.00  DISSOLUTION 
12.01  If  you  are  no  longer  involved  today,  what  were  the  factors  that  contributed  to 
the  dissolution? 
12.02  Were  there  any  periods  of  crisis?  How  many? 
12.03  What  were  the  fundamental  causes  of  these  crises? 
12.04  How  were  they  managed  and  resolved? 
12.05  At  what  stage  in  the  alliance  did  they  occur? 
xxii 12.06  Were  there  any  critical  incidents  that  could  have  caused  an  exit  from  the 
alliance? 
12.07  How  were  these  resolved? 
12.08  What  effect  did  this  have  on  the  relationship  in  general? 
12.09  What  effect  did  this  have  on  the  structures  or  processes  in  the  alliance? 
12.10  Was  this  beneficial  or  not? 
12.11  Are  you  able  to  exit  from  the  relationship? 
12.12  At  what  stage  in  the  alliance  could  you  get  out  with  minimum  disruption? 
12.13  What  would  be  the  costs  of  exit,  in  both  personal  and  economic  terms? 
12.14  Was  withdrawal  implicit  throughout  the  duration  of  the  alliance? 
12.15  Were  options  considered? 
12.16  What  were  they? 
12.17  Do  you  think  your  organisation  is  crisis-prepared  or  crisis  prone? 
12.18  Please  explain  these  characteristics 
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Time  Title  Venue 
Miscellaneous 
1.  chlumberger  J  BI  Managing  Greenock  March  1998  90  T 
Director 
2.  Schl Sc Schlumberger  GB  Operations  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Manager 
3.  Schlumberger  IG  Materials  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Manager 
4.  Schlumberger  JM  Finance  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Manager 
5.  Schlumberger  K  Quality  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Manage 
Schlumberger  JD  Quality  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Manager 
Schlumberger  C  McL  Quality  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Technician 
Schlumberger  IA  Team  Greenock  March  1998  90 
Leader 
Schlumberger  CC  HR  Manager  Greenock  March  1998  90 
10.  Playtex  HM  Internal  Greenock  April  1998  60 
Consultant 
11.  Compaq  GD  MD  Erskine  March  1998  60 
-  12.  John  Dickie  RP  MD  Thon-dibank  January  1998  90 
Construction 
13.  James  Dr  Wilson  MD  Glasgow  January  1998  60 
Howden  &Co 
14.  Kinloch  Dr  McKay  MD  Greenock  January  1998  60 
Electronics 
15.  Plavtex  MH  MD  Greenock  January  1998  90 
16.  Glenmorangie  GW  Operations  Edinburgh  February  1998  90 
Manager 
17.  Royal  Dr  Gilks  Director  Bishopton  March  1998  120 
Ordenance 
18.  Kinlock  S  Mcs  Operations  Greenock  March  1998  120 
electronics  Director 
19. 
- 
Linn  Products 
- 
NI  Me  Operations  Waterfoot  June  1998  120 
j  -20-  Grants  GW  Operations  Bellshill  Sept.  1998  90 
1  Whiskey  Director 
IDV  Interviews 
21.  IDV  EH  1  rocurement  Dublin  August  1996  90 
Director 
I  I 
22.  IDV  P  Br  Buver  Dublin  August  1996  90 
23.  IDV  MH  Buyer  Dublin  August  1996  90 
24.  J  IDV  De  OT  Materials  Dublin  August  1996  90 
1  25.1  IDV  IFCI  Qualitv  I  Dublin  I  August  1996  1  90  1 
xxiv 26.  IDV  MS  Quality  Dublin  August  1996  90 
27.  IDV_  ED  Marketing  Dublin  August  1996  90 
28.  IDV  P  O'R  Operations 
supervisor 
Dublin  August  1996  90 
29.  IDV  ED  Marketing  Dublin  July  1997  70 
30.  IDV  MS  Quality  Dublin  July  1997  55 
31.  IDV  PB  Buyer  Dublin  Sept  1997  90 
32.  IDV_  MH  Buyer  Dublin  Sept  1997  75 
.  33.  IDV  D  OT  Materials 
Manager 
Dublin  Sept  1997  55 
34.  IDV  P  O'R  Materials 
controller 
Dublin  Sept  1997  60 
35.  IDV  EH  Procurement 
Director 
Dublin  March  1997  90 
36.  IDV  EH  Procurement 
Director 
Dublin  March  1998  120 
. 
37.  UDV  MS  Quality  Dublin  26  Aug  1999  90mins 
38.  UDV  PB  Buyer  Dublin  26  Aug  1999  90mins 
39.  UDV  MH  Buyer  Dublin  26  Aug  1999  90mins 
40.  UDV  D  OT  Operations  Dublin  26  Aug  1999  90mins 
Killeen  Interviews 
41.  Killeen.  TL  Managing 
Director 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
42.  Killeen  LK  Financial 
Director 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
43.  Killeen  SF  Operations 
Manager 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
44.  Killeen  EP  Print 
Manager 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
45.  Killeen  FS  Commercial 
Manager 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
46.  Killeen  SK  Special 
projects 
manager 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
47.  Killeen  TR  Commercial 
mana, 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
48.  Killeen  PC  Quality 
Supervisor 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
49.  Killeen  B  Quality 
Supervisor 
Dublin  Aug  1996  90 
50.  Killeen  TR  Commercial 
manager 
Dublin  July  1997  30 
51.  Killeen  SK  Special 
projects 
manager 
Dublin  July  1997  60 
5  2  Killeen  EP  Print 
Manager 
Dublin  July  1997  65 
E 
5  3. I  Killeen  FS  Commercial 
Manager 
Dublin  July  1997  60 
5 54.  4.  Killeen  SF  Operations 
ger 
Dublin  July  1997  50 
xxv 55.  Killeen  LK  Financial  Dublin  Aug  1997  60 
Director 
56.  Killeen  PH  Sales  Dublin  Sept  1997  60 
57.  Killeen  _  TL  MD  Dublin  Sept  1997  45 
58.  Killeen  SK  Special  Dublin  25  Aug  1999  90mins 
projects 
Manager 
59.  Killeen  OIC  Operations  Dublin  25  Aug  1999  90mins 
Manager 
_60. 
Killeen  D  MD  Dublin  25  Aug  1999  150 
Shell  Expro  UK  Limited  -  Interviews 
61.  Shell  ST  Logistics  Aberdeen,  June  1998  90 
Manager  Tullos 
62.  Shell  GI  Commercial  Aberdeen,  June  1998  90 
Manager  Altens 
63.  Shell  TG  Asset  Aberdeen,  June  1998  60 
Manager  Altens 
64.  Shell  J  Mac  Asset  Aberdeen,  Torry  June  1998  90 
Manager 
65.  Shell  GI  Contract  Tullos  Nov  1998  60 
Specialist 
66.  Shell  BK  Logistics  Tullos  Nov  1998  60 
facilitator 
67.  Shell  J  Mac  BrP  Torry  Nov  1998  60 
68.  Shell  ST  Supply  Tullos  Nov  1998  60 
Logistics 
Manager 
69.  Shell  TG  Asset  Altens  Nov  1998  20 
Manager 
70.  Shell  ST  supply  TuRos  May  1999  120 
Logistics 
71.  Shell  G  Asset  Altens  May  1999  90 
Manager 
72.  Shell  GL  UESL  Tullos  June  1999  120 
Seaforth  Maritime  Limited  -  SML 
73.  Seaforth  MP  Base  Aberdeen.  Tony  June  1998  90 
Manager 
74.  Seaforth  AB  Manager  Aberdeen,  Nord  June  1998  60 
75.  Seaforth  MP  Base  Torry  Nov  1998  60 
Manager 
76.  Seaforth  DB  Base  Altens  Nov  1998  20 
Manager 
77.  SML  DB  Altens  Base  Altens  May  1999  60 
Manager 
78.  SML  GI  Contract  Altens  May  1999  90 
Manager 
79.  SML  IH  Commercial  Altens  June  99  120 
Mana 
80.  SUL  GN  Operations  Altens  June  1999  120 
Manager  =a".  I  I  81.  1  SML  ýe-n 
e  -ý=s  ta-s 
I  Alte  s  May  1999  60 Manager 
82.  SML  GI  Contract  Altens  May1999  90 
Manager 
83.  SNE  IH  Conunercial  Altens  June  2,99  120 
1  1  1  Manager  I 
--- 
1  1 
84.  SUL  GN  Operations  I  Altens;  17  June  1999  12  1  I 
Manager 
ARR-Craib  -  ARRC 
85.  Craib  BP  Transport  Aberdeen,  Torry  June  1998  90 
Manager 
86.  Craib  EA  M.  D.  Aberdeen  July  1998  60 
Tullos 
87.  Cmib  GC  Director  Dyce  Oct  8  1998  90 
88.  Craib  BP  Transport  Torry  Feb  15  1999  60 
1  1  manager 
89.  1  Cmib  EA  MD  Altens  24June,  1999  60 
Sun/  Birkby's  -  Secondary  Interviews 
90.  SUN  IG  European  Linlithgow  April  1999  120 
supply 
Logistics 
12  Sun  Secondary 
emews 
7  Birkbys  Secondary  I 
interviews 
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APPENDIX  VI:  BACKGROUND  TO  IDV/KIULLEEN  ALLIANCE 
1UDV  Operations  Ireland 
History:  Justerini  and  Brooks  Ltd.  was  established  in  1749.  In  1857,  the  Gilbey  family  set 
up  W  and  A  Gilbey  Ltd  as  a  wines  and  spirits  business.  Just  over  a  century  later  Gilbey 
merged  with  Justerini  and  Brooks  and  Twiss,  Browning  and  Hallowes  to  form  International 
Distillers  and  Vintners  (IDV)  which  Grand  Metropolitan  acquired  in  1972. 
In  1998  the  boards  of  Guinness  and  Grand  Metropolitan  announced  the  merged  companies 
into  DIAGEO. 
International  Distillers  and  Vinters,  is  an  international  wines  and  spirits  company  that 
produces,  markets  and  distributes  a  wide  range  of  branded  drinks  throughout  the  world  via 
a  network  of  companies  and  distribution  partnerships.  Trading  in  over  fifty  countries,  IDV 
locations  are  the  UK,  US,  Canada,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Portugal  and  South  Africa., 
IDV  acquisitions  include  Ramana  Sambuca  in  1986,  Heublein  (owners  of  Smirnoft)  in 
1987,  Christian  Brothers  of  California  and  Metaxa  of  Greece  in  1989,  and  Anglo  Espanola 
Distribucion,  Spain  in  1990.  A  substantial  interest  in  Cinzano,  acquired  in  1985,  led  to  full 
ownership  in  1992.  Other  significant  events  in  1992  were  acquisition  of  a  30%  share  in 
Gonzalez  Byass,  Spain,  a  joint  venture  in  Uganda,  and  several  investments  in  the  Far  East. 
1993  was  a  particularly  eventful  year  that  brought  expansion  into  Russia,  Poland,  the  Czech 
D'o.  u 
Rep  blic  and  China,  the  acquisition  of  Buton  of  Italy,  partnerships  in  Chile,  India  and  the 
Caribbean,  and  an  equity  stake  in  Laurent-Perrier  Champagne. 
EDV  Operations  Ireland  (Originally  Gilbeys  of  Ireland,  Manufacturing)  with  sales  of  over 
180K  and  260  employees  was  set  up  in  1990  to  more  efficiently  and  cost-effectively 
service  the  Gilbeys  and  Bailey's  companies  involved  in  production  of  quality  brands. 
(Grand  Metropolitan  Fact  Book  1994) 
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In  1970  Gilbey's  examined  the  idea  of  creating  a  new  Irish  product  embodying  the  national 
culture.  Whisky  and  dairy  products  were  highlighted  as  two  key  exports  reflecting  Irish 
tradition  and  natural  heritage.  Scientific  development,  to  produce  an  acceptable  taste  and 
stable  blend,  took  two  years  and  by  mid  1974  the  company  had  achieved  the  launch  of 
Bailey's  Irish  Cream  Liqueur.  By  1980  one  million  cases  had  been  sold.  In  value  terms, 
this  accounts  for  1.6%  of  Ireland's,  overall  exports,  while  5%  of  the  country's  milk 
production  is  used  in  the  making  of  Bailey's. 
Europe  is  now  Bailey's  single  biggest  market  accounting  for  51%  of  sales.  North  America 
takes  30%,  duty  free  outlets  have  12%,  and  the  remaining  7%  is divided  between  emerging 
markets  in  Asia,  Africa  and  Latin  America. 
l1DV  Operations  Ireland  produces  Bailey's  Original  Irish  Cream,  Sheridan's,  Emmets, 
O'Darby  and  Dubliner  for  world  markets  and  Smirnoff  for  Ireland.  Manufacturing  facilities 
are  in  Dublin  and  Bailieboro,  County  Cavan. 
Materials  /  plant set  up 
Bailey's  liqueur  is  manufactured  from  cream,  Irish  whisky  and  chocolate  flavours.  Most 
cream  is  made  in  the  summer  months  ranging  from  June  to  October.  The  ratio  of  cream 
availability  between  summer  and  winter  is  usually  about  13:  1. 
The  Dublin  plant  has  six  main  bottling  lines,  one  for  Smirnoff,  one  for  Sheridans  and  four 
for  Bailey's.  Two  of  the  Bailey's  lines  are  high  speed  single  size  lines;  the  other  two  are 
able  to  cope  with  many  different  sizes  of  bottles,  ranging  from  miniatures  to  one  litre.  A 
considerable  number  of  imaginative  value  adding  packages  is  used.  In  addition,  bottle  and 
package  labels  vary  in  design  between  specific  markets. 
Grand  Metropolitan  is  an  organisation  with  particular  skills  in  brand  marketing  and 
worldwide  management.  While  supporting  existing  products  and  making  relevant  add-on 
acquisitions  and  alliances,  the  group  has  built  its  business  through  consistent  development 
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of  new  brands  and  markets.  In  pursuance  of  this  strategy,  marketing  expenditure  increased 
in  1995  to  a  record  level  of  just  over  one  billion  pounds.  Brand  support  involves 
promotions,  often  with  special  bottle  and  packaging  that  vary  in  timing  and scale  in 
different  geographical  markets. 
A  summary  of  the  consolidated  financial  performance  of  Grand  Metropolitan  and  also 
Diageo  is  set  out  in  the  table  below:  - 
1994  1995  UDV  1996  UDV  1997-1998 
Grand  Met  Grand  Met  Grand  Met  Diageo 
18  months  ended 
June1998 
Turnover  Lm  7780  8025  8,025  17,592 
Income  after  669  622  649  1,459 
tax  im 
Earnings  per  32.2p  29.8p  3  I.  Op  34.5p 
share 
Source:  Press  release:  Proposed  Merger  of  Grand  Met  and  Guinness. 
1  1998  Annual  Report  and  Accounts 
Killeen  Corrugated  Products.  Killeen  Paper  Mills,  was  established  in  1902  to  make 
paper,  using  rags  and  straw  as  the  basic  raw  material.  The  company  struggled  to  exist  until 
the  outbreak  of  war  in  1939,  when  a  scarcity  of  paper  opened  up  new  markets.  In  1942  the 
company  started  to  manufacture  paper  bags  and  wrapping  paper  and  additional  paper 
making  machinery  was  installed  in  1944  to  meet  growing  demand. 
The  first  corrugating  machine  in  Ireland  was  installed  in  1949  at  Killeen  when  the 
Company  embarked  on  an  extensive  programme  for  the  manufacture  of  corrugated  boxes 
and  packaging.  A  paper  board  making  machine  was  subsequently  installed  to  produce  liner 
and  chipboard  for  corrugated  boxes.  It  was  at  this  time  that  an  export  demand  was 
identified  for  similar  products  in  the  UK. 
In  1963,  Killeen  Paper  Mills  was  taken  over  by  National  Board  and  Paper  Mills  of 
Waterford,  owned  by  the  St.  Joe  Paper  Company  of  Florida,  USA. 
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In  1969,  a  new  factory  was  built  on  a  site  off  the  main  Dublin/Nass  Road  for  the  production 
of  corrugated  materials.  It  was  intended  that  the  existing  plants  at  Killeen  and  Waterford 
would  close  down  after  work  was  transferred  to  the  new  plant.  Unfortunately,  the  new 
factory  was  completely  destroyed  by  fire  before  going  into  production. 
In  1989,  European  Paper  and  Packaging  Corporation  (EPPIC),  with  the  Jefferson  Smurfit 
Group  holding  a  minority  interest,  acquired  the  company.  In  1993  Killeen  Corrugated 
Products  became  a  fully  owned  subsidiary  of  the  Jefferson  Smurfit  Group  via  Smurfit  B.  V. 
Holland. 
The  Jefferson  Smurfit  Company  has  grown  from  a  locally  trading  Irish  Company  to 
become  the  world's  leading  paper-based  packing  company  in  less  that  forty  years.  The 
Group  is  growth  orientated  and  has  taken  quantum  leaps  in  size  through  acquisition.  A 
central  feature  of  the  Group's  acquisition  strategy  has  been  to  identify,  acquire  and 
subsequently  rationalise  undervalued  or  under  performing  assets. 
1998  was  a  watershed  year  for  the  group  and  the  industry,  due  to  a  merger  between 
Jefferson  Smurfit  Corporation  QSQ  and  Stone  Container  Corporation  (Stone).  The 
Smurfit-Stone  Corporation  was  created  in  November  1998.  Core  business  includes 
corrugated  containers,  folding  cartons  and  bag  packaging,  supported  by  an  integrated  mill 
system  with  significant  fibre  resources.  Smurfit-Stone  operates  approximately  300 
facilities  worldwide. 
Killeen  manufactures  ten  thousand  (10,000)  tonnes  of  paper  per  annum  and  about  75%  is 
made  from  recycled  material.  In  producing  corrugated  board  and  boxes  the  company  uses 
approximately  seventeen  hundred  (1,700)  tonnes  of  waste  fibre  per  annum,  which  is 
recycled  and  converted  into  paper. 
The  making  of  corrugated  board  involves  gluing  two  flat  sheets  of  paper  to  paper  of  a 
waveform.  In  some  cases  the  flat  outer  surface  is  coated  with  clay  that  takes  twenty-four IDV  Operations  and  Killeen  Corrugated  1994-1999 
hours  to  cure  before  it  is  ready  for  printing.  Where  Killeen  contributes  most  of  its  expertise 
is  in  printing  with  up  to  seven  colours,  often  in  complex  subtle  patterns,  using  a 
flexographic  process. 
Following  printing,  the  cardboard  is  cut  to  shape  creased  ready  for  folding  into  the  case  and 
paletted  for  -dispatch.  Production  processes  are  continuous  and  of  high  volume  so  that 
product  changeovers  involve  extensive  disruption.  Raw  paper  storage  is  extensive  and 
materials'  handling  is  significant  at  the  start  up  of  new  production  runs. 
For  twenty  years  IDV  Operations  has  been  a  significant  customer  to  Killeen  who  provides 
packaging  and  printing  of  the  highest  quality  possible.  Killeen's  other  customers  include 
leading  producers  of  beverages,  food,  agricultural  products  and  pharmaceuticals. 
Recent  financial  performance  of  the  Jefferson  Smurfit  Group  is  as  follows:  - 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Turnover  133,215  104,226  110,637  326,373  193,712  2,570,864  2,887,879 
IRLOOO 
Profit  112,501  46,786  297,010  311,044  139,716  109,142  139,910 
after  tax 
IRLOOO 
Ordinary  0.551p  3.088p  2.7p  4.  Op  4.2p  6.2p  6.6p 
Share 
Dividend 
Source:  Jefferson  Smurfit  Group  PLC  Annual  Report  1996  and  1998 
NB.  Killeen  figures  are  not  separately  identified  in  publicly  available  information. 
AN  OVERVUEW  OF  THE  SUPPLY  CHAIN 
IDV's  Customer  Services  department  receives  monthly  forecasts  from  each  of  its 
customers,  who  are  the  National  Marketing  Companies  (NMC's).  Similar  information  is 
also  sent  to  IDV  Ireland  from  International  Customer  Services  (ICS). 
"The  National  Marketing  Companies  are  our  customers,  they  generate  forecastsfor  us  and 
the  AMC  get  information  fton;  their  customers.  Information  passed  on  by  the  AMC  is 
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consolidated  Generally  the  AMC  would  give  us  aforecastfor  say  six sizes  of  Bailey's  or 
Smirnoff.  By  and  large,  we  don't  produce  that  for  a  specific  customer,  unless  it  is  for  a 
promotion.  "  (PDUDV9715) 
The  market  is  divided  into  big  volume  NMCs,  in  the  USA,  Germany,  UK,  France,  or 
Spain  and  IDV  Operations  deals  directly  with  them.  The  International  Customer  Service 
Centre  (ICS)  based  in  London  picks  up  information  from  all  the  smaller  and  outlying 
markets  and  NMC"s.  consolidates  it  and  then  places  orders  with  IDV  Operations. 
An  example  of  such  an  ICS  forecast  might  be  that  Singapore  requires  100  cases,  Malaysia 
100  cases  and  Hong  Kong  300  cases.  ICS  gathers  these  together  and  IDV  actions  the  order 
without  having  to  communicate  directly  with  the  individual  outlets  in  the  markets.  The 
ICS  also  deal  with  NMC's  that  handle  the  IDV  multi-brands  and  sometimes  they  are  not 
even  NMCs.  Sometimes  these  are  just  agencies  that  IDV  has  set  up  in  countries  where  it 
supplies  J&B,  Gilbey's  Gin,  Malibu  or  Bailey's. 
The  International  Customer  Service  centre  collects  and  distributes  all  the  orders  to  the 
appropriate  manufacturing  operation,  such  as  Bailey's,  J&B,  Cinzano  and  Smirnoff,  who 
return  the  completed  order  to  the  ICS  for  shipment  to  the  specific  markets.  This  means  that 
customers  in  the  market  do  not  have  to  deal  with  the  manufacturing  companies.  The  ICS 
centre  does  the  invoicing  in  local  money  so  that  the  customer  is  not  involved  in  currency 
transactions.  IDV  deals  directly  with  huge  markets  where  the  bulk  of  the  business  is  only 
Bailey's.  All  the  foregoing  information  is  directed  to  the  coordinator  responsible  for  order 
processing  and  to  the  customer's  coordinator  responsible  for  handling  market  demand. 
Data  is  brought  together  from  the  NMC's  and  the  ICS.  This  includes  the  supply  chain 
demand  forecast  and  weekly  and  monthly  updates,  and  is  used  to  formulate  a  base  plan  that 
takes  into  account  changing  demand  patterns,  stock  and  any  other  factors  required  to  meet 
the  forecast.  The  plan  overlays  sales  information  as  it  comes  in  and  weekly  meetings  with 
IDV  production  and  materials  people,  including  Killeen  personnel,  serve  to  track  and 
update  progress  and  changes. 
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A  daily  meeting  takes  place  between  IDV  staff  responsible  for  production,  materials  and 
logistics  to  co-ordinate  demand  and  production  and  to  discuss  forecasts  and  production 
planning.  A  representative  responsible  for  Killeen  customer  liaison  is  in  attendance.  These 
kind  of  meetings  took  place  prior  to  the  partnering  agreement  and  were  not  specifically  set 
up  with  the  aim  of  including  Killeen.  However,  the  alliance  process  relied  so  much  on 
Killeen  representation  that,  with  passage  of  time,  Killeen  became  an  integral  party  to  the 
planning. 
Information  entered  into  the  Materials  Requirements  Plan  (MRP)  is  converted  into  a 
detailed  production  plan  called  the  Finite  Scheduler,  and  allocated  to  production  to  generate 
orders.  The  Finite  Scheduler  identifies  the  quantity  that  a  line  can  produce  in  a  given 
period  of  time,  and  involves  a  weekly  phased  forecast  and  shipping  plan.  Listings  are 
manually  updated  on  a  daily  basis  and  order  receipts  tracked  and  monitored  against 
forecasts.  The  short-term  planning  horizon  is  between  one  and  four  weeks  and  the  medium 
to  long  term  horizon,  five  to  fifty  two  weeks. 
Information  produced  manually  is  given  to  all  suppliers  in  a  report  format.  Data  is 
generated  for  the  Demand  Requirement  Plan  and  Materials  Requirement  Plan.  This  draws 
out  the  production  requirement  and  materials  explosion  for  a  six-week  period,  broken  down 
by  market  and  into  numbers  of  bottles,  labels,  etc.  This  breakdown  is  given  to  the 
appropriate  supplier,  labels  to  labels  supplier,  bottles  to  bottles  supplier,  cartons  to  cartons 
supplier  etc.  and  as  it  attends  the  daily  meetings,  Killeen  has  the  supply  chain  information 
first  hand. 
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APPENDIX  VII:  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  SUPPLY  CHAIN  ALLIANCE 
Shell  Expro  (Supply  Logistics)  from  1994  to  present 
In  1994  Shell  Expro  (UK)  Transport  and  Supply  Department's  name  changed  to  Logistics 
and  Procurement  signalling  a  raising  of  the  profile  of  the  two  activities.  Historically 
Procurement  had  been  remote  both  physically  and  in  terms  of  its  activities.  Procurement 
was  seen  as  the  commercially  oriented,  intellectual  custodian  of  the  business  case  with 
responsibility  not  only  for  getting  new  business  and  drawing  up  contracts  but  also  for 
warehousing  and  storage. 
In  contrast,  Logistics  was  involved  with  use  of  airplanes  and  boats.  The  arrangements  for 
these  called  on  the  expertise  of  marine  and  aircraft  specialists.  Logistics  was  less 
concerned  with  the  commercial  side  of  the  business  which  was  taken  care  of  by  the 
procurement  people.  Procurers  saw  themselves  as  businessmen  and  on  the  most  part  they 
and  Logistics  communicated  infrequently,  if  at  all. 
Within  Logistics  there  are  four  operational  service  lines,  Air,  Marine,  Supply  and  Waste;  all 
supported  and  linked  by  the  Business  Development  programme  and  working  to  Shell 
quality  standards. 
In  Logistics,  the  name  change  was  intended  to  pave  the  way  for  a  philosophical  and 
behavioural  shift  and  it  coincided  with  the  introduction  of  a  Total  Quality  Management 
programme.  Instead  of  simply  talking  about  transportation,  Logistics  began  to  look  at 
customers  who  needed  the  goods  in  the  containers  and  the  people  who  travelled  in  the 
planes  and  boats. 
This  meant  identifying  both  the  person  paying  and  the  individual  using  the  service  and 
examining  all  aspects  of  their  custom. Shell/  Seaforth  Maritime  and  ARR  Craib  Case  Study  1996-1999 
Well  Engineering  in  the  90's  was  the  next  step.  Major  drilling  was  out-sourced  with 
contractors  now  directing  construction  and  working  on  platforms  and  rigs,  instead  of  this 
being  done  by  Shell  drilling  teams. 
An  out-sourcing  strategy  involves  giving  contractors  greater  responsibility  and 
accountability  for  managing  the  scheduling  and  execution  processes,  to  allow  Shell  staff  to 
focus  on  long  term  planning,  analysis  and  business  improvements. 
Out-sourcing  drilling  and  oil  production  meant  that  Shell's  core  business  changed  from 
hands-on  engineering  to  concentrate  on  exploration  and  reservoir  management.  This  put  in 
jeopardy  peripheral  departments  like  Logistics. 
The  most  extreme  market  perception  of  Shell  is  of  an  enormously  wealthy  company  that 
can  afford  to  behave  in  an  aggressive  and  arrogant  manner.  It  is  in  this  context  that  Shell 
implemented  in  1996  its  enhancement  phase.  The  aim  of  which  was  to  dispel  the  image  of 
94  control  an4  tell".  The  shift  was  from  an  unalloyed  use  of  power  to  a  more  open 
entrepreneurial  environment  that  more  closely  involved  contractors. 
People  had  been  leaving  mostly  through  natural  wastage,  but  sometimes  it  was  because 
contractors  were  now  doing  the  work.  This  caused  resentment  and  the  feeling  was  that  the 
regular  workforce  was  being  taken  advantage  of  by  these  outside  contractors.  In  many 
people's  minds,  the  job  could  have  been  done  better  and  cheaper  in-house.  The  challenge 
for  some  was  to  prove  that  by  getting  back  to  basic  in-house  expertise  and  knowledge,  Shell 
would  end  up  with  a  more  efficient  and  cost  effective  service.  Now,  with  fewer  Shell 
people  about,  valuable  work  was  handed  out,  and  at  the  same  time  Shell  was  trying  to 
maintain  control  as  before. 
Others  saw  the  change  as  a  breath  of  fresh  air.  Project  teams  were  there  to  solve  problems 
and  it  was  quickly  apparent  that  "if  you  have  brought  a  team  together,  then  management 
had  better  make  use  of  it  Don'tjust  give  the  team  members  ajob,  say  afew  nice  things, Shell/  Seaforth  Maritime  and  ARR  Craib  Case  Study  1996-1999 
pat  them  on  the  head  and  wander  off.  If  you  don't  believe  them,  they  won't  help  you  a 
second  time.  "  (LQMSE9829) 
Management  took  on  board  the  enhancement  phase  and  employees  were  encouraged  to  use 
initiative  and  to  experiment.  This  conflicted  with  the  old  attitude  when  no  mistakes  were 
tolerated.  In  the  new  philosophy,  employees  were  not  to  be  afraid  of  making  mistakes  and 
if  they  did,  to  learn  from  them.  A  learning  concept  was  abroad,  although  not  universally 
accepted. 
Shell  is  still  in  this  enhancement  phase  although  Logistics  and  Procurement  remain 
separate.  Procurement  is  part  of  Finance,  and  Logistics  is  considered  a  technical  service, 
which  is  reasonable  from  a  hierarchical  organisation  point  of  view  but  illogical  from  a 
supply  chain  stand  point.  The  supply  chain  appears  broken  and  one  of  the  challenges  is  to 
close  this  gap. 
Logistics  provides  a  full  logistical  service  to  its  internal  customers,  the  combined  Brent  and 
Northern  business  unit,  as  well  as  Central  and  partial  support  to  the  Southern  business 
units. 
By  late  1998,  the  price  of  crude  oil  had  fallen  to  less  than  $14  dollars  a  barrel  (by 
comparison  it  stood  at  $20  in  1996)  and  in  December  1998  the  price  fell  to  an  all  time  low 
of  $8.  This  was  caused  by  a  combination  of  factors  including,  excess  production  world 
wide,  the  Asian  recession  and  the  prospect  of  a  slow-down  in  the  global  economy.  In 
November  1998,  the  Anglo-Dutch  Shell  oil  group  reported  a  56%  collapse  in  third-quarter 
net  profits  to  $841  (E497m);  a  forecast  far  worse  than  predicted. 
Mark  Moody-Stuart,  Chairman  of  Shell  UK,  promised  a  dispassionate  and  fundamental 
review  of  Shell's  extensive  asset  base,  pledging  that  the  company  would  use  these 
disappointing  results  as  a  milestone  and  catalyst  for  changing  the  group's  traditional 
consensus-driven  culture  (Financial  Times  p  22,  November  6  1998). 
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Corporate  determination  to  deal  with  long-term  under-performance  has  involved 
restructuring  all  of  Shell's  businesses.  Technical  services  have  responded  quickly  and  are 
working  to  reduce  budgets  by  setting  up  supply  chain  alliances. 
Seaforth  Maritime  -  logistics  operations 
Seaforth  operates  a  custom-built,  marine  supply  base  in  Aberdeen  Harbour;  the  principal 
port  servicing  exploration  and  production  activity  in  the  UK  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf 
The  facilities  include  the  following:  - 
9a  four-berth  base  with  a  total  quay  length  of  285  metres.  The  berths  are  accessible  at  all 
tides  and  have  a  minimum  water  depth  of  5.6  metres. 
multiple  and  simultaneous  loading  of  deck  cargo  and  bulk  materials 
supervision  of  operations  over  twenty-four  hours,  seven  days  a  week,  including  co- 
ordination  of  land  transport,  craneage  and  plant,  stevedoring,  agency  services  and 
communications 
Seaforth  Maritime  is  part  of  Halliburton  and  Brown  and  Root,  USA,  one  of  the  world's 
leading  offshore  energy  support  companies.  The  company's  logistics  division  provides  a 
comprehensive  range  of  onshore  services  and  facilities  for  offshore  operations.  These 
include  a  "one  stop  shop"  marine  support  base,  pipe  storage  and  handling,  short  and  long 
distance  trucking,  warehousing,  distribution  and  office  accommodation. 
Seaforth  began  as  an  engineering  company  twenty  seven  years  ago.  The  oil  market  crisis 
in  the  1980's  forced  Seaforth  to  reduce  its  asset  base  and  sell  its  fleet  of  ten  to  twelve 
supply  vessels,  releasing  DOOm  of  tied  up  capital. 
Haliburton  acquired  the  company  in  late  1993.  At  that  time  Seaforth  comprised  four 
wholly  owned  subsidiary  companies,  Seaforth  Logistics  Ltd  (SLL),  Seaforth  Marine 
Services  Ltd  (SMSL),  Seaforth  Kinergetics  Ltd  (SKL)  and  Seaforth  Ltd.  Seaforth's 
combined  turnover  was  about  120m.  Of  these,  three  subsidiary  companies  have  since  been 
sold,  wound  up  or  merged  within  other  parts  of  the  Halliburton  Organisation. 
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Up  until  1995  most  oil  companies  managed  their  own  logistics  and  Seaforth  sold  its 
customers  a  service  by  the  hour.  Efficiency  was  irrelevant,  in  fact,  the  more  inefficient,  the 
more  money  was  made  by  Seaforth;  it  was  a  "licence  to  print  money.  "  The  objective  was 
to  keep  trucks  and  men  on  the  job  for  as  long  as  possible.  The  longer  the  man  and  truck 
were  out,  or  the  boat  idle  at  the  quayside,  the  more  Seaforth  was  paid. 
Since  1996,  driven  by  Brown  and  Root  to  do  business  differently,  the  company  had  to  be 
transformed.  Contractors  and  the  oil  companies  alike  realised  that  the  industry  could  not 
sustain  existing  operating  costs  in  the  light  of  the  depressed  oil  market.  Nevertheless,  it 
was  difficult  for  Seaforth  to  sit  around  a  table  with  Shell  and  discuss  issues  unspoken 
previously.  It  also  required  a  major  shift  in  mind  set  on  the  part  of  the  oil  companies  who, 
up  to  that  time,  decided  matters  in  isolation,  as  though  they  were  a  cut  above  the 
competition.  Today,  everything  has  changed,  and  every  oil  company  understands  that  it  is 
doing  the  same  thing  to  the  same  end  and  as  a  consequence  vessels  and  other  infrastructure 
are  often  shared.  Entire  logistics  operations  are  being  contracted  out  for  the  sake  of  cutting 
costs. 
This  sea  change  was  forced  by  a  number  of  factors;  the  oil  crisis  in  the  1980's,  a  maturing 
industry,  aging  platforms,  changing  profile  of  production,  crude  oil  of  lesser  quality  than  in 
the  past  and  reduced  payback.  In  essence,  the  need  to  survive  and  to  continue  to  make 
money  drove  the  companies  to  consider  radical  cost  reduction  while  at  the  same  time 
maintaining  or  increasing  production  to  get  economies  of  scale.  Seaforth  is  now 
accountable  for  the  entire  logistics  process  on  behalf  of  several  oil  companies. 
According  to  its  own  marketing  literature,  today  Seaforth  Maritime  Limited  (SUEL) 
continues  to  develop  the  traditional  logistics  business  of  Seaforth  Logistics  Ltd  (SLL)  by 
providing  added  value  services,  structured  within  innovative  commercial  arrangements,  to  a 
growing  client  base.  In  particular  SML  employees  are  said  to  pride  themselves  in  their 
ability  to  operate  in  diverse  cultural  environments  that  require  flexible  management  styles. 
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Seaforth  Maritime's  current  turnover  is  about  123M;  more  than  double  that  in  1995. 
Margins  however  are  less  that  3%  and  this  together  with  an  austerity  policy  imposed  by 
Brown  and  Root,  which  discouraged  investment  and  replacement  of  assets,  has  resulted  in 
disappointing  financial  returns.  The  future  of  the  oil  and  gas  industry  in  general  depends  on 
achieving  greater  cost  effectiveness.  Seaforth  Maritime's  declared  business  mission  is  to 
offer  integrated  management  and  services  in  packages  that  reduce  interface  costs  and  lower 
overall  operating  expenditure  by  improving  the  efficiency  in  the  client's  supply  chain. 
The  overriding  motivation  for  Seaforth  to  be  part  of  the  new  Supply  Chain  Alliance  was  the 
attraction  of  securing  Shell  business.  However,  a  great  deal  of  time,  effort  and  resources 
have  been  committed  to  the  SCA  and  it  is  still  difficult  to  accurately  calculate  the  return. 
A.  A.  R.  Craib  Transport  Limited 
Two  local,  independent  Scottish  companies,  Aberdeen  Road  Runners  (ARR)  and  Craib 
Transport,  merged  in  January  1983.  Aberdeen  Road  Runners  was  an  oil  related  specialist 
that  had  developed  a  strong  customer  base  of  major  UK  and  European  players  in  the  oil 
industry.  Craib  was  a  traditional  long  distance  haulier  serving  the  paper,  food  and  steel 
businesses. 
By  constructing  a  custom  built  depot  at  Dyce,  Aberdeen  Road  Runners  had  over  stretched 
its  resources  and  was  advised  to  seek  a  partner.  ARR  and  Craib's  close  working  relations 
lead  to  their  merger  in  1983.  In  1985  Mr.  G.  Craib  bought  out  the  major  shareholders  of 
Aberdeen  Road  Runners  and  introduced  his  own  management  team. 
Since  then  the  company  has  grown  steadily,  from  a  fleet  of  about  25  vehicles  and  annual 
turnover  of  just  over  LIM  to  about  120  vehicles  and  a  LIOM  turnover.  In  early  1999,  the 
company  succeeded  in  being  awarded  a  substantial  non-oil  related  contract  that  will  double 
its  annual  turnover.  Nevertheless  the  company  directors  take  a  conservative  approach  to 
growth  and  concentrate  on  developing  infrastructure  in  their  Dyce  headquarters. 
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Craib's  commitment  to  quality  is  demonstrated  in  adoption  of  the  ISO  9002  and  working 
towards  the  BS  EN  ISO  1400  Environmental  Standard.  The  organisation  is  apparently 
concerned  to  control  the  impact  of  its  activities  on  the  environment,  to  undertake 
environmental  reviews  or  audits,  as  well  as  to  live  up  to  its  Investors  in  People 
accreditation. 
AN  OVERWEW  OF  THE  SUPPLY  CHAIN 
The  Supply  Chain  Alliance  (SCA)  partners  are  Seaforth  Maritime  Limited  (SML),  ARR 
Craib  Transport  Limited  (ARRC)  and  Shell  UK  Expro  (responsible  for  Supply  Logistics) 
who  is  also  a  customer  member  of  the  SCA.  Shell  Expro  made  available  the  physical 
assets,  which  include  the  Altens  (AOB),  and  Torry  Marine  bases  (TMB)  to  help  achieve  the 
SCA  objectives 
Altens  Operating  Base  (AOB).  AOB  is  a  36acre  site  located  four  miles  south  of  Aberdeen 
harbour.  It  has  four  large  heated  warehouses  providing  about  15,000  cubic  metres  of 
internal  storage  with  racking  and  25,000  cubic  metres  of  bulk  storage  as  well  as  Receipts, 
Dispatch  and  Central  Packing  areas.  In  addition,  there  is  40,000  cubic  metres  of  external 
storage  serviced  by  either  concrete  or  tarmac  roads.  The  site  also  has  a  centralised 
chemical  packing  facility  and  is  licensed  to  handle  waste. 
Torry  Marine  Base  (TMEB).  TN1B  is  a  secure  nineteen  acre  site  leased  from  the  Aberdeen 
Harbour  Board  and  the  local  council  with  a  165  metre  long  quay  dredged  to  a  depth  of  5.6 
metres.  There  is  access  to  a  further  berth  at  Woodacon  quay  which  is  120  metres  long. 
There  are  two  fixed  cranes  on  the  base,  each  with  the  capacity  to  lift  up  to  45  tons  and  with 
a  reach  to  any  part  of  a  vessel's  deck. 
TMB  facility  has  two  warehouses  and  a  Shipping  Office.  The  latter  houses  the  Marine 
Control  Department,  which  maintains  radio  links  with  Northern  and  Central  North  Sea 
offshore  platforms  and  provides  information  ranging  from  weather  reports  to  vessel 
positions.  A  Road  Transport  Control  'Centre  executes  and  monitors  road  transport 
requirements. 
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APPENDIX  VIIII:  BACKGROUND  TO  SUN  /  BBIKBYS  ALLIANCE 
Sun  Microsystems 
1991-1999 
A  group  of  graduate  students  from  the  University  of  California  and  Stanford  University 
identified  a  growing  demand  in  the  technical  market  for  powerful  computer  workstations, 
with  clear  graphics,  and  extensive  information-sharing  facilities.  They  founded  Sun 
Microsystems  in  February  1982  and  the  new  company's  first  big  breakthrough  was  a 
contract  signed  in  1984  with  ComputerVision  to  supply  hardware  on  which  this  company's 
CAD  software  would  run. 
While  Sun  Microsystems  does  not  make  PCs,  its  core  products,  based  on  the  UNIX 
operating  system,  are  workstations,  file  servers,  central  processing  units  and  related 
machines  all  of  which  are  aimed  at  the  high  volume,  data  transaction  market. 
The  market  jesponse  to  the  company's  products  was  enthusiastic  and  since  inception 
revenues  have  grown  substantially.  The  table  below  gives  an  idea  of  the  past  six  years 
financial  perfonnance  (year-end  June): 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Revenue.  $m  4.7  5.9  7.1  8.5  9.7  11.7 
Net  income 
$11000 
196  356  476  762  763  1,031 
Earnings  per 
share.  $ 
1.01  1.81  1.53  1.03  1.02  1.35 
hource:  1996,19979  1999  Annual  Reports 
Workstations  were  becoming  popular  at  the  time  of  Sun's  entry  into  the  market  and  the 
effect  of  this  movement  was  at  the  expense  of  minicomputers.  As  a  newcomer  Sun  was 
able  to  focus  exclusively  on  new  technology,  when  established  competitors  had  to  continue 
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to  support  older  systems  that  customers  were  reluctant  to  scrap.  It  also  concentrated  on 
building  strong  relations  with  valuable  clients  and  leading  software  developers. 
By  the  late  1980's  Sun  had  developed  a  faster  workstation  based  on  a  different  kind  of 
microprocessor  using  reduced  instruction  set  computing  (RISC),  and  scaleable  performance 
architecture  (SPARC).  By  the  end  of  1989  SPARC  was  the  most  popular  workstation  on 
the  market  although  by  this  time  Sun  had  outsourced  the  manufacture  of  processors,  by 
licensing  the  design  to  other  manufacturers  who  supplied  Sun's  needs.  By  1992  all  of  its 
new  workstations  used  SPARC  technology. 
Alongside  hardware  development,  the  company  was  simultaneously  ensuring  that  software 
was  available  to  take  advantage  of  the  enhanced  capacity  of  its  systems.  To  this  end,  Sun 
signed  an  agreement  with  AT&T  to  develop  an  enhanced  version  of  the  UNIX  operating 
system,  which  became  the  software  standard  for  workstations. 
In  1990  Sun  Microsystems  extended  its  target  market  beyond  engineers  and  designers  to 
include  other  commercial  users,  including  insurance  companies,  airlines  and  publishers.  A 
basic  system  was  introduced  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  lower  end  of  this  sector,  and  software 
publishers  were  persuaded  to  adapt  many  popular  programmes.  For  example,  Lotus  123 
ran  on  the  SPARC  system  and  this  broadened  its  appeal  in  the  commercial  market.  By 
1991  Sun  had  gained  3  8%  of  the  workstation  market  and  this  was  attributed  not  so  much  to 
the  speed  or  the  system,  but  to  the  open  UNIX-based  operating  platform. 
Birkbys  Plastics 
Birkbys  Plastics  makes  mouldings  at  its  Liversedge  headquarters  near  Leeds,  and,  since 
1996  in  Glenrothes,  Scotland.  '  The  company,  which  was  founded  in  1926  to  make 
telephones,  was  taken  over  by  Plessey  in  1982.  General  Electric  Corporation  (UK)  then 
bought  Plessey,  but  decided  that  Birkbys  was  too  remote  from  its  core  business.  General 
Electric  sold  it  in  1990  to  the  current  owners,  the  Japanese  Marubeni  Corporation,  which  is 
trading  company. 
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Birkbys  is  the  longest  established  thermoplastic  injection  moulding  company  in  the  UK  and 
it  offers  a  complete  service  from  product  design  to  JIT  manufacture  of  mouldings, 
metalwork  and  assemblies.  Birkbys  ships  to  eighty  locations  in  more  than  twenty  countries 
and  the  company  has  technology  transfer  agreements  in  Portugal  and  the  USA. 
Prior  to  1991,  Birkbys  sold  most  of  its  production  to  the  automotive  industry.  Today  its 
main  customers  are  Sun  Microsystems  (Scotland  and  California),  Ford  (worldwide),  Xerox 
Corporation  (worldwide)  and  Black  and  Decker  (UK).  Birkbys  main  suppliers  are  GE 
Plastics  and  BASF.  It  has  a  turnover  of  160m. 
Until  1996  all  staff  concerned  with  design  engineering  and  manufacturing  worked  at  the 
Head  Office  in  Liversedge  where  a  range  of  presses  mould  plastic  resin  to  designs  specified 
by  the  customer.  Sun  often  uses  Birkbys  design  expertise,  as  the  company  had  pioneered 
the  application  of  Computer  Aided  Design  technology  in  the  plastics  industry. 
Design  and  manufacturing  is  for  four  product  sectors,  European  automotive  (e.  g.  Ford  and 
VW),  Japanese  automotive  (Nissan  and  Toyota),  Consumer  Electronics  (Black  and 
Decker),  and  business  electronics  (Sun). 
The  company's  aim  in  1994  was  "to  become  a  world  class  manufacturer  in  our  field  by 
meeting  our  customers  standards  and  requirements.  " 
Birkbys  today  (1999)  has  preferred  supplier  status  with  Sun  Microsystems  worldwide  and 
Toyota  and  has  quality  approvals  with  respect  to  ISO  9001,  ISO  9002  and  Ford  Q1.  It  is  a 
certified  supplier  to  Rank  Xerox  and  to  Digital  worldwide. 
OVERVIEW  OF  THE  SUPPLY  CHAIN 
The  Linlithgow  plant  assembles  components  made  by  and  obtained  from  other  suppliers, 
and  Printed  Circuit  Boards  (PCB's)  made  in-house,  into  a  range  of  workstations  designed 
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by  the  parent  company  in  the  USA.  Each  Monday  the  corporate  supply  chain  team 
provides  Linlithgow  with  a  weekly  and  monthly  supply  plan  for  each  product  assembled  at 
the  plant.  The  buyer/planners  convert  this  to  material  requirements  that  are  passed  on  to 
suppliers. 
Frans  Maas  and  occasionally  other  freight  companies,  deliver  components  to  a  warehouse  a 
few  miles  from  Linlithgow.  There  the  parts  are  assembled  into  kits,  which  Frans  Maas 
transport  to  Linlithgow  to  replenish  the  assembly  lines.  Operators  take  a  kit,  assemble  a 
complete  unit,  and  pass  it  for  testing.  Once  tested,  units  are  passed  for  packaging  and  then 
dispatched  to  the  European  distribution  centre  in  Holland,  or  shipped  to  Japan  for 
distribution  in  the  Far  East. 
Frans  Maas  is  responsible  for  all  logistical  aspects  of  the  process  including  assembling 
parts  into  kits;  delivering  them  to  Linlithgow,  and  dispatching  finished  products. 
GE  Plastics  makes  plastic  resin  at  its  plant  in  Spain  and  Birkbys  moulds  the  resin  into  parts. 
These  are  then  assembled  with  other  components  to  make  the  chassis,  or  enclosure,  into 
which  Sun  installs  the  PCB's.  The  other  components  such  as  metal  parts,  cabl6s  and  power 
supplies  are  bought  from  sub-tier  suppliers. 
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